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PREFACE 
Prof. Dr. Jan Wouters 
Director, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies 
Jean Monnet Chair ad personam EU and Global Governance, KU Leuven 
This compilation brings together a number of the best papers that were presented at the 
interdisciplinary doctoral colloquium ‘The European Union as a Global Actor’ that took place 
on 8 May 2015. The colloquium was organized by the Leuven Centre for Global Governance 
Studies at KU Leuven, in co-operation with the Centre for EU Studies at Ghent University, the 
Antwerp Centre for Institutions and Multilevel Governance (ACIM) at Antwerp University, the 
Faculty of Law of KU Leuven and the Leuven Institute for International and European Studies 
(LINES) at KU Leuven, and with the support of the Flemish Government and the European 
Society of International Law. 
The colloquium – the programme of which is included as an appendix to this volume - came 
at a propitious moment. Establishing the European Union (EU) as a more visible, more 
effective and stronger global actor was one the key objectives of the Treaty of Lisbon, which 
had been in force for more than five years in the spring of 2015.  The EU had taken initiatives 
in many different areas of international law and relations, making the area of EU external 
action increasingly the subject of research in law and political science. Indeed, the study of 
the EU’s place in the world, and the way in which the Union seeks to influence international 
developments, is a topic of interest for a rapidly increasing number of doctoral researchers, in 
Belgium and throughout Europe. Too often, this research is dispersed and isolated, among 
different universities, among different departments and in different academic disciplines. One 
of the reasons we decided to organise the interdisciplinary doctoral colloquium of 8 May 2015, 
based on an international call for papers, was to bring together these researchers, from law, 
international relations and political science in order to discuss these issues. How do lawyers 
and political scientists assess the EU’s influence and role as an international actor? With the 
colloquium, we aimed to encompass different topics in this wide area of research, and give 
doctoral researchers in law and political science the opportunity to present and discuss their 
research in a conference style format. Senior speakers and discussants from the EU 
institutions and from academia interacted with more junior researchers.  
When introducing the conference on that 8th of May (just a day before Europe Day), I pointed 
to the topicality of the EU’s actions and position on the international scene. The European 
External Action Service’s (EEAS) Security Policy and Conflict Prevention Directorate was just 
hosting peace mediation experts from sixteen regional and international organisations in 
Brussels to discuss peace mediation as a key foreign policy tool; the  Advisory Group of the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) was meeting to discuss investment 
arbitration; and, in the beginning of the week the new Secretary-General of the EEAS, Alain 
Le Roy, had delivered a strong statement reconfirming the EU’s commitment to multilateralism 
at the United Nations General Assembly Thematic Debate on Strengthening Cooperation 
between the UN and regional and sub-regional organizations. Just a week before, the 2015 
Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty had begun its work, with the 
EU Delegation being led by High Representative Mogherini; the Commission and the High 
Representative had presented a new Action Plan for Human Rights and Democracy for the 
period 2015-2019; and the Council had adopted new conclusions on a review of the European 
Neighborhood Policy. In addition, EU foreign policy was facing a number of ongoing crises: 
the situations in Libya, the Sahel, Syria, Ukraine, and the issues of migration and the trafficking 
and smuggling of people across the Mediterranean. 
From the presentations and discussions at the colloquium, it became clear that the EU still 
has an important role to play in exporting its values and shaping the international order. We 
had panels on topics such as the EU as a social actor, as a sustainable actor, as a human 
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rights actor, and as a normative power. Despite the challenges facing the Union, we could 
see, throughout that doctoral day, how the EU continues to seek to shape and influence 
events, rather than just to respond to crises. 
Our Centre is grateful to Tina Van den Sanden and Jed Odermatt for their determination and 
steadiness – I would even be tempted to use a catchword that is very much à la mode today 
in EU parlance: resilience – in compiling and editing some of the most fascinating papers that 
were presented at the colloquium. We plan to organize a new interdisciplinary doctoral 
colloquium in 2018.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Jed Odermatt and Tina Van den Sanden  
The European Union has no shortage of internal challenges. With the European migrant crisis, 
the European debt crisis and inconsistent economic recovery, recent terrorist attacks in EU 
Member States, the surge of populist and nationalist movements and parties, and the 
withdrawal of the United Kingdom, all facing Europe, one may be forgiven for overlooking the 
goal, espoused in the Treaty of Lisbon, to establish the EU as a more effective and visible 
global actor. While the EU is confronted with such internal challenges, the need for the EU to 
play a role in the world is greater than ever. The European Commission’s White Paper on the 
Future of Europe1, which sets out the possible future alternatives for the European Union, for 
example, is not an entirely inward-looking document. It recognizes that addressing the EU’s 
challenges requires a broad-ranging and effective foreign policy. Many of these ‘internal’ 
issues, moreover, can only be addressed through more effective action at the international 
level. And while global governance institutions are under increasing pressure, especially in 
the light of waning commitment from the United States (as shown, for example, through its 
withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement) the European Union can provide support for 
the multilateral system in which these goals can be achieved.  
There continues to be a great deal of research examining and evaluating how well the EU has 
been able to live up to this ambitious goal. Political science scholars have discussed how well 
has the EU performed as a security actor, a human rights actor, an environmental actor and 
so on. The question is often whether, and to which extent, the EU has been able to influence 
international developments. Lawyers, for their part, have generally focused on the multitude 
of legal issues that arise from the EU seeking to play a greater role on the world stage. It 
recognizes that the EU’s ability to do so is often hampered by both political and legal 
complications, and presents ways in which the EU may overcome these hurdles. In this vein, 
the Department of European and International Law and the Leuven Centre for Global 
Governance Studies at the University of Leuven held a Doctoral Colloquium on the topic of 
“The EU as a Global Actor”. The event brought together doctoral researchers from Belgium 
and across Europe and from different disciplines whose aim was to assess the political and 
legal issues from a variety of perspectives. This Working Paper brings together some of the 
research presented at the Colloquium. 
The central issue that arose from this research is two-fold. On the one hand, the EU has set 
itself ambitious (external) objectives in several areas of global governance, such as in human 
rights protection, trade, health and development cooperation policy. Not only does the EU 
pursue an ambitious agenda, it also aims to establish itself as an ‘agenda-setter’ in these 
fields. On the other hand, legal and political barriers may hinder the realization of this 
aspiration. These barriers are caused, first, by the fact that the EU Member States remain 
highly relevant actors in their own right, both politically and legally speaking. The EU’s 
enhanced role on the world stage does not necessarily mean that this should come at the 
expense of the active participation of the EU Member States, however. Second, the internal 
division of competences and institutional set-up may create obstacles to the realization of the 
EU’s ambitions. This collection explores the ways in which the EU might seek to overcome 
these obstacles. The contributions combine analyses of discrete topics, all addressing the 
main question formulated above. The collection follows an interdisciplinary approach, allowing 
the volume to make an argument about how the EU can become a more effective international 
actor in different fields. 
                                               
1 European Commission, White Paper on the Future of Europe, Reflections and Scenarios for the EU27 
by 2025, 1 March 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/white_paper_on_the_future_of_europe_en.pdf  
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Steurs, Van de Pas, Delputte and Orbie address the main research question in the field of 
global health. They discuss a discrepancy between the EU’s aspiration to be an actor in global 
health, while the EU Member States have remained highly active in this domain. The question 
is not whether the EU is active, but to what extent a common EU vision on global health has 
emerged. Some Member States have their own global health strategies, and the conceptual 
shift from ‘international health’ to ‘global health’ has not emerged across all EU Member 
States. A comparative framing analysis of the global health policy documents of the European 
Commission and seven EU Member states aims to investigate the extent to which such a 
common vision exists. They identify the issues that might impede the EU having ‘added value’ 
in global health.  
Querci discusses the agenda-setter objective of the EU in the area of human rights protection 
and individual sanctions. The author argues that the European Union is one of the most active 
actors to issue individual sanctions, while firmly integrating human rights protection standards, 
initially mainly through the activism of European courts. Querci questions whether the EU’s 
approach to a human rights based adoption of individual sanctions may serve as a legal model 
for other legal orders. The EU’s action in the area of individual sanctions can also therefore 
be seen as a field where the EU is an international norm shaper and agenda setter. 
Saluzzo focuses on the legal complications that arise from the continued international action 
of the EU Member States, particularly with regard to international agreements. The EU 
Member States remain international legal subjects in their own right, and continue to enter into 
a range of international agreements with third states. Nonetheless, this right is conditioned by 
EU Membership. Saluzzo discusses how Member States are required to uphold the EU’s 
interests when engaging in legal relationships with third countries and international 
organizations, especially if that action were to affect the EU legal order.  
Moskvan discusses the internal scope and division of competences in the area of foreign direct 
investment, which since the Treaty of Lisbon falls under the exclusive common commercial 
policy competence of the Union. Nevertheless, the author argues that the limited and 
ambiguous scope of the competence, with the Member States retaining competence over 
important investment aspects and challenging the scope of the EU’s competence, might still 
form an obstacle to the achievement of a successful investment policy. The question of who 
is competent to conclude agreements in this field (the EU only, or the EU and the Member 
States) continues to vex EU lawyers, and was one of the key issues in the Court of Justice of 
the European Union’s recent Opinion 2/15 on the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement.2  
Van den Sanden addresses the discrepancy between the EU’s ambitious policy objectives in 
the area of development cooperation policy on the one hand and the difficulties with defining 
the legal scope of the area on the other hand. The EU pursues a coherent and comprehensive 
development cooperation policy, formulated as a multidimensional policy field. The legal 
scope of the EU’s competences is, however, governed by the principle of conferral, which 
requires the EU to act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it. The paper 
analyses how a balance is struck between these two principles by analysing the legal scope 
of development cooperation policy and its delimitation with closely linked areas, such as 
environmental protection and trade. 
The contributions demonstrate the wide variety of topics addressed and methods used by 
doctoral students studying the EU as a global actor. The authors not only point towards 
problems and questions, but also discuss some of the ways in which these challenges might 
be addressed and overcome. Steurs et al, for example, question whether a ‘division of labor’ 
might be appropriate in the field of health and development, rather than pushing for a common 
EU approach. Saluzzo focuses on the legal mechanisms that can be used to coordinate the 
                                               
2 Opinion of the Court (Full Court) of 16 May 2017, EU:C:2017:376. 
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external action of the EU Member States. Querci, Moskvan and Van den Sanden discuss how 
a balance must be struck between competing interests (the fight against terrorism and human 
rights) between different actors (the EU and the Member States) and between different 
external goals (development cooperation policy and environmental protection).  
The EU’s role in the world, and its relations with other states and international organizations, 
continues to be an important subject of discussion. These debates often focus on issues such 
as trade and investment agreements, especially in the light of certain political opposition to 
agreements such as CETA and TTIP in Europe. These contributions demonstrate how the EU 
seeks to be an agenda-setter in fields such as global health, development, climate change, 
and the fight against terrorism. However, it seems that the current discussion is less about ‘EU 
and the world’ but rather the ‘EU and its Member States in the world’. For the EU to be a 
successful and influential global actor, it must be able to find ways to deal with the issues that 
arise from the continued legal and political relevance of those Member States. This is 
especially the case when some, such as the United Kingdom, view that their international 
interests are best served outside, rather than from within, a European Union.  
10 
 
THE GLOBAL HEALTH POLICIES OF THE EU AND ITS MEMBER 
STATES: A COMMON VISION?1 2 
 Lies Steurs (1), Remco Van de Pas (2), Sarah Delputte (1) & Jan Orbie (1) 
(1) Centre for EU Studies, Ghent University  
(2) Institute of Tropical Medicine Antwerp and Clingendael, Netherlands Institute of 
International Relations, The Hague  
 
ABSTRACT 
This contribution assesses the global health policies of the European Union (EU) and those of 
its individual Member States. So far, EU and public health scholars have paid little heed to 
this, despite the large budgets involved in this area. While the European Commission has 
recently attempted to define the ‘EU role in Global Health’, Member States are active in the 
domain of global health as well. Therefore, this paper raises the question to what extent a 
common EU vision on global health exists. This is investigated through a comparative framing 
analysis of the global health policy documents of the European Commission and seven EU 
Member states (France, Germany, the UK, Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands). The 
analysis is informed by a typology of four ‘global health frames’, namely social justice, security, 
investment and charity. The findings show a mixed picture. It became clear that the conceptual 
shift from ‘international health’ towards ‘global health’ has not gained ground within the 
Member States. Consequently, there are also differences in how health is being framed. While 
the European Commission, France, Belgium, Denmark and Spain clearly support a social 
justice frame, the policy documents of the UK, Germany and the Netherlands put an additional 
focus on the security and/or investment frames.  
 
  
                                               
1 This manuscript builds on the working paper “International assistance from Europe for global health: 
searching for a common paradigm” (2012) of our colleagues Gorik Ooms, Rachel Hammonds and Wim 
Van Damme from the Institute of Tropical Medicine, Antwerp. We are grateful for their insight and 
advice, on which we could build our conceptualization and analysis. 
2 This manuscript was completed in January 2016.  
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1. Introduction 
During the past 20 years, health has increasingly gained importance on the global policy 
agenda. There has been an unprecedented growth in funding for health, several new 
partnerships and initiatives were launched3, philanthropic foundations such as the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation became key players, and health emerged on the agenda of high-
level fora such as the UN and the G8. This ‘global health revolution’ has also been 
accompanied by “a re-conceptualization of health as more than a technical, humanitarian 
concern and as relevant to the vital interests of states in security and economic well-being”.4 
A milestone has been The Oslo Ministerial Declaration, advanced by the ministers of Foreign 
Affairs of Brazil, France, Indonesia, Norway, Senegal, South Africa, and Thailand in 2006, that 
declares that ‘‘health as a foreign policy issue needs a stronger strategic focus on the 
international agenda’’.5  
The European Union has been trying to find its place in the growing global health arena, in 
addition to the efforts of its Member States.6 Health has always been an important issue in the 
development policy of the EU. In 2002 the Communication from the European Commission 
on Health and Poverty Reduction in Developing Countries established for the first time “a 
single Community policy framework to guide future support for health, AIDS, population and 
poverty within the context of overall EC assistance to developing countries”.7 While 
recognizing the “differing histories and experiences in framing development policy”8 of 
Member States, the increasing convergence of general development objectives was 
mentioned as an opportunity to improve coordination of EU Member States’ development 
policies and approaches in the health sector. Furthermore, the European Consensus on 
Development (2006) stressed the importance of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
with a specific focus on the health-related MDGs. Also in the EU’s health policy, more attention 
has been given to global health issues. In 2007, the importance of a European contribution to 
the global health debate was recognized in a white paper stating that “in a globalized world, it 
is hard to separate national or EU-wide actions from the global sphere, as global health issues 
have an impact on internal community health policy and vice versa”.9 
Recognizing that global health is influenced by several policy domains, the Directorate-
General Health, DG Development and DG Research initiated a consultation process with 
several stakeholders in 2009, which resulted in the launch of a Commission communication 
on the EU Role in Global Health in 2010.10 This document stated, “the EU should apply the 
common values and principles of solidarity towards equitable and universal coverage of quality 
health services in all external and internal policies and actions”.11 By focusing on universal 
coverage of basic quality care, health systems strengthening and policy coherence, it 
proposed a clear vision on global health. It was followed by Council conclusions12 and the 
                                               
3 E.g. GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance in 2000, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in 
2002 and the US President's Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in 2003. 
4 Fidler, D. P.(2009). After the revolution: global health politics in a time of economic crisis and 
threatening future trends. 2 Global Health Governance (2008/09), 2. 
5 Feldbaum, H., Lee, K. & Michaud, J. (2010) Global health and foreign policy. Epidemiol Rev 32; 86. 
6 Rollet, V., & Chang, P.(2013). Is the European Union a global health actor? An analysis of its 
capacities, involvement and challenges. European Foreign Affairs Review, 3, 309-328. 
7 European Commission. (2002). Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament: Health and poverty reduction in Developing Countries. Brussels, 2. 
8 Communication Health and poverty reduction in Developing Countries, 15. 
9 European Commission. (2007). White Paper -Together for Health: A Strategic Approach for the EU 
2008-2013 (COM(2007) 630). Brussels. 
10 European Commission. (2010). Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The EU 
Role in Global Health. Brussels. 
11 Communication The EU Role in Global Health, 5. 
12 Council of the EU. (2010). Council Conclusions on the EU role in Global Health. . Brussels. 
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establishment of a Global Health Policy Forum, bringing together several stakeholders to 
discuss a wide range of global health issues. 
The attempts of the EU to claim a role in global health are clearly linked with current debates 
on the EU’s role in development policy. The European Commission is not only an international 
donor in its own right; the EU also has a ‘federalizing’ role in coordinating and harmonizing the 
aid policies of its Member States. Since the 2000s, the European Commission has increasingly 
stressed this latter role, fostering European aims, European approaches and European 
actions in development policy.13 The Commission communication and Council Conclusions on 
the EU Role in Global Health of 2010, can thus be seen as part of these ongoing coordination 
efforts, specifically focusing on the health sector. 
However, despite the attempts to coordinate EU action on global health, Member States want 
to retain their influence on this domain as well. The Council Conclusions on the EU role in 
Global Health make it very clear that the stronger EU voice on global health should be 
endeavored “without prejudice to the respective competencies”.14 As development policy is a 
shared competence, EU donors have their own policies regarding (health) development policy. 
Furthermore, the conceptual shift from ‘international health’ to ‘global health’ (infra) has not 
manifested itself in the same way along all EU Member States. Like the European 
Commission, some Member States have released their own global health strategies (the UK 
in 2008 and 2011 and Germany in 2013). While these strategies are also the result of an 
interdepartmental cooperation, they might however not necessarily echo the central objectives 
of the 2010 Commission communication. As Member States remain important actors in 
development policy in general, and in global health more specifically, the question remains to 
what extent a common EU vision on global health exists. This paper therefore investigates to 
what extent an EU vision on global health exists. 
The relationship between global health policies of the EU and its Member States has so far 
received little attention among EU and public health scholars. The limited literature on the role 
of the EU in global health mainly focuses on the European Commission’s policy15 and on the 
representation of the EU towards the World Health Organization (WHO).16 The policies of EU 
Member States on global health have been largely neglected in literature.17 
Besides the European Commission, seven Member States were selected for our comparative 
analysis, namely: France, Germany, the UK, Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and Denmark. This 
selection is based on two main reasons. First, this selection comprises the largest EU financial 
donors in health. Second, by including northern, southern and central European countries, this 
                                               
13 Bretherton, C. (2013). Development policy. In C. B. a. M. L. Mannin (Ed.), The Europeanization of 
European Politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan; Orbie, J. (2012). The EU’s role in development: a 
full-fledged development actor or eclipsed by superpower temptations. The European Union: 
enlightened superpower in the making, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 17-36;  
14 Council conclusions, 3.  
15 Aluttis, C., Krafft, T., & Brand, H. (2014). Global health in the EU–a review from an agenda-setting 
perspective. Global health action, 7; Emmerling, T., & Heydemann, J. (2013). The EU as an Actor in 
Global Health Diplomacy Global Health Diplomacy (pp.223-241): Springer; Rollet, V., & Chang, 
P.(2013). Is the European Union a global health actor? An analysis of its capacities, involvement and 
challenges. European Foreign Affairs Review, 3, 309-328. 
16 Battams, S., van Schaik, L., & Van de Pas, R. (2014). The EU as a Global Health Actor: Policy 
Coherence, Health Diplomacy and WHO Reform. European Foreign Affairs Review, 19(4), 539-561; 
Van Schaik, L. (2011). The EU’s Performance in the World Health Organization: Internal Cramps after 
the ‘Lisbon cure’. Journal of European Integration, 33(6), 699-713. 
17 Gagnon, M. L., & Labonté, R. (2013). Understanding how and why health is integrated into foreign 
policy-a case study of health is global, a UK Government strategy 2008–2013. Glob Health, 9(1), 24 is 
a noteworthy exception. 
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selection covers a broad range of European approaches towards development.18 By 
comparing the policy documents of the Commission with these Member States, we aim to 
identify differences and similarities which might impede or strengthen the EU’s added value in 
global health.  
In the next part, we will provide more information on framing analysis and describe the 
typology of global health frames. Next, the findings of the comparative analysis will be 
discussed. Lastly, the conclusions will summarize the main findings and discuss some 
suggestions for further research.  
 
2. Typology of Global Health Frames 
Global health is a complex policy area which is understood differently by academic scholars 
and policy makers. For this paper, we will not stick to a strict definition, as the question on how 
different EU Member States interpret global health is an integral part of the research. An 
important discursive distinction made by several authors, however, is the one between 
‘international health’ and ‘global health’.19 The term ‘international health’ originates from the 
colonial period and is associated mainly with assisting developing countries in fighting 
infectious and tropical diseases. In contrast, ‘global health’ is understood as a broader 
concept, focusing on health issues that transcend national boundaries, the health impacts of 
deepened globalization for all countries (also industrialized countries), and the need for global 
action and solutions by a wide range of actors.20 
On top of the difference between ‘international’ and ‘global’ health, there are different 
perspectives on the main problems (and solutions) involving ‘global health’. In this paper we 
refer to these as global health ‘frames’. A frame can be defined as “an organizing principle 
that transforms fragmentary or incidental information into a structured and meaningful 
problem, in which a solution is implicitly or explicitly included”.21 Framing analysis has been 
used extensively in social sciences.22 More recently, it has also been used among EU-
scholars23  and global health scholars.24 Despite methodological and theoretical differences, 
                                               
18 Carbone, M. (2007). The European Union and international development : the politics of foreign aid : 
UACES contemporary European studies series. New York: Routledge; Hoebink, P.& Stokke, O. (2005). 
Perspectives on European Development Co-operation. Policy and performance of individual donors 
countries and the EU. New York: Routledge. 
19 E.g.: Bozorgmehr, K. (2010). Rethinking the “global”in global health: a dialectic approach. 
Globalization and Health, 6(1), 19;  Koplan, J. P., Bond, T. C., Merson, M. H., Reddy, K. S., Rodriguez, 
M. H., Sewankambo, N. K., & Wasserheit, J. N. (2009). Towards a common definition of global health. 
The Lancet, 373(9679), 1993–1995. 
20 For reasons of simplicity, the term global health is used in this chapter as an overarching term for 
both ‘internal’ and ‘global’ health. When referring to the semantic difference between both terms, the 
terms ‘international’ and ‘global’ health will be put between quotation marks. 
21 Verloo (2005). Mainstreaming gender equality in Europe. A critical frame analysis approach. The 
Greek Review of Social Research, 117,20. 
22 Entman, R. M.(1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. Journal of 
Communication, 43 (4), 51-58; Snow, D. A., & Benford, R. D. (1988). Ideology, frame resonance, and 
participant mobilization. International social movement research, 1(1), 197-217. 
23 Verloo (2005). Mainstreaming gender equality in Europe. A critical frame analysis approach. The 
Greek Review of Social Research, 117,11-34; Lombardo, E. & Meier, P.(2006). Gender Mainstreaming 
in the EU. Incorporating a feminist reading? European Journal of Women’s Studies, 13(2), 151-166; 
Daviter, F. (2007). Policy Framing in the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy, 14(4), 
654-666. 
24 Labonté, R. Gagnon M.L. (2010) Framing health and foreign policy: lessons for global health 
diplomacy. Globalization and Health 6:14; Shiffman, J. (2009). “A Social explanation for the rise and fall 
of global health issues.” Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 87, 608-613; McInnes, C. et al (2012) 
Framing global health: the governance challenge. Global Public Health,7, Suppl 2, S83-94. 
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these studies share the idea that the same issue can be framed differently by different actors, 
and that the way a certain topic is ‘framed’ also affects the proposed solutions to deal with this 
topic.  
Importantly, framing analysis pays specific attention to how actors and institutions frame 
issues in a particular way.25 We can expect that dominant frames will differ depending on the 
country, and specifically also on which institution within the country takes the lead in 
formulating a global health policy. Before the global health revolution, international health 
policy was mainly dealt with by the ministries of development cooperation, growing out of 
former colonial relations. However, the increasing awareness of Western states’ own interests 
in global health has ‘lifted’ the subject onto the agenda of ministries of health and foreign 
affairs. In a growing number of countries, a ‘whole-of-a-government approach’ is used to 
address a broad range of global health themes. Although policy documents rarely follow just 
one frame, the dominance of one or another frame may be linked to who had the biggest voice 
in the debate.  
Previous research has identified several ‘frames’, ‘perspectives’ or ‘metaphors’ of global 
health.26 To provide insights into the different policy discourses, this paper will make a 
distinction between four frames, namely social justice, charity, investment and security. 
Differences between these frames relate to four criteria: the purpose, main interest, 
commitment towards international health assistance (IHA), and the main focus (table 1). 
 Charity Social justice Investment Security 
Purpose Fight absolute 
poverty 
Reinforce 
health as a 
social value and 
a human right 
Maximize 
economic 
development 
Combat infectious 
diseases and contribute 
to social and political 
stability 
Main 
Interest 
Partner 
Countries 
Partner 
countries 
Donor Donor 
Commitme
nt towards 
IHA 
Ad-hoc, 
unpredictable 
Long-term Long-term Long-term 
Main focus Popular 
themes of 
victimhood & 
emergencies 
Health systems 
& primary 
health care 
Disease-
specific 
Disease-specific 
Table 1: Typology of global health frames 
 
                                               
25 Verloo (2005). Mainstreaming gender equality in Europe. A critical frame analysis approach. The 
Greek Review of Social Research, 117,11-34; McInnes, C. et al (2012) Framing global health: the 
governance challenge. Global Public Health,7, Suppl 2, S83-94. 
26 Kickbusch, I. (2011). Global health diplomacy: how foreign policy can influence health. BMJ, 342(d3), 
154; Labonté, R. Gagnon M.L. (2010) Framing health and foreign policy: lessons for global health 
diplomacy. Globalization and Health 6:14; Stuckler, D., & McKee, M. (2008). Five metaphors about 
global-health policy. The Lancet, 372(9633), 95-97;  
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The charity frame promotes health as a key element in the fight against poverty and prioritizes 
popular themes of victimhood such as mother and child mortality health and malnutrition.27 
Lencucha28 links the charity frame also with the periodic engagement with events such as 
natural disasters or catastrophic events that pose an imminent threat to the health of people. 
Just like the social justice frame, it refers to the interests of the inhabitants of the countries 
receiving health assistance. However framed as charity, international health assistance is 
voluntary, temporary and reactive.29 The amount of IAH depends entirely on the benevolence 
or generosity of the contributor, which makes it less reliable than the social justice frame. 
The social justice perspective aims to “reinforce health as a social value and human right, 
supporting the UN MDGs, advocating for access to medicines and primary health care, and 
calling for high income countries to invest in a broad range of global health initiatives”.30 It 
builds on cosmopolitan values that stress the importance of solidarity towards individuals at 
the global level, notwithstanding their nationality.31 According to this frame, the national 
government is not the sole body responsible for realizing the right to health for its population, 
as countries ‘in a position to assist’ bear a complementary international obligation as well. The 
level of the health assistance should be based on the needs of the country and aims to fill the 
gap between what the national government can provide and what is needed to realize the right 
to health. The funding is for a considerable part focused on health systems and primary health 
care. 
The investment frame considers health as a means of maximizing economic development.32 
It is not only concerned with the economic effects of health on the population of countries 
receiving IHA, but also with the result of a growing global market in health goods and 
services.33 Compared to the two previous frames, the investment frame thus marks a shift 
from other-interestedness to self-interestedness: if IAH contributes to economic growth, the 
donors will benefit as well, as they will be able to sell more products and services to the 
countries. This frame provides strong incentives for the continuation or even increase of IHA, 
but with a focus on the control of diseases that mostly affect people who are economically 
productive. 
Similar to the investment frame, the security frame is also self-interested, as it is mainly 
concerned with protecting donor countries’ own population. Global health funding can 
contribute in two ways to security: either by helping to contain infectious diseases in other 
parts of the world or by contributing to social and political stability (which might be at risk due 
to bad health conditions). The security frame motivates long-term action, following the logic 
that sustained support will ensure sustained national security.34 Nevertheless, security-based 
concerns lead to the focus being placed on infectious diseases. According to Rushton35 health 
                                               
27 Stuckler, D., & McKee, M. (2008). Five metaphors about global-health policy. The Lancet, 372(9633), 
95-97. 
28 Lencucha, R. (2013). Cosmopolitanism and foreign policy for health: ethics for and beyond the state. 
BMC International Health and Human Rights, 13(1). 
29 Lencucha, R. (2013). Cosmopolitanism and foreign policy for health: ethics for and beyond the state. 
BMC International Health and Human Rights, 13(1). 
30 Kickbusch, I. (2011). Global health diplomacy: how foreign policy can influence health. BMJ, 342(d3), 
154. 
31 Lencucha, R. (2013). Cosmopolitanism and foreign policy for health: ethics for and beyond the state. 
BMC International Health and Human Rights, 13(1). 
32 Stuckler, D., & McKee, M. (2008). Five metaphors about global-health policy. The Lancet, 372(9633), 
95-97. 
33 Kickbusch, I. (2011). Global health diplomacy: how foreign policy can influence health. BMJ, 342(d3), 
154. 
34 Lencucha, R. (2013). Cosmopolitanism and foreign policy for health: ethics for and beyond the state. 
BMC International Health and Human Rights, 13(1). 
35 Rushton, S. (2011). Global Health Security: Security for Whom? Security from What? Political 
Studies, 59(4), 779-796. 
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security could also be conceptualized in a less self-interested way, namely as a vital part of 
‘human security’, recognizing a broader range of threats and taking the individual/community 
as the primary referent object instead of the (western) state. However, the infectious disease-
focused and state-centric version of health security is used more frequently.  
Although we do not consider it as a separate frame, it is worth mentioning the concept of 
health as a global public good (GPG).36 Although there have been arguments that health itself 
for societal reasons should be considered a GPG,37 more recent literature talks about Global 
Public Goods for Health (GPHG). GPGH for health could include, for example, infectious 
disease control, universal health coverage, and mitigating climate change. GPGH is thus more 
of an umbrella concept that ties the several frames together, than a frame in itself. 
Our framing analysis was informed by the typology of four global health frames mentioned 
above. These frames were applied to the main global health policy documents of the European 
Commission and the selected donors (table 2). Except for the Netherlands, we found specific 
policy notes on external health policy. These can be sector strategies of the 
development/international cooperation department and/or ‘whole-of-government strategies’. 
For Denmark, we also analyzed the specific strategies for HIV/AIDS and sexual and 
reproductive health and rights, as the general health and development policy note mentions 
that the Danish development assistance in health is underpinned by these two strategies. The 
Netherlands does not have a specific policy note on global health, but the policy document on 
aid, trade and investment also touches upon external health policy. Table 2 provides an 
overview of the relevant documents. 
European 
Commission 
Communication on ‘the EU role in Global Health’ (2010) + 
accompanying working documents 
United Kingdom  Health is Global: A UK Government Strategy 2008-2013. 
UK government. Health is Global: An outcomes framework for global 
health 2011-2015. 
DFID Health position paper - Delivering health results. (2013) 
Germany Sector Strategy: German Development Policy in the Health Sector 
(2009) 
 
Shaping global health - taking joint action - embracing responsibility: the 
federal Government's strategy paper (2013) 
France Strategy for international health cooperation (2012) 
The Netherlands A world to gain: a new agenda for aid, trade and investment (2013) 
Belgium The Right to Health and Healthcare (2008) 
Denmark Health and Development, a guidance note to Danish Development 
Assistance to Health (2009) 
                                               
36 Kaul I. & Gleicher D.(2011) Governing global health: is Europe ready? Global Health Europe 
Research Paper No.3; Labonté, R. Gagnon M.L. (2010) Framing health and foreign policy: lessons for 
global health diplomacy. Globalization and Health 6:14. 
37 Woodward, D. Smith, RD (2003). 1. Global Public Goods and Health: concepts and issues in Global 
Public Goods for Health - A reading companion. World Health Organization. Retrieved from 
http://www.who.int/trade/distance_learning/gpgh/gpgh1/en/index15.html. 
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Strategy for Denmark’s Support to the International Fight against 
HIV/AIDS (2005) 
The promotion of sexual and reproductive health and rights, strategy for 
Denmark’s support (2006) 
Spain Health Strategy for Spanish Cooperation (2007) 
Sector-specific Action Plan for Health (PAS-S) (2011-2013) 
Table 2: overview of analyzed policy documents 
The documents were read, reread and analyzed using NVivo software. Codes were attributed 
to text parts which expressed arguments of the donor to invest in global health, for example 
‘moral duty’, ‘health industry, ‘protect own population’, ‘health as a human right’. Accordingly, 
these codes were linked to the four frames of the strategy. Additional information was acquired 
through an interview with a global health expert within the European Commission, as well as 
through some secondary literature on the policy documents.  
 
3. Findings 
3.1 The Notion of ‘Global Health’ within the EU 
Before discussing the results of the framing analysis, it is necessary to elaborate briefly on a 
finding that emerged through the selection of the above-mentioned document. Interestingly, it 
has become clear that the concept of ‘global health’ has been less dominant with the EU 
Member States than may have been expected. With regards to the distinction between 
‘international health’ and ‘global health’, the latter concept seems to have gained ground only 
in the policy notes of the European Commission, the UK and Germany. Their policy documents 
focus on the health impacts of globalization, the shared risks and threats and the need for a 
truly global action. Moreover, even within the documents of those countries that do refer to 
‘global health’, there is not a clear definition of what the concept means. Only the global health 
strategy of the UK is clear on this. The European Commission on the other hand, claims that 
“no single definition of the concept exists”38  and the German strategy does not elaborate on 
the meaning of the concept.  
What is special about the ‘global’ health policy documents is that they are developed by 
several Ministries or Directorate-Generals. Both the UK and the German strategy are 
presented as whole-of--government strategies. Within the UK, the Department of Health led 
an inter-ministerial working group for Global Health, which coordinated the development of the 
2008 strategy and would oversee its implementation.39 The group included representatives of 
a wide range of departments,40 with the Department of Health, the Ministry of Defense, the 
Department for International Development and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office being 
the most important. For the development of the German strategy, several ministries were 
                                               
38 European Commission. (2010). Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The EU 
Role in Global Health, 2. 
39 Primarolo, D., Malloch-Brown, M., & Lewis, I. (2009). Health is global: a UK Government strategy for 
2008–13. The Lancet, 373(9662), 443-445. 
40 The working group includes Ministers from the Department for Business, Enterprise & Regulatory 
Reform,  
Department for Children, Schools and Families, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 
Ministry of Defense, Department of Health, Department for Innovation, Universities & Skills, Department 
for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Home Office, HM Treasury, and the 
Northern Ireland Government. 
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involved as well, claiming that “the federal ministries involved already regularly share their 
information and experience on current and planned activities in the field of global health when 
needed, this instrument will be expanded”.41 However, it is unclear from the Strategy which 
ministries are actually involved. Bozorgmehr et al42 also criticized the lack of clarity on how 
the inter-ministerial collaboration would be effectively arranged. The Communication of the 
European Commission ‘The EU Role in Global Health’ was launched by three directorates-
general, namely DG Devco, DG Sanco and DG Research. These three DGs are also taking 
the lead in the further development of global health action of the EU as rotating chairs of an 
inter-service group on global health.43 The participation of other services depends on the 
specific subjects, but recurring services are DG Trade, DG Environment, DG Near, DG 
Enlargement, DG ECHO, and the EEAS.  
France takes a particular stance with regards to the concept of global health. As mentioned 
before, it was one of the seven signatories of the Oslo Ministerial Declaration on health and 
foreign policy.44 Nevertheless, the main policy document on global health is entitled 
‘international health strategy’. Despite stating that “the important pace of globalization has in- 
creased the cross-cutting nature of health threats and demonstrated the shared beneﬁts of 
universal access to quality care”, the strategy focuses only on the development aspects of 
health. The strategy can thus be considered as a sector strategy for international cooperation 
rather than a global health strategy, as it was developed by the Directorate-General of Global 
Affairs, Development and Partnerships of the French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs.  
Belgium, Denmark and Spain do not have global health strategies. They do have policy notes 
on the health sector, however, developed respectively by DG Development of the Federal 
Public Service for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, DANIDA (the 
Danish International Development Agency) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, and 
AECID (Agencia Espaõla de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo) of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. As mentioned already, the Netherlands does not have a 
specific policy note on external health policy. The policy note “A World to Gain”, that we have 
analyzed, was developed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
The fact that some countries have a global health strategy, while others only have a sector 
strategy, also impacts on the framing of the policy documents, as will be discussed in the next 
part. 
3.2 Differences in Framing 
When looking at the frames, we can make a distinction between two main groups. The first 
group includes the European Commission, France, Belgium, Denmark, and Spain. Within the 
analyzed policy documents, the dominant frame is social justice. The second group is 
Germany, the UK and the Netherlands. While the social justice arguments are present in their 
strategies as well, there is an additional, more dominant focus on the security and/or 
investment frame. 
3.3 Dominance of the Social Justice Frame 
The social justice frame is present in the policy documents of all donors. It is the most explicit 
in the documents of the European Commission, France, Belgium, Denmark and Spain. Firstly, 
                                               
41 German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (2009). Sector Strategy: 
German Development Policy in the Health Sector. Retrieved from 
http://www.bmz.de/en/publications/type_of_publication/strategies/konzept187.pdf, 41. 
42 Bozorgmehr, K., Bruchhausen, W., Hein, W., Knipper, M., Korte, R., Razum, O., & Tinnemann, 
P.(2014). The global health concept of the German government: strengths, weaknesses, and 
opportunities. Global health action, 7. 
43 Information based on an interview.  
44 Feldbaum, H., Lee, K. & Michaud, J. (2010) Global health and foreign policy. Epidemiol Rev 32; 82–
92.  
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these often refer to certain values. For example, the European Commission states “the EU 
should apply the common values and principles of solidarity towards equitable and universal 
coverage of quality health services in all external and internal policies and actions.”45 Also the 
Spanish Plan of Action46 mentions that the values of solidarity, equity and social justice, which 
are central in their domestic health system, should be translated in their international 
cooperation for health. The strategy of France mentions solidarity, human rights and aid 
effectiveness as the central values of their strategy, which are all three clearly linked with the 
social justice frame.47 However, the strategy does not elaborate much on the specific 
understanding of these values. 
Closely linked to this, these documents also often refer to health as a human right. This is the 
most explicit in the policy document of Belgium, which is entitled ‘right to health’ and focuses 
entirely on how to achieve this “inalienable right”. But the policy documents of Spain, Denmark, 
France and the European Commission also make reference to the universal right to health. In 
the Spanish Plan of Action it is stated that that “health is a fundamental human right and a key 
element for equitable and sustainable development, including poverty reduction, whose public 
responsibility is both locally and internationally.”48 For Denmark “the rights issue is key” and in 
the France document human rights are mentioned as a central value. Lastly, the EU’s focus 
on strengthening health systems should lead to ”basic equitable and quality health care for all 
without discrimination on any grounds as defined by Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.”49 
As we will discuss in the next part, the social justice frame also appears to a certain extent in 
the policy notes of the UK, Germany and the Netherlands, but the security and/or investment 
frames are more dominant in these documents. This seem to correlate with differences in 
institutional set-up, as could also be expected from a framing analysis perspective. In Belgium, 
Denmark, France and Spain, the sector strategy was developed within the development 
department only. Although the communication of the European Commission was launched by 
three DGs, there was only one commissioner taking the lead, which happened to be the 
development commissioner.50 
3.4 Additional Security and Investment Frames 
Within the German, the Dutch and British policy documents, there is a more vague 
combination of frames. The British ‘Health is Global’ strategy also fits the social justice frame 
in that it claims to aim to contribute to a ‘better and fairer world’ through a global health policy. 
However, as Labonté and Gagnon pointed out,51 the most prevalent objective of this strategy 
is to benefit the UK. One of the criteria used to determine the areas covered in the Health is 
Global strategy was “whether the UK stands to benefit directly from engaging in the issue, for 
example, where there are clear links to the health of the UK population”.52 Accordingly, there 
                                               
45 European Commission. (2010). Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The EU 
Role in Global Health, 5. 
46 Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación, Aecid (2007). Plan de actuación sectorial de 
salud vinculado al III Plan Director. 
47 French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Directorate-General of Global Affairs Development 
and Partnerships. (2012). France's strategy for international health cooperation, 5. 
48 Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación, Aecid (2007). Plan de actuación sectorial de 
salud vinculado al III Plan Director, 3. 
49 European Commission. (2010). Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The EU 
Role in Global Health, 6. 
50 Information based on an interview.  
51 Labonté, R. Gagnon M.L. (2010) Framing health and foreign policy: lessons for global health 
diplomacy. Globalization and Health 6:14. 
52 UK government. (2008). Health is Global: A UK Government Strategy 2008-2013, 18. 
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is a dominant focus on security and investment within the strategy. As mentioned in the 
foreword written by Gordon Brown, “global health is a question not just of morality but of 
security as well. […] the first duty of any government must be to ensure the safety of its people, 
but this can no longer be achieved in isolation.”53 Interestingly, the security arguments not only 
focus on protecting the population against infectious diseases, but there is also much attention 
on possible threats stemming from political instability elsewhere for the UK. 
“Poor health is more than a threat to any one country’s economic and political viability – it is a 
threat to the economic and political interests of all countries. Working for better global health 
is integral to the UK’s modern foreign policy.”54  
This quote illustrates that the focus is not only on political stability, but also on economic 
stability. This connects with the investment frame, which can be derived from two main 
arguments made in the document. Firstly, there are many references to the link between a 
healthy population and economic stability, productivity and growth. Secondly, the specific 
economic benefits for the UK health industry are stressed, with one of the objectives being 
“the enhancement of the UK as a market leader in well-being, health services and medical 
products.”55 The dominance of the security and investment frames was even more apparent 
in the 2011 outcomes framework, which aimed to “reassure the UK’s security and prosperity 
at home, and UK citizens’ interests overseas.”56 Furthermore, the brief reference to human 
rights, which was still present in the 2008 strategy, has disappeared. 
The German sector strategy of 2009 had a clear human rights approach. It explicitly claimed 
that “German development policy in the health sector pursues a human rights-based 
approach.”57 The German global health strategy of 2011 still referred to human rights and 
values. Nevertheless, in addition to the social justice frame, the 2011 strategy also witnesses 
security and investment frames. The security arguments are mainly focused on the protection 
against cross-border health threats, claiming that one of the goals of the strategy is to “ensure 
the sustainable protection and improvement of the health of the German Population”. The 
investment frame is clearly present when stating that “German health research and the health 
care industry […] can make an essential contribution to improving the global health situation”.58 
Since the Netherlands does not have a specific policy note on external health policy (see 
above), we analyzed the policy note “A World to Gain”. This document proposes an integrated 
agenda on aid, trade and investment. Consequently, it focuses not only on poverty reduction, 
but pays considerable attention to the economic and investment aspects. While combating 
poverty is said to be based on solidarity, the trade and investment focus are explicitly framed 
as self-interested (or at least an “enlightened” form):  
“We combat extreme poverty principally out of solidarity. We encourage trade and investment 
principally out of self-interest. Trade can provide an important contribution to growth. Where 
aid and trade coincide, we act both out of solidarity and enlightened self-interest.”59  
With regards to health, the Netherlands focuses only on sexual and reproductive health and 
rights. This is one of the four priorities of the Dutch aid policy, next to water, food security and 
                                               
53 UK government. (2008). Health is Global: A UK Government Strategy 2008-2013, 3. 
54 UK government. (2008). Health is Global: A UK Government Strategy 2008-2013, 14. 
55 UK government. (2008). Health is Global: A UK Government Strategy 2008-2013, 10. 
56 UK government. (2011). Health is Global: An outcomes framework for global health 2011-2015, 2. 
57 The Federal Government of Germany. (2013). Shaping global health - taking joint action - embracing 
responsibility: the federal Government's strategy paper. Berlin: The Federal Government of Germany, 
4. 
58 The Federal Government of Germany. (2013). Shaping global health - taking joint action - embracing 
responsibility: the federal Government's strategy paper. Berlin: The Federal Government of Germany, 
33. 
59 A world to gain, p.11 
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rule of law. On the one hand, it is claimed that the Netherlands invests in sexual health and 
rights “because these are fundamental rights”,60 which links to the social justice frame. On the 
other hand, however, the document states that the four priorities are also in line with the 
“Netherlands’ economic and other interests”61 which links to the investment frame. In a 
parliamentary letter on the new focus of development cooperation policy, the choice for SRHR 
as a priority was also underpinned by the fact that life sciences is an economic area in which 
the Netherlands excels.62  
Again, the institutional factor, namely which ministry is taking the lead within the countries, 
sheds light on these findings. The additional focus on security and investment in Germany and 
the UK can indeed partly be explained by the fact that several ministries were on the table. 
The Ministries of health and/or foreign affairs would have focused mostly on the security 
aspects, while the Ministries of foreign policy and trade would also be stressing the investment 
arguments. The fact that the former German sector strategy of 2009 does not focus much on 
investment and security confirms this analysis, as this strategy was only developed by the 
development departments. Similarly, the DFID health policy position paper of 2013 – which 
was developed after the ‘health is global’ strategy - again mainly focused on health as a human 
right without referring to the security interests or investment opportunities for the UK. This 
DFID strategy paper did however not replace the global health strategy, as “it stops short of 
being a full health strategy and so does not contain new policy or a full reflection of the whole 
of the UK government’s health investments in developing countries”.63 
 
4. Conclusion  
Global health has appeared highly on the international agenda over the past two decades. In 
addition, the EU and most of its Member States have been active in this area. The European 
Commission has been an important actor in global health, while at the same time common 
strategies for global health have been developed at the EU level. Nevertheless, Member 
States remain important bilateral players in this field as well. Against this backdrop, this 
chapter aimed to analyze to what extent a common ‘EU’ vision in global health might have 
emerged. In order to answer this question, we engaged in a framing analysis of relevant policy 
documents of the European Commission, the UK, France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Spain, 
Belgium, and Germany. 
Surprisingly perhaps, it became clear that the concept of ‘global’ health has not yet gained 
ground within the policy documents of all Member States. Besides the Commission 
communication on the ‘EU role in global health’, only two Member States – the UK and 
Germany – have issued a ‘global’ health strategy. Their strategies were developed through a 
whole-of-government approach, thus involving several ministries within the British and 
German governments. In contrast, the relevant policy documents of the other Member States 
were elaborated within the development departments. Taking this into account, the framing 
analysis has shown a mixed picture regarding the existence of an ‘EU’ vision. The documents 
from the European Commission, France, Belgium, Denmark and Spain clearly hold a social 
justice frame, stressing values and human rights. While the social justice frame is also 
apparent, at least to some extent, in the policy notes of the UK, Germany and the Netherlands, 
the security and/or investment frames are more dominant in these documents. 
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61 A world to gain, p.7 
62 Dutch Ministry of foreign affairs. (2011). Parliamentary letter presenting the new focus of development 
cooperation policy., 10. 
63 DFID (2013). Health Position Paper: delivering health results. Retrieved from 
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Based on these findings, we can conclude that the existence of an EU vision on global health 
is questionable. In case the EU wants to be an important actor in global health, there is a clear 
need for European policy-makers to engage more in deliberations on what exactly their global 
health policies imply. European Member States that still hold to a traditional ‘international 
health’ approach should consider the modernization towards a global health approach, in line 
with evolutions in global health thinking at the level of the EU, the WHO and other international 
institutions. However, countries engaging in a global health approach should ensure that 
interest-based motives (security and investment) do not out-balance social justice 
considerations. 
Further research is needed on several aspects. First, more research is needed in order to 
explain the observed differences between Member States. Why are the UK and Germany the 
only Member States with a global health strategy? How can we explain the differences in 
framing? This paper already mentioned the differences in institutional set-up as one 
explanatory factor, but other factors related to the domestic politics of these countries should 
also be considered.  
Second, more research is needed on the implementation and operationalization of the global 
health and international health strategies. We have only focused on a number of relevant 
policy documents, not on whether and how this may have been translated into political 
practice. More empirical research should be conducted focusing on whether and how different 
framings by Member States also translate into different political practice. Several case studies 
could be examined in this regard, for example, the EU and Member States’ approaches to the 
recent Ebola outbreak in West-Africa.  
Third, the results of our comparative analysis also raise further questions on the relationship 
between the EU and its Member States with regard to global health. While Member States 
remain important actors in global health, they also refer in their policy documents to the EU as 
an important actor in this field. While the EU is increasingly trying to coordinate European 
action in global health, it is not clear yet where these coordination efforts are leading. Given 
the diversity in approaches, a procedural ‘division of labor’ that acknowledges existing 
differences between the EU and its Member States may be more feasible than a ‘common’ 
EU policy. Future research could look into procedural coordination (e.g. a ‘division of labor’) 
on global health between EU Member States. A critical investigation of Brussels-based 
coordination mechanisms such as the EU Member States Experts Group on Global Health, 
Population and Development as well as the Global Health Policy Forum might be helpful in 
this regard, in addition to fieldwork on European coordination, division of labor and joint 
programming within developing countries.  
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‘EUROPEANIZATION’ OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: INDIVIDUAL 
SANCTIONS AS A CASE STUDY 
Isabella Querci 
 
ABSTRACT 
The European Union is one of the most active entities to issue individual sanctions in the 
international arena. These are featured in a unique, human rights-centered fashion, mainly 
through the activism of European courts. While political institutions of the EU now embrace 
human rights standards as judicially defined, the study addresses the question whether 
individual sanctions adopted by the EU may serve as a legal model in framing similar 
instruments in other legal systems. 
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1. Introduction 
Globalization consists, inter alia, in the emergence of a set of concurring regulatory 
mechanisms attributable to a very diverse range of subjects in an increasingly interdependent 
world. These entities are likely to compete with each other in order to increase their own 
influence and to profit from the ensuing benefits, such as market enlargement, stabilization of 
neighboring areas, the generation of political and operational support from other players, etc. 
The most influential actors on the international scene utilize deeply distinctive legal models 
and, therefore, their governance techniques tend to diverge sharply. As a consequence, their 
external activities rely on instruments of international relations that are differently designed. 
Indeed, in today’s plural world order, a different array of jurisdictions and levels of governance 
increasingly advance competing claims of legal authority.1  
From a historical perspective, human rights are closely connected with globalization, but at 
the same time, they raise the question about the foundation of globalization: is there a 
universal community or only economic and political power relations? The political use of 
human rights discourses is twofold: it serves both as a critique of power and as an extension 
of power, and the disclosure of this bifurcation helps with the understanding of the inner politics 
of human rights. Human rights are not a mere ideology but they may serve the same utopian 
goals that political ideologies once served: that of envisioning and hopefully creating a better 
and more equal world. At the same time, human rights have a surprising function in legal and 
political culture, that of creating, legitimizing, branding, or even expanding different 
communities.2 
The point that will be made in the present paper is that for the European Union (EU) human 
rights are one of the core values in its international relations and that the human rights-led 
approach that is a typical component of the EU’s external action is a distinctive feature capable 
of catalyzing profitable outcomes. Within external action-related measures, individual targeted 
sanctions are a particularly pivotal means: conceived initially at the UN level with the aim to 
avoid that the adverse consequences of sanctions would affect the entire population, as will 
be further explained, they are considered to focus upon the ‘delinquent rulers’3. In a similar 
way, they were soon to be issued also at the EU level and their issuance is invariably 
accompanied by strict human rights conditionality. It will also be maintained that the central 
role of human rights in crafting individual sanctions ‘made in the EU’ may amount to a legal 
model that is, to a certain extent, in the process of spreading on a global scale.  This paper 
will examine that issue by analyzing individual sanctions as a case study.  
Therefore, the paper aims to answer three, progressive questions: i) are human rights the 
leading principle of EU external action? ii) is the mainstreaming of human rights by the EU a 
feature in the sanctions regime? iii) can this approach be considered as a legal model and 
therefore be suitable for replicating? 
In order to answer these questions, the first section will deal with the analysis of human rights 
as an external action comprehensive principle, as far as the EU is concerned, and will provide 
an overview of the most common practices in this field. The second section will focus on 
targeted sanctions issued by the EU, in order to test to what extent the human rights 
component in the external action of the EU is actually relevant, both internally and externally. 
The third section, finally, will analyze some empirical data in order to assess if the European 
                                               
1 D Halberstam and E Stein ‘The United Nations, the European Union, and the king of Sweden: 
economic sanctions and individual rights in a plural world order’ (2009) 46 CML Rev 61. 
2 K M Simonsen, ‘The politics of universalism. Strategic uses of human rights discourses in early 
modernity’ (2013) 5 JAC 1. 
3 UNGA, ‘We the Peoples, The role of United Nations in the Twenty-first century: Report of the Secretary 
General’, 27 March 2000, UN/Doc A/54/2000 (Millennium Report). 
29 
 
model of individual sanctions is suitable for influencing - or even for legal transplant - in third 
legal orders. 
2. Human Rights in the External Action of the European Union 
The EU is an active international actor, despite the number of limitations that scholars have 
often highlighted.4 Also, thanks to its multilevel structure, a mixed supranational and 
intergovernmental character and its objective towards ‘pool and share’ approaches, the EU is 
demonstrating a growing proficiency in engaging in international scenarios and in self-
promotion in reference to other international actors. In this regard, the concept of actorness 
reflects the intra-EU dimension of the EU’s international interactions, which is the capacity to 
emerge as a cohesive, authoritative and autonomous player in the international arena and to 
become recognized by others as such.5 
The EU has widened its capacities in human rights protection, mainly through the activism of 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The binding force attributed to the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights since 2009 and the planned accession of the EU to the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms6 underline the EU’s commitment 
to human rights in all spheres. In the words of the ECJ, ‘the applicability of European Union 
law entails applicability of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter’.7 
Moving to the external perspective, although Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU do not attribute any 
specific competence to the EU in the human rights field, their inclusion in the Treaties supports 
at least a human rights-oriented interpretation of norms in external action matters, besides 
influencing (as it will be seen) a groundbreaking conception of international relations.  The 
above-mentioned provisions may appear, at first glance, to be mere political statements but, 
instead, they constitute a solid background for a wide range of normative activities and 
operational initiatives. Human rights, as described in the TEU, are an external objective and a 
policy at the same time. In this context, experts define the concept of ‘mainstreaming human 
rights’ as ‘a strategic process of deliberately incorporating human rights considerations into 
processes or organizations which are not explicitly mandated to deal with human rights’.8 
The EU incorporates human rights in its foreign policy in order to affirm its identity and employs 
them as a unique signature. Human rights are at the top of the European agenda because the 
                                               
4 According to some positions, the ‘high point in terms of political support for the creation of powerful, 
supranational human rights regime was reached in the early 1950s and …progress in recent decades 
has been much more hesitant and deeply contested’, see G De Burca ‘The Road Not Taken: The EU 
as a Global Human Rights Actor’ (2011) Am. J. Int. L., 3. For more references see, inter alia, H Bull 
‘Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’ (1982) 21 JCMS 149; S Fernandez ‘EU Policies 
towards Russia, 1999-2007’, in N Tocci, Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor?, The European 
Union and its Global Partners (CEPS 2008) 37; A Hyde-Price ‘Normative Power Europe: a Realist 
Critique’ (2006) JEPP 217; C Schneipers and D Sicurelli, ‘Normative Power Europe: a Credible Utopia?’ 
(2007) JCMS 2007; N Wright ‘The European Union: what kind of international actor?’ Political 
perspectives (Political Perspectives 2011) <www.politicalperspectives.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/PPVolume5-Issue2-2011-Wright-1_final.pdf>; K Brummer ‘Imposing sanctions: not so 
‘normative power Europe’’ (2009) 14 EFAR 191. 
5 S Blavoukos and D Bourantonis, ‘Do sanctions strengthen the international presence of the EU?’ 
(2014) 19 EFAR 394. 
6 As it is well known, Art. 6 TEU provides for legal basis for EU’s accession to the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR); nevertheless, the ECJ issued its Opinion 2/15, in which it expresses a 
number of critical issues in relation to the actual accession. Therefore, presently, the latter could be 
considered more a political will, rather than a legal accession procedure. 
7 Case C-617/10 Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, para 21.  
8 European Parliament, Human rights mainstreaming in EU’s external relations 
(EXPO/B/DROI/2008/66, 2009). 
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EU tends to call on human rights in order to increase its international influence and to shape 
the global context according to its vision of the world. 
The wording of Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU implies, in addition, a particular understanding of 
power, conceived as the ‘ability to make another actor to do what he would have not otherwise 
done’. 9 In the early 2000’s, notoriously, Manners qualified the EU as a normative power, i.e. 
a powerful actor due to the capacity to expand its ideas and shape the will of the recipients of 
such ideas through culture.10 Some scholars have argued that this kind of approach is radically 
incompatible with profitable economic arrangements or strategic interests.11 On the contrary, 
here it is maintained that, by setting external normative goals that are related to human rights, 
the EU does pursue economic and strategic interests as well.  The function of human rights in 
the EU is therefore what Etienne Balibar has called ‘a politics of universalism’,12 and as such 
their discourse is never neutral. Tensions exist concerning the proper understanding of human 
rights and especially their role within a community. Human rights are promoted from very 
specific power-positions and with specific political intentions that reinterpret the sense of 
human, cultural and political community.13 Reasons that have been formulated to explain why 
the EU would take up the role as a normative power include migration containment, market 
enlargement, the chance to have others relying on its legal expertise, the increased appeal of 
settling litigation in the EU etc. 
In brief, the EU employs human rights as a means to develop, consolidate and enhance its 
influence and competitiveness at the international level, i.e. to promote more effectively ‘its 
values and the well-being of its people’ (Article 2 TEU, emphasis added). Therefore, human 
rights in the EU’s external action fall in the category of normative goals, meaning that they try 
to shape the wider environment within which the EU unfolds and contribute to the definition of 
the EU as a human rights champion.14  
In order to pursue its human rights aims in its external action, the EU relies on several 
instruments: pre-accession procedures (so-called Copenhagen criteria), stabilization 
agreements, association agreements, neighborhood policies, conditionality clauses in aid 
agreements, promotion of specialized organizations, funding, demarche, economic sanctions, 
individual targeted sanctions, Generalized System of Preferences ‘plus’ (GSP+s), deployment 
of peacekeeping forces in post conflict situations, Certifications Schemes with violence 
clauses or consideration of human rights in formulating Impact Assessments.15 The remaining 
                                               
9 R A Dahl, ‘The concept of power’ Behav. Sci. 3 (1957) 201. 
10 I Manners, ‘Normative power Europe: the international role of the EU’ (Biennal Conference of the 
European Community Studies Association, May 2001). 
11 T Diez, ‘Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering “Normative Power Europe”’ 
(2005) 33 J Int’l St 613; T Diez, and M Pace, ‘Normative Power Europe and Conflict Transformation’ 
(EUSA conference, May 2007). 
12 E Balibar, We the People of Europe (Princeton, 2004), 34. 
13 K. M. Simonsen, ‘The politics of universalism. Strategic uses of human rights discourses in early 
modernity’ (2013) 5 JAC 1.  
14 N Tocci, ‘The European Union as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor’, CEPS Working Documents, 
2008/281 < http://aei.pitt.edu/7582/1/Wd281.pdf> As A Von Bogdandy argued, ‘human rights would 
determine rather than simply limit the European legal system and would move to the forefront of its 
institutions’ activity’, ‘The European Union as a human rights organization? Human rights and the core 
of European Union’ (2000) 37 CML Rev 1307. 
15 The literature on the topic is endless. For some reference, see E Morgera, ‘Protecting Environmental 
Rights Through the Bilateral Agreements of the European Union: Mapping the Field’, Edinburgh School 
of Law Research Paper No. 2013/23 < http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2273307>; 
B Brandtner and A Rosas, ‘Human Rights and the External Relations of the European Community: An 
Analysis of Doctrine and Practice’, (1998) 9 EJIL 469; European Parliament, ‘The impact of the 
resolutions and other activities of the European Parliament in the field of human rights outside the EU’ 
(EXPO/B/DROI/2011/17 2012); D Nougueras and DJ Linan, 'Human Rights Conditionality in the 
External Trade of the European Union: Legal and Legitimacy Problems’ (2001) 7 Colum. J. Eur. L. 307; 
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part of the paper will not deal with all these means but, instead, will mainly focus on targeted 
sanctions as a case study and will occasionally touch upon various other measures. Given the 
number of different instruments available, the Council has recently issued a comprehensive 
Action Plan,16 aimed at further implementing the EU Strategic Framework on Human Rights 
and Democracy, with sufficient flexibility to respond to new challenges as they arise. It builds 
upon the existing body of EU human rights and democracy support policies in external action 
and covers relevant human rights aspects.  
Before dealing with individual sanctions, however, it is worth briefly concentrating on two 
instruments that incorporate human rights protection standards in trade relations with 
developing countries:  the Generalized System of Preferences ‘plus’ and conditionality clauses 
which, despite their shared objective, have distinctive rationales and tend to operate rather 
differently.17 These tools represent the backdrop against which one may evaluate the activism 
in sanctions issuance by the EU, with reference to human rights situations. 
The Generalized System of Preferences “Plus” constitute a specification of the Preferential 
Trade Agreements cluster of waivers created within the WTO system, under which developed 
countries allow preferential tariffs to imports from developing countries.18 These are granted 
to countries that ratify and implement international conventions relating to human and labor 
rights, environmental protection and good governance. Conditionality clauses in EU 
international agreements, on the other hand, grant the EU the power to suspend its treaty 
relations with other states in the event of human rights violations within that state.19 The 
“extraterritorial” promotion and protection of human rights is therefore pursued by the EU as a 
form of incentive, illustrated in the former example, since beneficiary countries that comply 
with human rights norms are entitled to benefits,20 and through a sanctioning mechanism in 
the latter, under which treaty-based preferences may be withdrawn when a contracting party 
fails to comply with the relevant standards.21 Based on two cases in which preferences were 
withdrawn by the EU (Myanmar22 and Belarus23), scholars24 concluded that these incentives 
had little impact on the exports of the two countries, since both of them are strongly supported 
                                               
M Nowak, ‘European Human Rights Mechanisms in Comparison with the US’ (2011) Austrian Review 
of International and European Law 7. 
16 General Secretariat of the Council, ‘Council Conclusions on the Action Plan on Human Rights and 
Democracy 2015 - 2019’ (10875/15 2015). 
17 T Cottier, J Pauwelyn and E Burgi, Human rights and international trade (OUP 2005). 
18 see D Kleimann, ‘EU preferential trade agreements: commerce, foreign policy and development 
aspects’, CADMUS Working Paper 2013 < http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/27661/EU-
Preferential-Trade-Agreements.pdf?sequence=6> and the literature there reported. 
19The policy of the EU to include human rights conditionality clauses in its international agreements is 
virtually unique. For more details, reference can be made to Directorate-General for External Policies 
of the Union, ‘The application of human rights conditionality in the EU’s bilateral trade agreements and 
other trade agreements with third countries’ (EXPO-B-INTA-2008-57 2008). See also L Bartels, Human 
rights conditionality in the EU’s international agreements (OUP 2005).  
20As an example, on 23 February 2015 the Council has repealed the measures limiting the European 
Union's cooperation with Guinea-Bissau. This comes in the wake of credible elections in 2014, the 
restoration of constitutional order and the country's progress in putting into practice reform commitments 
made to the EU. Therefore, the EU fully resumes cooperation with Guinea-Bissau.  
21European Parliament, ‘The impact of the resolutions and other activities of the European Parliament 
in the field of human rights outside the EU’ (EXPO/B/DROI/2011/17 2012). 
22 Council Regulation (EC) 552/97 temporarily withdrawing access to generalized tariff preferences from 
the Union of Myanmar [1997] OJ L 085, 27/03/1997. 
23 Council Regulation (EC) 1933/2006 temporarily withdrawing access to the generalized tariff 
preferences from the Republic of Belarus [2006] OJ L 405, 30.12.2006. 
24 W Zhou and L Cuyvers, ‘Linking international trade and labour standards: the effectiveness of 
sanctions under the European Union’s GSP’ (2011) 45 J. World Trade 63-85; B Kerremans and J Orbie, 
‘The social dimension of European Union Trade Policies’ (2009) 14 EFAR 629-641; J Orbie and L 
Tortell,  ‘The new GSP+ beneficiaries: ticking the box or truly consistent with ILO findings?’ (2009) 14 
EFAR 663-681. 
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by two powerful countries, China and Russia respectively. As a consequence, the EU’s 
incentives had little influence on non-economic goals, such human rights. The same criticism 
appears to apply to other means of human rights promotion enacted in the field of the EU’s 
external action.25 
Recent events provide several examples, which demonstrate the interaction among different 
instruments. Indeed, in several contexts, the EU adopted individual sanctions as part of a 
wider framework of foreign policy initiatives. While in some of them, for instance Myanmar, the 
primary concern was the promotion of human rights and democracy, in others, as for instance 
in the case of Iran, the main objective was to fight illegal nuclear activities undertaken by the 
government. In the latter case, human rights became relevant as a secondary objective 
pursued by the EU in the country, although strictly related to the main task of contrasting 
nuclear proliferation. Furthermore, as a reaction against acts of violence, repression, and 
serious human rights violations in Burundi, and following President Nkurunziza’s 
announcement that he intended to run for a third term, the EU issued targeted sanctions.26 
Almost at the same time, the Council27 triggered Article 96 of the EU-ACP Partnership 
Agreement. This norm - in the event of failure to respect essential elements of the Agreement 
namely human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law- constitutes the basis for 
political consultations in order to remedy the non-respect of the agreement. In the event that 
the consultations fail, the EU could possibly take a further step and call upon Article 97 of the 
same agreement, providing the legal basis for the suspension of the Cotonou Agreement in 
cases where one of the parties feels that the agreement’s essential and fundamental elements 
are not being respected. Inasmuch as theoretical analysis is concerned, the answer to the first 
question that this paper aims to tackle, that is ‘are human rights the leading principle of EU’s 
external action?’ may well be affirmative.28 
The mission civilisatrice29 of the EU, however, receives criticism for being imperialistic,30 
because it ‘imposes’ regulatory standards that incidentally favor European interests. Such a 
view is, at least, partially true. However, third parties might be able to attain higher human 
rights standards, while also benefitting from trade opportunities, common infrastructures, 
interconnection of transport networks, joint tackling of security and environmental threats.31 
As already indicated, at the same time the EU openly declares that the aim of its global agenda  
is ‘promoting the European interest’ and ‘making the EU a dynamic, competitive, knowledge 
                                               
25 D D'Hollander, A Marx and J Wouters, ‘Integrating Human Rights in EU Development Cooperation 
Policy: Achievements and Challenges’ Frame Working Paper 134/2014 
<http://www.coris.uniroma1.it/sites/default/files/integrating%20human%20rights%20in%20EU%20dev
elopment%20cooperation.pdf>. 
26 Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1763 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in 
Burundi  [2015] OJ L 257/1. 
27 Letter from ACP Working Party To the Permanent Representatives Committee/Council, on Opening 
of consultations with Burundi under Article 96 of the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, 13105/15, 16 
October 2015. 
28 With reference to the implementation phase, the answer is much less univocal, though, as 
demonstrated by recent analytical studies: K Starl, et al, ‘Baseline Study on Human Rights Indicators 
in the Context of the European Union’ Frame Working Paper 1/2015 <http://www.fp7-frame.eu/wp-
content/materiale/reports/12-Deliverable-13.1.pdf>. See also A Timmer, et al, ‘Critical analysis of the 
EU’s conceptualisation and operationalisation of the concepts of human rights, democracy and rule of 
law’ Frame Working Paper 2/2014 < http://www.fp7-frame.eu/wp-content/materiale/reports/10-
Deliverable-3.2.pdf>. 
29 S Wood, ‘European Union: A Normative or Normal Power’ (2009) 14 EFAR 113. 
30 J Zielonka, ‘Europe as a global actor: empire by example?’ (2008) 84 Int'l Aff. 480. 
31 Nevertheless quite a number of contradictory evidences exists, e.g. India and Brazil made it 
impossible for Europe and US to include core labor and environmental standards on the multilateral 
trade agenda. 
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based society’, as envisaged in the Lisbon strategy for growth and jobs.32 Human rights 
protection and promotion in the external action of the EU is a strategic concept, capable of 
enhancing the competitive position of institutional and private representatives of the EU and 
of defending the set of European social preferences.33  
The remaining part of the paper is built upon the assumption that human rights are a priority 
across-the-board for the EU and at the heart of its strategic agenda. The following sections 
investigate the possible answer(s) to the second and third questions i.e. is the mainstreaming 
of human rights by the EU a feature of the sanctions regime? Can this approach be considered 
as a legal model and therefore be suitable for replicating? Individual sanctions constitute an 
excellent case study in order to verify if the European “legal model” of extraterritorial promotion 
of human rights is actually on its way to being disseminated, as these sanctions are a 
(relatively) new product of social engineering in the international sphere and are currently 
adopted by the majority of relevant international actors. 
 
3. Individual sanctions and human rights in the European Union: 
case study 
Individual sanctions are more and more frequently adopted because their deployment reduces 
collateral effects of other ‘conditionality’ activities. Authors have referred to the ‘humanitarian 
cost’34 related to traditional sanctioning mechanisms; in fact, these often imply a lowering of 
the quality of life for the citizens of the recipient States. On the one hand, economic sanctions 
and all forms of trade and aid restrictions entail coercion in order to modify the target State’s 
cost-benefit calculation of pursuing a certain policy, while the relevant costs (economic as well 
as social) are  deemed to burden civil society.  Individual (or “smart”, or targeted) sanctions, 
on the other hand, aim at changing the policy of a third country by putting pressure upon 
specific individuals. Relevant policies include the failure to respect the rule of law or 
democratic principles or international law in general, including human rights.35 Individual 
sanctions directed towards specific natural or legal persons were first adopted by the United 
Nations Security Council36 (UNSC) in the 1990s and the EU has embarked upon similar 
policies ever since.   
Seen from the point of view of their addressee, the EU issues two different types of individual 
sanctions. The first type targets governing elites of specific countries, whilst the second is not 
                                               
32 The European Interest: succeeding in the age of globalization – Communication from the Commission 
to the Parliament, Brussels 3rd October 2007, COM(2007), pp. 2-6. 
33J Zielonka, ‘Europe as a global actor: empire by example?’ (2008) 84 Int'l Aff. 480. 
34 M Craven, ‘Humanitarianism and the Quest for Smarter Sanctions’ (2002) 13 Eur. J. Int'l L. 45. 
35 European Commission – Restrictive measures, 2008, available at 
http://eeas.europa.eu/index_en.htm. 
36 In Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, published in January 1995, Secretary General Boutros Ghali 
called sanctions ‘a blunt instrument.’ They raise the ethical question of whether suffering inflicted on 
vulnerable groups in the target country is a legitimate means of exerting pressure on political leaders 
whose behavior is unlikely to be affected by the plight of their subjects. In a Security Council debate on 
January 19, 1995, Ambassador N. Rodrigo of Sri Lanka concurred, saying that decisions must take 
better account of the sanctions' impact on ordinary people and must seek to avoid the ‘suffering of the 
innocent’. Although the Security Council first recognized in resolution 326 (1973) ‘the special economic 
hardships’ confronting a member state (Zambia) as a result of the comprehensive sanctions imposed 
on Southern Rhodesia, it was only in 1995 that all permanent members definitively recognized that 
‘further collective actions in the Security Council within the context of any future sanctions regime should 
be directed to minimize unintended adverse side-effects of sanctions on the most vulnerable segments 
of targeted countries’ (S/1995/300). While resolving intrastate conflict remains a common objective, 
there has also been a trend toward using targeted sanctions for other purposes: nonproliferation, 
counter-terrorism, democratization, protection of civilians and human rights. 
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geographically defined, because it focuses on specific phenomena (e.g. terrorism), regardless 
of the addressees’ nationality and political status. Another distinction can be drawn based on 
the relevant international context in which the EU imposes sanctions. In fact, the EU may 
implement UNSC-sourced sanctions, provide its own lists of targeted individuals or, finally, in 
implementing UNSC sanctions, it can possibly add other persons as recipients, according to 
its own (rectius, the Member States’) intelligence activities. 
From now on, within the present paper, unless otherwise stated, “sanctions” shall be used as 
meaning individual sanctions. Furthermore, only measures ex Article 215(2) TFEU will be 
hereinafter considered.  
The next section explores the role of human rights in the deployment of individual sanctions 
by the EU. This relationship, under EU law, is twofold: from an “internal” perspective, human 
rights are one of the standards for legislative action and judicial review. From an “external” 
perspective, the EU adopts sanctions (also) in relation to human rights violations committed 
outside its jurisdiction. 
 
3.1 The Internal Perspective: Human Rights as a Possible Ground for the Annulment of 
Sanctions 
The ECJ applies very high standards when it comes to the assessment of the legitimacy of 
EU acts with regard to compliance with human rights, despite the peculiarity of former 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) norms,37 the limited judicial review applied by 
the ECJ, pursuant to Article 275(2) TFEU. The express derogation to the rule of exclusion of 
ECJ jurisdiction in CFSP matters ex Article 24 TEU - in circumstances under which the review 
of legality of decisions for which restrictive measures against natural or legal persons adopted 
by the Council is required - by itself seems to highlight the importance of human rights in the 
EU legal order. 
The famous Kadi38 saga established the primacy of fundamental rights and freedoms over 
security and the prevalence of EU obligations (now grounded in the EU Charter for 
Fundamental Rights) over those that Member States subscribed to when they adhered to the 
UN Charter (with particular regard to Article 103, establishing the prevalence of UN law over 
conflicting national provisions). More specifically, relevant human rights are the ‘judicial 
protection cluster’ of rights39: in Kadi, the ECJ stated that the applicant who aims to annul its 
entry in a sanction list benefits from ‘in principle full judicial review’40 by the EU Courts - despite 
the confidential nature of the evidence provided for the listing initiatives - and that (s)he has 
the right to be informed and heard at any stage of the sanctioning process.  
The consequences, with regard to the drafting of black lists, are significant. First, the Council 
must ensure high standards of transparency and accountability, a feature that is not to be 
taken for granted in a body operating according to the intergovernmental method. Secondly, 
meeting such requirements may hamper the correct and prompt implementation of UNSC 
resolutions. Especially in a sensitive field such as targeted sanctions, the threat of ‘judicially 
enforced non-compliance’ with UN resolutions is likely to interfere with the very functioning of 
the UN sanctions mechanism. To some degree this turned the EU into more of an actor on its 
                                               
37 As widely known, ECJ’s scrutiny is usually excluded over the former CFSP pillar.  
38 Joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities [2008] 
ECR I-06351 and Joined cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P European Commission and 
Others v Yassin Abdullah Kadi ECLI:EU:C:2013:518. 
39 As per Title VI of EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
40Kadi case, para 326. 
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own in the field of sanctions, rather than a mere implementing body; an actor more true to its 
declared policy of fighting terrorism whilst respecting human rights.41 
With regard to the transnational reach of European human rights policy, and its possible 
negative impact on the coherence of multilateral actions, the United States (US) government 
expressed its ‘increasing concern about the weaknesses in the European sanctions 
mechanisms’.42 Such ‘weaknesses’ relate to the paramount role played by human rights in EU 
law, stressing the distance between the EU and US governance techniques when it comes to 
human rights. This is even more evident when comparing the ECJ decision to annul the 
regulation blacklisting Mr. Kadi, and one of the US District Court for the District of Columbia 
that in 2012 had dismissed the same claim. According to the US court, the relevant evidence 
gave sufficient reason to believe that Mr. Kadi had provided support to terrorists or people 
associated with them.43 It is not by chance that the use of secret evidence made available to 
the courts and to those who are listed is one of the most contentious aspects in this field.  
In this regard, the EU appears to be at the forefront. Reference is made to the recent 
amendment of the procedural rules in the EU General Court, defined as part of adapting to 
jurisprudential reality after the Kadi judgment.44 Article 105 of the Rules45 sets out new 
procedures for the treatment of confidential information or material pertaining to the security 
of the EU or of its Member States or to the conduct of their international relations, and the 
exceptions to the adversarial principle that may arise as a result, in compliance with the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. Indeed, a recent study published by the Directorate-General 
for External Policies of the EU compared the two approaches regarding human rights and its 
overall conclusion seems to be that the EU is more willing than the US to incur costly sacrifices 
in order to pursue its human rights policy.46  
Recent European case law provides many examples of such costs. In the B and D47 judgment 
the ECJ took the rather surprising view that being blacklisted does not preclude, in principle, 
the enjoyment of individual rights, such as those associated to the status of refugee under 
Directive 2004/83/CE,48 which were therefore granted to the applicants despite their alleged 
                                               
41 P Eeckhout, ‘Kadi and the EU as instrument or actor. Which rule of law for counter terrorism?’ in M 
Cremona, J Monar and S Poli, The external dimension of the European Union’s Area of Freedom 
Security and Justice (Peter Lang-P.I.E. 2011). 
42 L Normann, ‘US weights in on problems with EU sanctions regime’ The Wall Street Journal (30 
January 2015). 
43 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Timothy Geithner, (United States District Court for the district of Columbia, 
19 March 2012). The decision also left open the question of whether or not Mr. Kadi had sufficient 
financial ties to the U.S. to require due process protections, while the same safeguards in EU do not 
depend on nationality as they are applied as a default rule. On 11 September 2014, US Office of Foreign 
Assets Control (OFAC) unblocked the property and interests in property of Mr. Kadi pursuant to E.O. 
13224, ‘Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons Who Commit, Threaten to commit, 
or Support Terrorism’. This removal was due because of the removal of Mr. Kadi’s name in UN’s lists. 
44 HD Lidington MP, UK Justice, Institutions and Consumer Protection Sub-Committee, available at 
http://www.parliamentlive.com. 
45 Entered into force on 1 July 2015. 
46 Directorate-General for External Policies of the European  Union, ‘A Comparative Study of EU and 
US Approaches to Human Rights In External Relations’ (EXPO/B/DROI/2014/27 2014). 
47 Joined cases C-57/09 and C-101/09 Bundesrepublik Deutschland v B and D ECR 2010 I-10979.  
48 Council Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country 
nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection 
and the content of the protection granted [2004] OJ L 304. This directive was repealed by directive 
2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the 
qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, 
for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of 
the protection granted [2011] OJ L 337.  
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membership of the PKK.49 The same finding was reached by another judgment, with reference 
to the residency permit of a third country national whose name was blacklisted: in a preliminary 
ruling the Court stated that ‘the refoulement of a refugee (…) is only the last resort a Member 
State may use where no other measure is possible or is sufficient for dealing with the threat 
that that refugee poses to the security or to the public of that Member State’.50 It is therefore 
important to verify, on a case-by-case basis, whether the acts of the organization in question 
can endanger national security or public order.51 In the EU, the mere fact that the refugee 
supported a blacklisted organization cannot automatically mean that that person’s residence 
permit has to be revoked.52 
The Safa Nicu53 judgment, delivered by the General Court in November 2014 represents 
another recent example of costly human rights policies pursued by the EU. The applicant, an 
Iranian company, obtained compensation as a result of the Council’s failure to provide 
adequate evidence for including it in a black list. This case is presently under the scrutiny of 
the Court, whose final decision may open a Pandora’s box of compensation claims, 
considering the great number of pending cases. 
Empirical analysis demonstrates that the issuance of sanctions by the EU leads to a 
considerable amount of litigation: in the relevant period between 1 January 2015 and 7 
October 2015, 75 judicial proceedings were considered by the ECJ on the topic of the relation 
between human rights and sanctions. The number of annulments (12) is now smaller than the 
number of rejected applications of the same kind (23). Furthermore, every request for interim 
relief (5) was dismissed.  Nevertheless, many (29) proceedings are (as of 7 October 2015) still 
pending. They cover different questions. 
First, some of the decisions continue to be based on the violation of Article 47 of the Charter 
of Fundamental rights. This is the case of Dynamo-Minsk,54 where the General Court held that 
being a leading businessman in a country (Belarus, in this case), upon who individual 
sanctions  had been issued is not enough by itself to show that the applicant provided financial 
support to the regime nor that he perpetrated any human rights violation, and that the Council 
had not put forward sufficient evidence that he did. Furthermore, the General Court delivered 
its first judgment55 on the EU’s targeted sanctions regime concerning Ukrainians allegedly 
responsible for misappropriation of State funds. Mr Portnov’s listing was annulled because, 
while the Council stated that an investigation into Mr Portnov and others had ‘made it possible 
to establish’ misappropriation of State funds, the evidence did not specify anything about Mr 
                                               
49 The Kurdistan Workers' Party, commonly referred to by its Kurdish acronym, PKK (Partiya Karkerên 
Kurdistanê) is a Kurdish nationalist organization. Taking the view that action by the European 
Community was needed in order to implement UNSC Res 1373 (2001), on 27 December 2001 the 
Council of the European Union adopted Common Position 2001/930/CFSP on combating terrorism and 
Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism. The 
organization’s leader, Mr. Ocalan applied for and obtained the annulment of such measures 00045 
because the Council had failed in providing adequate evidence to the listing. Case T-229/02 Osman 
Ocalan acting on behalf of PKK v Council of the European Union [2008] ECR II-45. 
50 Case C-373/13 H. T. v Land Baden-Württemberg [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:413. 
51 Ibid para 84. Accordingly, in the context of the judicial review, it must be ascertained: whether the 
applicant has committed terrorist acts, whether and to what extent he was involved in planning, 
decision-making or directing other persons with a view to committing acts of that nature, and whether 
and to what extent he financed such acts or procured for other persons the means to commit them (para 
90). 
52 Ibid para 87. 
53 Case T-384/11 Safa Nicu Sepahan Co. v Council of the European Union [2014] ECLI:EU:T:2014:986. 
54 Case T-275/12 Football Club ‘Dynamo-Minsk’ ZAO v Council of the European Union [2015] 
ECLI:EU:T:2015:747. 
55 Case T-290/14 Portnov v Council of the European Union [2015] ECLI:EU:T:2015:806. 
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Portnov, and the EU had not conducted its own analysis into whether he fulfilled the criteria 
for listing. 
Second, a certain number of the pending applications raise different issues: probably due to 
the decreased number of annulment decisions on the grounds of human rights incompatibility 
of sanction regimes, applicants appear now to challenge the choice of the correct legal basis 
for sanctions. To provide one example, in Hmicho,56 an application for annulment was filed in 
May 2015: the first plea alleges that ‘there is an absence of legal basis for restrictive measures 
against [the listed person]’, while the second plea challenges the compatibility of the measure 
with human rights standards. The parties eventually reached an agreement and dropped the 
proceeding but the change in the litigation strategy on the part of those affected by sanctions 
could indicate that the high threshold of human rights protection set by the Court is now met 
at Council level, when sanctions are drafted and issued.  
Third, as one of the most recent developments in the field of sanctions, one may also recall 
the reference for a preliminary ruling,57 by which the High Court of Justice of England and 
Wales asked the Court whether – with  regard to CFSP matters –  the Court  has jurisdiction 
to give a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU on the validity of an act of secondary law 
imposing sanctions. Clearly, the answer to such a reference is able to seriously modify 
institutional balances and, even more importantly, open unexpected ways of access to the 
ECJ. 
3.2 The External Perspective: Individual Sanctions as a Reaction Against Gross Human 
Rights Violations 
As of today, the EU has created 19 sanctioning regimes grounded on human rights violations 
in third countries. Among them, 11 are unilaterally put forth by the EU,58 6 are implemented in 
UNSC resolutions59 and 3 originated in UNSC resolutions, but, at the same time include 
                                               
56 Case T-275/15 Hmicho v Council [Action brought on 29 May 2015]. 
57 Case C-72/15 OJSC Rosneft Oil Company v Her Majesty's Treasury, Secretary of State for Business, 
Innovation and Skills, The Financial Conduct Authority [Reference for preliminary ruling from High Court 
of Justice (England & Wales), Queen's Bench Division, filed on 18 February 2015]. 
58 1. Belarus: Common Position 2004/661/CFSP (OJ L 301 2004), in force: Council Decision 
2012/642/CFSP (OJ L 285 2012); 
2. Burundi: Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1763 (OJ L 257 2015); 
3. Ukraine: Council Decision 2014/119/CFSP (OJ L 111 2014); 
4. Zimbabwe: Council Common Position 2002/145/CFSP (OJ L 50 2002), in force: Council 
Decision 2014/119/CFSP (OJ L 111 2014); 
5. Syria: Council Decision 2011/273/CFSP (OJ L 269 2011), in force: Council Decision 
2013/255/CFSP (OJ L 147 2013); 
6. Burma/Myanmar: Council Common Position 2004/423/CFSP (OJ L 125 2004); in force: Council 
Decision 2013/184/CFSP (OJ L 111 2013); 
7. Egypt: Council Decision 2011/172/CFSP (OJ L 76 2011); 
8. Bosnia and Herzegovina:  Council Decision 2011/173/CFSP (OJ L 76 2011) [ceased]; 
9. Tunisia: Council Decision 2011/72/CFSP (OJ L 28 2011); 
10. Moldova: Council Common Position 2003/139/CFSP (OJ L 53 2003), in force: Council Decision 
2010/573/CFSP (OJ L 253 2010): 
11. Iran: Council Decision 2011/235/CFSP (OJ L 100 2011). 
59 1. South Sudan: Council Common Position 2005/411/CFSP (OJ L 148 2005), pursuant to UNSCR 
1591(2005), in force: Council Decision 2014/449/CFSP (OJ L 203 2014); 
2. Democratic Republic of Congo: Council Common Position 2005/440/CFSP (OJ L 264 2005), 
pursuant to UNSCR 1596 (2005), in force: Council Decision 2010/788/CFSP (OJ L 336 2010); 
3. Côte d'Ivoire: Council Common Position 2004/852/CFSP (OJ L 368 2004), pursuant to UNSCR 
1572 (2004), in force: Council Decision 2010/656/CFSP (OJ L 285 2010).  
4. Somalia: Council Common Position 2009/138/CFSP (OJ L 46 2009), pursuant to UNSCR 1844 
(2008), in force: Council Decision 2010/231/CFSP (OJ L 105 2010);   
5. Yemen: Council Decision 2014/932/CFSP (OJ L 365 2014), pursuant to UNSCR 2140 (2014); 
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additional individuals and entities to those originally designated by the UN.60 It does not 
consider regimes put in place in order to pursue objectives other than human rights protection 
and promotion, such for instance, the well-known anti-terrorism regimes. 
The numbers are clear: the EU is by far the major ‘sanctioner’, as a reaction to human rights 
violations. While the EU implements the largest number of these regimes, other international 
actors often follow its sanctioning initiatives.  
In order to test the EU’s stance as a human rights promoter through sanctions and its impact 
on the international community, only unilateral regimes shall be considered. Because of the 
binding nature of UNSC resolutions, the regimes set in this context are widely implemented 
across the globe, which makes them less suitable to test actors’  reactions when confronted 
with human rights violations. 
  
                                               
6. Republic of Guinea-Bissau: Council Decision 2012/237/CFSP (OJ L 119 2012), pursuant to 
UNSCR 2048 (2012). 
60 1. Libya: Council Decision 2011/137/CFSP (OJ L 58 2011), pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011); 
2. People's Democratic Republic of Korea: Council Common Position 2006/795/CFSP (OJ L 
200M 2007), pursuant to UNSCR 1695 (2006), in force. Council Decision Council Decision 
2013/183/CFSP (OJ L 111,2013). 
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Table n. 161 
Table no. 1 shows the correlation between the EU’s unilateral regimes and the ones of the 
US, Canada and Australia,63 also engaged in unilateral sanctions. Regarding the EU’s 11 
autonomous regimes Australia maintains 7, Canada 5 and the US 4 initiatives directed toward 
specific individuals allegedly involved in human rights violations in other countries. The 
regimes pursued by the three States, despite being less than the ones pursued by the EU, are 
not completely identical, confirming that strategic considerations lie at the root of the 
sanctioning initiatives and that the latter often have objectives further than the mere promotion 
of human rights. 
The four ‘sanctioner’ legal orders share both the objective of sanctioning  (human rights 
promotion and protection) and the means used – (assets freezing and travel bans) but only in 
three cases each and every actor considered maintains a unilateral regime: those are 
Burma/Myanmar, Syria and Ukraine.                                                            
 
One of the main goals pursued by the adoption of sanctions is the public display of 
disagreement from the ‘sanctioner’ to the ‘sanctionee’, with reference to a specific policy 
allegedly disrespectful of basic human rights and democracy standards. Therefore, the choice 
                                               
61 Data were gathered through the following governmental websites of Australia 
(http://dfat.gov.au/international-relations/security/sanctions/sanctions-regimes/pages/sanctions-
regimes.aspx), Canada (http://www.international.gc.ca/sanctions/index.aspx?lang=eng) and US 
(http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/Programs.aspx).  
62 At this regard, not every relevant actor relates its sanction regime to strictly Ukraine as a State, since 
the crisis that has given rise to the need of sanctions involves nationals of several States. Nevertheless, 
the regimes herewith reported are meant to tackle the same phenomenon of human rights and 
democracy violations happened in relation to Russian occupation of Crimea. 
63 The choice of the case studies is due to linguistical accessibility of the relevant legislation and stance 
of the actor on the international scene. 
 European Union Canada Australia US 
1 Belarus x  x 
2 Bosnia and Herzegovina  x (Former 
Yugoslavia) 
 
3 Burma/Myanmar x x x 
4 Burundi    
5 Egypt    
6 Iran x x  
7 Moldova    
8 Syria x x x 
9 Tunisia    
10 Ukraine/Russia62 x x x 
11 Zimbabwe x x  
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of undertaking initiatives in this regard could be a legitimate indicator to identify the 
commitment of one actor to the cause of extraterritorial human rights promotion and protection.  
Table no. 2 considers the three regimes that are maintained by the EU,64 US,65 Canada66 and 
Australia67 as highlighted in Table no. 1, and points at the swift  issuance of sanctions. Rapidity 
can be considered a marker of sanctions effectiveness. Indeed, designated individuals may 
well withdraw their assets and properties from jurisdictions where they suspect that restrictive 
measures are about to be issued. In two cases out of three, the EU has been the first 
international actor to react unilaterally to human rights violations in third countries, by issuing 
individual sanctions.  While the long term possibility of success of these regimes remains to 
be evaluated, the results outlined in Table no. 2 demonstrate that on the international scene 
the EU ranks first as a ‘sanctioner’ legal regime, outside the UN framework. One may also 
note that the issuance of sanctions by the US against Syrian nationals in 2004 could be related 
to the latter’s opposition to the Iraq war, which strongly deteriorated the diplomatic relations 
with the US and thus can explain the larger timeframe that separates the US’ initiative from 
other actors. More generally, however, it is possible to affirm that the EU is very often the first 
to undertake sanctioning initiatives on the international scene, when human rights violations 
occur.68 
Table no. 2 
 1 2 3 4 
Burma/Myanmar EU (26/04/04) AU (24/10/07) CA (13/12/07) US (11/07/12) 
Syria US (12/05/04) EU (9/05/11) CA (24/05/11) AU (20/08/13) 
Ukraine EU (5/03/14) CA (17/03/14) AU (17/06/14) US (19/12/14) 
 
A comprehensive worldwide study on sanction activism is, in the author’s knowledge,69 still 
missing. Nevertheless, on the basis of the data sample considered herein, it is possible to 
confirm that human rights violations represent a powerful trigger for the EU to apply individual 
sanctions. This initiative is moreover suitable to be sustained by other actors’ in a relatively 
short period of time.  
                                               
64 Burma regime: Council common position 2004/423/CFSP (OJ L 125 2004), in force: Council Decision 
2013/184/CFSP (OJ L 111 2013); Syria regime: Council Decision 2011/273/CFSP (OJ L 199 2011), in 
force: Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP (OJ L 147 2013); Ukraine regime: Council Decision 
2014/119/CFSP (OJ L 66 2014). 
65 Burma: U.S. EO 13619 Federal Register Vol. 77, No. 135 (11 July 2012); Syria: U.S. EO 13338 
Federal Register 
Vol. 69, No. 93 (12 May 2004); Ukraine: U.S. EO 13685 Federal Register Vol. 79, No. 247 (19 December 
2014). 
66 Burma: Special Economic Measures Act SOR/2007-285 (13 December 2007); Syria: Special 
Economic Measures Act SOR/2011-114 (24 May 2011); Ukraine: Special Economic Measures Act 
SOR/2014-60 (17 March 2014). 
67 Burma: Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 No. 247 (as amended on 21 August 2012); Syria: 
Autonomous Sanctions (Designated Persons and Entities and Declared Persons - Syria) List 2012 
F2013C00664 (20 Aug 2013); Ukraine: Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 No. 247 (as amended 
on 17 Jun 2014). 
68 See previous note 57. 
69 Last checked: 24 January 2017. 
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Given the relevance of human rights in the EU’s sanctioning regimes, as highlighted in this 
section, it can be affirmed that the mainstreaming of human rights is indeed a feature of EU’s 
sanctions regime (ii). 
4. EU sanctions as a legal model on global scale? 
The extent to which international actors use sanctions as a means to enforce human rights 
standards has not received much attention in legal literature. As the leading role of the EU in 
the sanctioning process is ascertained, it is now worth verifying, at least by way of a selection 
of case studies, if the EU’s approach to sanctions has (or may in the future) become a 
reference for other legal systems.  
Sanctions issued by the UN, as administrative instruments of preemptive security, are based 
on a severe non-disclosure principle; and they still lack, at this level, an effective judicial 
protection mechanism. By contrast, EU institutions assert that listed persons have the right to 
challenge the legitimacy of sanctions before a court, and to have relevant information 
disclosed to them at any stage of the process and to enjoy ‘in principle full judicial review’. 70 
Experience shows that the legitimacy and effectiveness of the sanction could be improved 
through more precise regulation of the three stages of the sanctioning process.71 In March 
2015 the Council released the updated version of ‘EU Best Practices for the effective 
implementation of restrictive measures’,72 which contains non-binding recommendations for 
the implementation of EU sanctions.  The context in which the document was elaborated, 
within the RELEX group, allowed the regular hurdles that arose during the process of 
implementing sanctions to be tackled. Just to mention one example, the Best Practice provides 
specific clauses73 in order to deal with issues relating to mistaken identity of the addressee of 
sanctions. Under the new EU Best Practices a preferential communication channel with the 
Commission is available to persons who, despite not being the actual designated individual, 
are subject to sanctions. This illustrates the point that identifiers other than the persons’ full 
names should be provided along with the proposal of the sanction. The aspect is of practical 
importance, due to relevant difficulties in transliterating names or because of cases of 
homonymy. Indeed this was the ground for annulment of several entries in black lists74 and, 
through prompt regulation, it offers a means of diminishing successful challenges for 
annulment.  
The design of a comprehensive regulatory package in the field of sanctions can be quite 
attractive, since it allows interested countries to rely on the EU’s expertise and resources, and, 
on that basis, to be an active player in the international arena. 
4.1 Evolution of the UNSC’s sanctioning regime in the light of the European ‘model’ 
The Kadi decisions have undoubtedly been a particularly important catalyst, as they paved 
the way for dialogue between the UN and the EU concerning the scope of application of human 
rights law. The judgment has been interpreted as an “ultimatum” to the UNSC, which was 
required to amend its blacklisting procedures to ensure compliance with fundamental rights 
(by, for example, providing means of effective judicial protection and sufficient information to 
                                               
70Kadi case, para 326. 
71 The ex ante phase (design and adoption of the measures), to the implementation phase (enforcement 
and compliance) and the ex post phase (responsiveness and flexibility, see supra note 37. 
72 Communication n. 10254from the Foreign Relations Counsellors Working Party to the Permanent 
Representatives Committee of 24 June 2015. 
73 Paras 8-17.  
74 Inter alia see  Case T-384/11 Safa Nicu Sepahan Co. v Council of the European Union, 
ECLI:EU:T:2014:986. 
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enable blacklisted individuals to exercise their rights of review) in order to avoid the risk of the 
blacklists system being declared unlawful in the EU legal order.75 
It has to be recalled that the Kadi saga originated in the context of counterterrorism, from 
resolution 1267/1999,76 which had also set up a designated Sanctions Committee for the 
management of the black lists. Like the UNSC itself, Sanctions Committees are entrusted with 
the follow up of the application of sanctions and still qualify as political organs. Their 
composition mirrors that of the UNSC and so does their decision-making procedure, i.e. they 
decide by consensus, with all the well-known consequences.  In the words of the ad hoc 
Special Rapporteur for Human Rights,77 ‘the listing procedure still falls short of providing 
guarantees with respect to the rights to property, to private life, to the rights of the listed person 
to be informed of the accusation and to be heard and judged’.  
The designation and monitoring procedure has nonetheless progressively taken an 
administrative turn, in the sense that starting from 2005, a number of resolutions provided 
procedural safeguards in order to protect the rights of the listed persons and to avoid arbitral 
decisions. Indeed, shortly after the first Kadi ruling,78 the UNSC endeavored to reassure at 
least some of the most relevant human rights concerns: in fact, before it, no procedure existed 
for obtaining an individual de-listing, apart from the one available to the country of the listed 
person. At the same time as the ECJ ruling, due to the emerging risks for the uniform 
implementation of UNSC resolutions, a focal point79 responsible for considering such 
applications and the office of the Ombudsperson80 were established. Furthermore, a minimal 
requirement of notification for blacklisted individuals and an obligation to provide them with a 
copy of the reasons underpinning the listing decision was introduced.81 However, the 
guarantees set up at the UN level were not deemed to be sufficient because the procedure 
before the Committee did not provide the individual with ‘real opportunities to assert its 
rights’.82 Hence, following some further reforms at the UN level, the UNSC was required to 
provide a narrative summary of reasons for listing available on its website and stated that each 
entry had to be reviewed every two years.83  
Nevertheless, the ECJ in its second ruling on Mr. Kadi’s case upheld the right of full judicial 
review84 and reiterated the European choice of human rights prevalence over public interest 
and international security. Although EU case law in relation to sanctions had (and, to some 
extent, still has) a considerable impact on UN architecture, European standards of human 
rights protection are far from being reached. In fact, the EU has developed its own practice of 
implementing UN sanctions, according to its own values.  
                                               
75 G Sullivan and B Hayes, Blacklisted. Targeted sanctions, preemptive security and fundamental rights 
(2011) < https://www.tni.org/files/eu-ecchr-blacklisted-report.pdf>. 
76 UNSCR 1267 (1999). 
77 Report of M. Schenin, Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental freedoms while Countering Terrorism, 6 August 2010. 
78 21September 2005. 
79 UNSCR 1730 (2009). 
80 UNSCR 1904 (2009). 
81 UNSCR 1735 (2006). 
82 Joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation vs Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities [2008] 
ECR I-06351 para 323. 
83 UNSCR 1828 (2009). 
84 Joined cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P European Commission and Others v Yassin 
Abdullah Kadi, ECLI:EU:C:2013:518. 
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4.2 National Sanctions Regimes in Light of the European Model 
Although the sanctioning technique of the EU remains unique, it is beyond any doubt that it is 
carefully monitored and is regarded as particularly advanced by the international community. 
Moreover, some evidence exists that this model has spread to other legal orders.  
In March 2015, the EU decided to renew its sanctions related to the situation in Zimbabwe.85 
Candidate countries (former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Iceland, Serbia 
and Albania), potential candidate countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina),  EFTA countries 
(Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway), as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Armenia 
all aligned themselves with the Council initiative86 and thus provided identical packages of 
sanctions to those of the EU.  The wide-scale association to the EU sanctioning initiative 
happened when the same countries aligned themselves to the Council’s decision87 to invoke 
restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining the independence of Ukraine,88 and its 
decision to expand EU sanctions against perpetrators of human rights violations in Belarus89 
and North Korea.90 
In Switzerland, legislative reforms now empower the Swiss Federal Council to refrain from 
implementing the UNSC resolution in certain circumstances - including, inter alia, where 
blacklisted individuals and groups have not been afforded access to an independent 
mechanism of review or where they have been listed for more than three years without being 
brought before a court.91 The Federal Council made it clear that ‘it is not possible for a 
democratic country based on the rule of law that sanctions imposed by the Sanctions 
Committee, without any due process guarantee, result in the suspension, for years and without 
any democratic legitimacy, the most basic human rights’.92 Furthermore, considering the 
situation in Ukraine, and following the invitation of the EU to do so, the Federal Council decided 
to extend its measures in order to prevent the circumvention of EU sanctions. It further added 
the measures decreed by the EU,93 following the non-recognition of the annexation of Crimea 
to its ordinance on international sanctions.94 The Federal Council also added to its lists the 
names of 28 other persons and entities who have had financial and travel restrictions imposed 
on them in the EU.95 
Australia’s restrictive measures against Iran were, inter alia, described as ‘EU-style’.96 In 
Australia’s ‘Autonomous Sanctions Bill 2010’97 it was expressly stated that ‘Australia, as well 
as the European Union and other states, imposes autonomous targeted financial sanctions 
and travel restrictions on a range of individuals and entities beyond those required by the 
Security Council’. This reference explains how relevant the EU’s model of sanctions has 
become, challenging the monopoly of UN-originated regimes as a reference for other like-
                                               
85 Council Decision 2015/277/CFSP (OJ L 47 2015) 
86 Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain 
third countries with the Council Decision 2015/277/CFSP amending Council Decision 2011/101/CFSP 
concerning restrictive measures against Zimbabwe <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2015/04/10-declaration-hr-zimbabwe-alignments> 
87 Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP (OJ L 78 2014). 
88 Council Decision 2015/959/CFSP (OJ L 156 2015). 
89 Council Implementing Decision 2015/1142/CFSP (OJ L 185 2015). 
90 Council Decision 2015/1066/ CFSP (OJ L 174 2015). 
91 <www.finma.ch/archiv/gwg/e/dokumentationen/gesetzgebung/sanktionen/index.php#21> 
 92G Sullivan and B Hayes, Blacklisted. Targeted sanctions, preemptive security and fundamental rights 
(2011) < https://www.tni.org/files/eu-ecchr-blacklisted-report.pdf>. 
93 Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 (OJ L 78 2014). 
94 Ordinance of the Federal Council on international sanctions of 27 August 2014. 
95 Press release of the Federal Administration of Switzerland 
<www.news.admin.ch/index.html?lang=en>. 
96 ‘Australia adopts EU-style sanctions against Iran’ <www.iran-times.com>. 
97 Autonomous Sanctions Bill, 2010 Bills Digest No. 111, 2010–11. 
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minded legal orders.  Also in relation to sanctions against Zimbabwe, triggered by human 
rights violations in the country, both the EU98 and Australia had issued sanctions and when 
the EU partially eased its own, Australia followed.99 The same happened when the EU lifted 
the sanctions that had been imposed in response to the junta's suppression in Myanmar:100 
Australia and Canada also lifted their measures, while the US suspended the sanctions but 
did not lift them entirely.101  
With reference to Canada, the need for granting individual rights in the sanctions field was 
established by the leading precedent Abdelrazik,102 in which the Canadian Supreme Court 
stated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms when implementing UN-sourced sanctions against Mr. Abdelrazik, without granting 
him a fair access to judicial remedy. Again, timing is not irrelevant, since the Kadi decision 
was pronounced by the ECJ in September 2008 and Abdelrazik just a few months later, in 
June 2009 by Canadian Supreme Court. 
Recently, the EU Council has sanctioned four Burundian nationals whose activities have been 
said to be undermining democracy in the country, particularly through violence and serious 
human rights violations. Shortly after, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union 
decided to impose targeted sanctions,103 including asset freezes and travel bans, against any 
person or entity involved in the perpetuation of violence in Burundi or against anyone who 
impedes the search for a solution to the crisis the country is facing. The Council of African 
Union’s decision follows the EU’s introduction of sanctions, since the list is identical. 
In the light of these examples, it is possible to state that the EU is particularly committed to 
deploy its sanctions mechanism to respond to human rights violations, both in qualitative and 
quantitative terms. Moreover, some evidence exists that its model has inspired sanctions 
issuance in the same field by other legal orders.  
 
5. Conclusion 
At the beginning of the paper, three questions were outlined, to which it is now appropriate to 
return. 
Human rights are undoubtedly a leading tenet in EU external action. In this perspective, they 
are a strategic concept, capable of enhancing the competitive position of institutional and 
private representatives of the EU and of defending the set of European social preferences. At 
the same time, human rights allow the EU to describe itself as the champion of stability, human 
rights and democracy promotion, allowing it to spread prosperity, sustainable development 
and to be a supporter of the enforcement of the rule of law and good governance. 
Significant evidence exists that illustrates the way in which human rights play a pivotal role in 
the EU’s issuance of sanctions, from both the internal and the external perspective. This 
means, on the one hand, that very high standards of human rights are guaranteed to 
addressees of targeted measures in the EU. This process was boosted by ECJ’s annulments 
of several regimes, until a sufficient standard of ‘procedural rights’ was reached at Council 
level. Consequently, the amount of annulments of sanction regimes seems to have now 
decreased. On the other hand, from the external point of view, the EU is the major international 
                                               
98 Council Decision 2011/101/CFSP (OJ L 42 2011). 
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100 Council Decision 2014/214/CFSP (OJ L 111 2014). 
101 Al Jazeera - English, November 13, 2014. 
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actor when it comes to reacting to human rights violations by means of individual sanctions. 
These allow the population to be spared from further suffering due to the imposition to 
economic sanctions without renouncing its opposition to gross violations of fundamental rights 
and to prosecuting actual culprits. 
The case studies reported above demonstrate that major international actors closely scrutinize 
the EU’s ‘model’ of sanctions.  The scrutiny has various forms. EFTA countries, candidates to 
membership potential candidate and partners in Stabilization and Association Agreements 
seem willing to draw on the experience of the EU. In these cases, one may assert that the 
European model of sanctions has indeed circulated, since these States rely on the initiative of 
the EU and then simply align their own national sanction policy to that of the EU, even in fields 
where the EU’s competence is weak, such as visa restrictions. In other cases, such as 
Australia and Canada, for instance, several differences exist among the regimes but the 
impact of the Kadi decision and the consequences that it had ignited, can be tracked in these 
legal orders. Furthermore, these actors cautiously monitor the EU’s activism in the field of 
sanctions and seek coordination whenever it is feasible, in order to achieve greater 
effectiveness. Finally, at the UN level, very little impact can be traced. This may be explained 
by the structure of this organization that is not deemed to directly regulate individuals’ legal 
positions, which explains why procedural rights at this level are not well developed.  As a 
conclusion, whilst the EU’s approach to sanctions may well be considered a legal model, its 
circulation is limited to countries where the EU is influential across a range of sectors, because 
of geographic proximity and political and economic dependence. This influence decreases but 
remains perceivable in other important actors on the international scene, such Canada and 
Australia, but evidence does not show any relevant impact on UN architecture.  
Furthermore, the same model also suffers from the criticism from the US104 and China. China’s 
attitude is one of opposition to the values promoted by the EU, in particular as regards human 
rights. This is particularly interesting because it reveals the most relevant hurdle in the 
phenomenon of circulation of the legal model, i.e. that mere transplants of regulations are not 
effective, if not accompanied by a fertile cultural and legal environment. Indeed, with specific 
regard to sanctions, China, as well as India, Brazil and South Africa, showed a certain 
solidarity with Russia’s annexation of Crimea by abstaining at the UN, thus defeating the EU’s 
diplomatic effort in relation to the Ukrainian crisis. As one observer pointed out, as one of the 
findings from the structured EU-China Dialogue on human rights,105 ‘China does not need 
human rights lesson’.106 
Due to the existence of Articles 3(5) and 21 TFEU, individual sanctions under EU law are quite 
unique. The rationale of these norms, indeed, goes very well together with the means of 
individual sanctions, which encompass human rights both internally and externally. It remains 
to be seen whether individual sanctions are in fact a valuable administrative instrument in the 
field of international relations. Some scholars have criticized the effectiveness of targeted 
sanctions,107 and one may add that the EU’s ‘favorable’ approach toward blacklisted persons 
                                               
104 See part I of the present article. 
105 This dialogue was set up in 1995. Two rounds of the dialogue take place every year, one under each 
EU Presidency. It allows the EU to channel all issues of concern (such as the death penalty, re-
education through labor, ethnic minorities' rights, civil and political freedoms etc.) in a forum where 
China is committed to responding. 
106 N Nielsen, ‘China does not need human rights lesson, says top envoy’ EuObserver, 9 December 
2014. 
107Inter alia, see D Esfandiary, ‘Assessing the European Union’s Sanctions Policy: Iran as a case 
study’, Non-Proliferation Papers, 34/2013 < 
http://www.nonproliferation.eu/web/documents/nonproliferationpapers/dinaesfandiary52b41ff5cbaf6.p
df>; R Drulàkovà et al, ‘Assessing the effectiveness of EU sanction policy’, 4 Central European 
Journal of International and Security Studies (2010) 101; AW de Vries, C Portela and B Guijarro-
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could possibly lead to some forum shopping:  it could be more convenient for an individual to 
risk incurring ‘Europeanized’ sanctions, rather than those administered by other legal systems. 
The consequences arising out of the severe scrutiny on the legality of sanctions on the 
grounds of human rights are twofold: on the one hand, costs are deemed to increase due to 
the possibility of awarding compensation for wrongful listing initiatives; and on the other hand, 
the EU is reinforcing its image as an international champion of human rights as well as through 
very high standards of accountability in political forum.  
As a more credible and better-defined international actor, the EU can engage in a number of 
initiatives, with a view of fostering its strategic and economic interests. Its sanctioning ‘model’ 
is at the forefront and is regarded as such by several international actors, while others criticize 
it. Individual sanctions - at least theoretically - represent the ‘win-win’ tool in external action of 
the EU, because they promote its regulatory patterns and jurisdictional capabilities without 
having devastating downsides. In this regard, commentators maintain deeply diverging 
opinions about sanction effectiveness in the long run; while some contest that the balance 
between pain and gain is not worthwhile, the point of the present paper is that individual 
restrictive measures are a useful tool in foreign policy. This may appear to be an obvious 
argument but sanctions contribute to shaping the image of the EU, providing diplomatic 
alternatives with more nuanced and targeted policies which ensure the EU’s leverage in 
foreign policy108 and show that the EU is able to stand by the principles it claims to uphold. 
In other terms, they enable the prosecution of actual culprits of human rights violations, foster 
a human rights culture as a whole and pave the way for both a fairer world and for more 
constructive relations among different legal orders. And this is indeed what the EU seems to 
be expected to do. 
 
                                               
95/2014. On the contrary, some Authors have a more positive attitude. For instance, see F Giumelli, 
The Success of Sanctions. Lessons Learned from the EU Experience (Ashgate 2013). 
108 F Giumelli, ‘How sanctions work. A new narrative’, ISS Chaillot Paper 129/2013 < 
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Chaillot_129.pdf>. 
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INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: AN ASSESSMENT OF A 
FRAGMENTED PRACTICE 
Stefano Saluzzo 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the legal aspects of the relationship between the European Union legal 
order and international agreements concluded by Member States with third countries, by 
analysing various forms of interference on the part of EU institutions in the exercise of Member 
States’ treaty-making powers. The paper focuses in particular on three different mechanisms 
used by the EU to coordinate Member States’ external action: agreements concluded on 
behalf (or in the interest) of the Union, agreements concluded under a previous EU 
authorisation and the practice of common positions that Member States have to follow in 
international organisations to which the EU is not a party. Although still being sovereign entities 
within the international community, Member States are required to uphold the Union’s interest 
in their relationship with third countries or international organisations and to avoid any action 
capable of affecting the EU legal order.  
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1. Introduction 
Research on the relationship between the European legal order and international law has 
traditionally focused on the issue of international obligations directly binding upon EU 
institutions. The European Union (EU) can be bound by an international norm by virtue of an 
agreement concluded by the EU itself with third countries, or by the existence of a norm of 
customary international law.1  
At the same time, detailed analyses have been devoted to the international obligations 
Member States have assumed towards third countries before the creation of the EU or before 
their accession to the organisation. This kind of international obligations – “previous 
international obligations” or “anterior treaties” – are relevant for the EU legal order in so far as 
they are protected by Article 351 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU).2 The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has addressed the issue of previous 
agreements on several occasions, and this has led to a certain extent of clarity on their value 
within the EU legal order and on Member States obligations towards the EU in case of 
conflicting international norms.3  
Much less has been said about a different case of interaction between EU law and 
international law, that is on so called “posterior treaties”, agreements concluded by Member 
States after the creation of the then European Community (EC) or after their accession to the 
EU. The reason for this lack of interest is perhaps due to the fact that the CJEU has only 
incidentally intervened on the matter, generally avoiding the most problematic aspects arising 
in these situations. Moreover, while the Treaties, after the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, contain many provisions on EU international agreements, they are silent on the matter 
of international treaties binding only EU Member States. Nevertheless, in recent years, 
scholars have started to devote more attention to the matter, due to the increasing number of 
treaties that Member States are still ratifying on their own, even if with some forms of control 
by the EU.4 This raises several questions on the scope of Member States’ foreign powers, the 
                                               
1 According to art. 216 of the TFEU “[a]greements concluded by the Union are binding upon the 
institutions of the Union and on its Member States.” See the recent study of M. MENDEZ, The Legal 
Effects of EU Agreements: Maximalist Treaty Enforcement and Judicial Avoidance Techniques, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2013. On the status of customary law within the EU legal order see J. 
WOUTERS, D. VAN EECKHOUTTE, Giving Effect to Customary International Law Through European 
Community Law, Working Paper 25, June 2002, Leuven Institute for International Law; T. 
KONSTADINIDES, The Meso Level: Means of Interactions between EU and International Law: Customary 
International Law as a Source of EU Law, A Two-Way Fertilisation Route?, in Yearbook of European 
Law, 2016, p. 513 ff.  
2 Art. 351(1) TFEU reads: “The rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before 1 
January 1958 or, for acceding States, before the date of their accession, between one or more Member 
States on the one hand, and one or more third countries on the other, shall not be affected by the 
provisions of the Treaties.” 
3 For the relevant case law and an analysis on agreements pre-dating accession to the EU see P. 
EECKHOUT, EU External Relations Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 421-434. However, 
the Court’s position in relation to art. 351 of the TFEU has been criticized for having interpreted the 
clause as a way for balancing EU law with international commitments of Member States. See J. 
KLABBERS, Treaty Conflict and the European Union, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 
148.  
4 See e.g. J.V. VAN ROSSEM, Interactions between EU Law and International Law in the Light of 
Intertanko and Kadi: The Dilemma of Norms Binding the Member States but not the Community, in 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 2009, p. 183 ff. A. ROSAS, The Status in EU Law of 
International Agreements Concluded by EU Member States, in Fordham International Law Journal, 
2011, p. 1304 ff.; M. CREMONA, Member States as Trustees of the Union Interest: Participating in 
International Agreements on Behalf of the European Union, in A. ARNULL, C. BARNARD, M. DOUGAN, E. 
SPAVENTA (Eds.), A Constitutional Order of States? Essays in EU Law in Honour of Alan Dashwood, 
Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011, p. 435 ff.; ID, Member States Agreements as Union Law, in E. 
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status in the EU legal order of agreements concluded by them with third countries and the 
possibility to consider those agreements as binding on EU institutions.  
The present contribution is aimed at describing the mentioned phenomenon and at 
understanding its legal implications for both the EU legal order and for Member States’ 
positions vis-à-vis third States. In the first part, the article will make an attempt to conceptualize 
the issue and to present various situations in which Member States continue to retain a form 
of treaty-making power at the international level. In the next sections, the paper will provide 
an analysis of the practice of the EU in relation to agreements concluded by Member States 
on its behalf and on agreements authorized by the Union itself, trying also to identify the effects 
that Member States agreements can produce within the EU legal order.5  In the last part, the 
work will offer a brief account of the questions raised in the context of common positions 
established by the EU in relation to Member States’ action within other international 
organisations. 
 
2. International Agreements of EU Member States: a Fragmented 
Practice 
Posterior treaties of Member States are not easy to define nor to classify. Using a negative 
definition, we should understand posterior agreements as agreements which do not fall under 
the scope of application of Article 351 of the TFEU.  
Some authors have attempted to classify Member States international agreements by focusing 
on different elements: the time of the conclusion of the agreement, the type of EU competence 
to which the agreement is related or the effect they produce in the EU legal order.  
Rosas has proposed to classify Member States treaties as: agreements binding on the Union 
through functional succession; agreements to which Union secondary law makes a renvoi; 
agreements concluded in the interests of the Union; and agreements that should be taken into 
account in the application or in the interpretation of EU law.6 As it is clear, this classification 
already takes into account the effects Member States agreements can produce within the EU 
legal order.  
There exists a wide range of situations in which Member States can exercise their treaty-
making power on the international plane, and they are not strictly limited to matters that fall 
outside the competence of the EU. In fact, on several occasions, EU Member States have 
ratified treaties which were (at least partly) covered by an EU competence, even by an 
exclusive one. Thus, competence is not a clear defining criterion to classify posterior treaties 
concluded by Member States.  
The time of conclusion could offer a better perspective, although it is not always easy to 
distinguish between an anterior and a posterior treaty, especially when an external 
                                               
CANNIZZARO, P. PALCHETTI, R. A. WESSEL (eds.), International Law as the Law of the European Union, 
Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012, p. 291 ff. 
5 This paper does not deal with international agreements between EU Member States (so called inter 
se agreements), since they pertain to a completely different legal situation, which is regulated by 
different rules. On this issue, see generally R. SCHÜTZE, Foreign Affairs and the EU Constitution. 
Selected Essays, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 138-155; A. DIMOPOULOS, Taming the 
Conclusion of Inter Se Agreements between EU Member States: The Role of the Duty of Loyalty, in 
Yearbook of European Law, 2015, p. 296 ff.  
6 A. ROSAS, The Status in EU Law of International Agreements Concluded by EU Member States, supra 
note 4, p. 1324 ff.  
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competence of the EU later emerges by virtue of the AETR doctrine, or when amendments to 
anterior agreements lead to the exclusion of the applicability of Article 351 TFEU.7  
There is another relevant category of agreements, that is those binding on the EU according 
to the doctrine of functional succession.8 The doctrine has been applied by the CJEU only in 
relation to the GATT, and it requires very specific and strict conditions in order for the EU to 
succeed in Member States’ international obligations.9 Moreover, even if it could theoretically 
be applied in cases of posterior treaties, it has usually been invoked to establish the binding 
character for the EU of Member States’ anterior treaties.  
However, rather than constituting a proper category of agreements, the case of the functional 
succession should be seen as one of the possible effects that Member States’ agreements 
have in the EU legal order, in the sense that, whenever there has been a complete transfer of 
competence to the Union (a supervening exclusive competence) in the subject matter 
regulated by a treaty to which all Member States are party, the latter could become binding for 
the Union itself.10  
It is nonetheless clear that attempts to classify posterior treaties have not led to more clarity 
on their relationship with EU law. Thus, it seems that an analysis of the practice concerned 
could be conducted by looking at the degree of EU “interference” in the exercise of Member 
States’ treaty-making power. This choice leads – for the purpose of this article – to distinguish 
between different patterns that create limits to Member States’ autonomy in the management 
                                               
7 See, e.g., the Open Skies judgments: CJEU, case C-467/98, Commission v. Denmark, 
EU:C:2002:625, para. 39; CJEU, case C-468/98, Commission v. Sweden, EU:C:2002:626, para. 37; 
CJEU, case C-469/98, Commission v. Finland, EU:C:2002:627, para. 39; CJEU, case C-471/98, 
Commission v. Belgium, EU:C:2002:628, para. 50; CJEU, case C-472/98, Commission v. Luxemburg, 
EU:C:2002:629, para. 45; CJEU, case C-475/98, Commission v. Austria, EU:C:2002:630, para. 47; 
CJEU, case C-476/98, Commission v. Germany, EU:C:2002:631, para. 66; more recently, CJEU, case 
C-523/04, Commission v. Netherlands, EU:C:2007:244, paras. 51-52. 
8 The Court has accepted in at least one case that an agreement concluded by Member States can 
have binding effects upon the Union. In International Fruit Company the Court was asked to assess the 
compatibility of a trade regulation in the light of the GATT 1947. Although previously concluded only by 
Member States, the Court acknowledged that the then Community had already assumed the functions 
inherent in the tariff and trade policies and that “[b]y conferring those powers on the Community, the 
Member States showed their wish to bind it by the obligations entered into under the General 
agreement. From this transfer of powers – also recognised by the other contracting parties – it followed 
that the provisions of the GATT had the effect of binding the Community. See CJEU, joined cases C-
22-24/72, International Fruit Company, EU:C:1972:115, paras. 14-18. The succession is defined 
“functional” in so far as it relates to a transfer of functions and not of territory, which is instead required 
by general international law for the succession of States in international treaties. See R. UERPMANN-
WITTZACK, The Constitutional Role of International Law, in A. VON BOGDANDY, J. BAST (eds.), Principles 
of European Constitutional Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 131, 149, where the author 
stresses that “[t]he rules of state succession are applicable when territorial sovereignty over an area 
has passed from one state to another. In the case of the EC, this is not what has happened. The EC is 
not a state. In particular it has not replaced its member States as territorial sovereignties but has just 
taken over some of their functions. One could ask if such a functional succession leads to a transfer of 
obligations under international law; however, such a functional succession has thus far been recognized 
neither by international treaties nor by customary international law as a reason for a legal succession.” 
9 See J. WOUTERS, J. ODERMATT, T. RAMOPOULOS, Worlds Apart? Comparing the Approaches of the 
European Court of Justice and the EU Legislature to International Law, in M. CREMONA, A. THIES (eds.), 
The European Court of Justice and External Relations Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 
255-261.  
10 The effects of this succession, however, will only involve the EU and its Member States and not the 
other third States. Consequently, the agreement will become binding on the Union and EU secondary 
law could be reviewed in the light of its norms, but the position of Member States vis-à-vis third States 
will stay unchanged. They will still be responsible for any breach of the treaty.  
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of their international relations.11 In particular, the article will present three forms of interactions 
between EU law and international agreements of Member States which have recently acquired 
a remarkable relevance for the field of EU external action, namely: agreements concluded by 
the entirety of EU Member States in the interest or on behalf of the Union; agreements 
concluded with a prior authorization of the EU; and the practice of the establishment of a 
common position Member States have to adopt in the context of other international 
organisations. 
The EU has several times authorized the Member States to ratify treaties falling within an 
exclusive external competence, whether express or implied and has recently intervened on 
how Member States should behave in other international organisation to which the Union is 
not a party. There are different reasons for the EU to adopt such decisions, and they are not 
necessarily of a legal nature.  
First of all, the EU could deem that, notwithstanding its legal capacity to directly ratify the 
treaty, it would be better to leave the negotiation and the ratification to the Member States. It 
is a matter of political discretion, by which the EU acknowledges a de facto situation, leaving 
some room for Member States treaty-making power. In the AETR case, the then Community, 
even if claiming an implied external competence in relation to the agreement, decided to let 
Member States ratify the convention on its behalf, due to the advanced stage of the on-going 
negotiation.12  
Another example has been recently provided by a 2012 Regulation establishing a system of 
transitional arrangements for Member States’ bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with third 
countries. According to the new Article 207 of the TFEU, foreign direct investments have 
become part of the Common Commercial Policy and thus have become an exclusive external 
competence of the EU. However, instead of imposing the forced termination of all the existing 
Member States’ BITs with third countries, the Regulation provides that Member States must 
notify to the Commission all the treaties in force and requests a previous authorization for any 
amendment to those treaties or for the conclusion of a new BIT with a third country.13 
In some cases, the reason for authorizing the Member States to act on behalf of the Union is 
a legal impediment. There are treaties that are open for accession only to States and not to 
international organisations or other entities, nor to regional economic integration 
organisations. The usual examples are agreements negotiated within UN agencies, like the 
                                               
11 On this perspective, see G. GAJA, Restraints Imposed by European Community Law on the Treaty-
Making Power of the Member States, in I. CAMERON, A. SIMONI (eds.), Dealing with Integration, volume 
II: Perspectives from Seminars on European Law 1996-1998, Uppsala, 1998, p. 97 ff. See also J. 
KLABBERS, Restraints on the Treaty-Making Powers of Member States Deriving from EU Law: Towards 
a Framework of Analysis, in E. CANNIZZARO (ed.), The European Union as an Actor in International 
Relations, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2002, p. 151 ff.; J. HELISKOSKI, The Obligation of Member 
States to Foresee, in the Conclusion and Application of their International Agreements, Eventual Future 
Measures of the European Union, in A. ARNULL, C. BARNARD, M. DOUGAN, E. SPAVENTA (eds.), A 
Constitutional Order of States. Essays in EU Law in Honour of Alan Dashwood, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 
2011, p. 545 ff.  
12 It was the Court itself that, accepting the Council’s argument, decided to let Member States conclude 
the agreement on behalf of the then European Community. See CJEU, case 22/70, Commission v. 
Council (AETR), EU:C:1971:32, paras. 82-90. The Regulation that implemented the Agreement 
recognised this result, by providing that “Whereas, since the subject matter of the AETR Agreement 
falls within the scope of Regulation (EEC) No. 543/69, from the date of entry into force of that Regulation 
the power to negotiate and conclude the Agreement has lain with the Community; whereas, however, 
the particular circumstances in which the AETR negotiations took place warrant, by way of exception, 
a procedure whereby the Member States of the Community individually deposit the instruments of 
ratification or accession in a concerted action but nonetheless act in the interest and on behalf of the 
Community.” See Regulation EEC No. 2829/77 of 12 December 1977.   
13 Regulation (EU) No. 1219/2012 of 12 December 2012 establishing transitional arrangements for 
bilateral investments agreements between Member States and third countries.  
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International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). In 
Opinion 2/91, the Court held that the ILO Convention n. 170 concerning Safety on the Use of 
Chemicals at Work was covered by an exclusive EU competence, but since the EU was not 
able to ratify the Convention it was for the Member States to conclude the treaty “jointly acting 
in the Community’s interest”.14 Indeed, this is a dynamic that pertains to cases of exclusive 
competence of the EU. In the event of an agreement falling within a shared competence, the 
most likely solution will be a mixed agreement, jointly ratified by the EU and the entirety of its 
Member States.15 
There are still other cases in which an agreement binding on the Member States could become 
relevant for the EU, and it is the one of a renvoi to the agreement provided by EU primary or 
secondary law. Examples of the former are the United Nations (UN) Charter and the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) or the 1951 UN Convention of the Status of Refugee 
and the Protocol to the same convention of 1977.16 There are instead several references 
contained in secondary law to international agreements of Member States17.  
As it is evident, there is still a great variety of situations in which Member States exercise their 
treaty-making power. In this article, however, we will address only three specific hypotheses 
that assume relevance both for the EU and for the international legal order, in order to 
understand how the Union has come to manage the Member States’ international agreements.  
 
3. Agreements Concluded by Member States on Behalf of the EU 
The practice of agreements being concluded by Member States on behalf of the Union has 
acquired a notable relevance in recent years.18 As we have seen, there could also be political 
reasons for the Union to decide to act externally through its Member States, even if it is often 
a matter of legal impediments. In all these cases, Member States enjoy a very limited degree 
of “contractual autonomy”, certainly the most limited if compared to other situations in which 
                                               
14 CJEU, Opinion 2/91 (ILO Convention n. 170), EU:C:1991:490, para. 5.  
15 Furthermore, the TFEU recognises a residual treaty-making power of Member States in specific 
matters. Arts. 34(2) allows for Member States participation in international organisations and 
conferences. Articles 165(3), 166(3), 167(3) and 168(3) provide that Member States shall enhance 
cooperation with third countries in the field of education, sport, vocational training, culture and public 
health. Also articles 191(4), 209(2), 212(3) and 214(4) preserve a role for Member States, stating that 
the competence of the Union to conclude treaties in the fields of environmental protection, development 
cooperation, economic, financial and technical cooperation is “without prejudice to Member States’ 
competence to negotiate in international bodies and to conclude agreements.” 
16 The effects produced by a renvoi, even if included in primary law, is however limited. The Court has 
recently acknowledged not to be competent to interpret the 1951 Geneva Convention, since the EU has 
not accessed it. See CJEU, case C-481/13, Qurbani, EU:C:2014:2101, para. 25: “The fact that Article 
78 TFEU provides that the common policy on asylum must be in accordance with the Geneva 
Convention and that Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union makes 
clear that the right to asylum is to be guaranteed with due respect for that convention and the Protocol 
relating to the status of refugees of 31 January 1967 is not such as to call into question the finding in 
paragraph 24 above that the Court does not have jurisdiction.” 
17 See, e.g., Regulation No. 338/97/EC on the Protection of Species of Wild Fauna and Flora by 
Regulating Trade Therein; Regulation No. 392/2009/EC on the Liability of Carriers of Passengers by 
Sea in the Event of Accidents; Directive No. 2005/35/EC on Ship-Source Pollution and on the 
Introduction of Penalties for Infringements. The Court has recognised in these cases that the reference 
provided by secondary legislation could entail a duty to take the agreement into consideration as an 
interpretative source. See CJEU, case C-510/99, Xavier Tridon, EU:C:2001:559, paras. 23-25.  
18 In contrast to what was originally expected. See P. KLEIN, La Responsabilité des Organisations 
Internationales, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1998, p. 329 : “L’hypothèse de la représentation de la 
Communauté européenne par ses Etats membres dans le domaine conventionnel appartient donc 
globalement au passé.” 
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they negotiate and ratify international treaties. Indeed, the conclusion of these agreements 
requires a considerable involvement of EU institutions.  
The procedure followed by the Commission and the Council for these agreements recalls the 
one set up by Article 218 of the TFEU for the conclusion of treaties by the Union itself. The 
Commission makes a proposal to the Council for a decision authorising Member States to 
negotiate and ratify an agreement in the interest of the EU. The terminology of these decisions 
has changed during the years. While, originally, they were drafted in terms of Member States 
acting “in the name and on behalf” of the Union, recent decisions have shifted to less technical 
formulations, usually requesting Member States to act “in the interest of the Union”. However, 
the change in terminology seems not to be particularly relevant as regards the nature of the 
decision or its effects.  
It is worth noting that the role of the negotiator is attributed to the Member States, which have 
to act according to a specific negotiating position, agreed by the Council and by the 
Commission.19 The entire negotiation phase must be conducted in compliance with the duty 
of sincere cooperation, enshrined in Article. 4(3) TEU.20 The value of the common position is 
self-evident: the result of a unitary representation of the Union by way of its Member States is 
achieved only in so far as the Member States conform themselves to the jointly defined 
negotiating position. In this sense, the duty of cooperation becomes an obligation of result, 
meaning that if Member States are not able to achieve the objective set forth in the common 
position, they are obliged not to conclude the agreement.21  
Once the text has been negotiated, the Council can authorise the Member States to conclude 
the treaty on behalf of the Union. The adoption of this decision, which must also provide the 
legal basis under which the agreement is to be ratified, should follow the same procedure of 
Article 218 of the TFEU. This must include, of course, the necessary consent of the European 
Parliament when required according to article 218(6) TFEU. This is also confirmed by the 
practice of the Commission. In a recent proposal to the Council, for a decision authorizing the 
Member States, in the interest of the EU, to ratify ILO no. 170 Convention, the Commission 
has stated that the proposal “is based on Article 218(6), applicable by analogy”.22 Council 
decisions also provide Article 218 of the TFEU as a legal basis for this kind of authorisation. 
The institutional balance that the Treaties have created between the different EU institutions 
should not be altered by the recourse to exceptional forms of external action.   
Even if it will become increasingly rare, the practice of the agreements concluded on behalf of 
the EU has developed also in relation to agreements not entirely covered by an exclusive 
competence of the EU. Nonetheless, with the aim of preserving the integrity of internal norms 
and, at the same time, of guaranteeing the coherence of its external action, the EU has 
                                               
19 Note, however, that there are cases where the role of the negotiator has been attributed to the 
Commission, as, for instance, in the negotiation of the Protocols of amendment to the Paris Convention 
of 29 July 1960 on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy. 
20 See M. CREMONA, Member States Agreements as Union Law, supra note 4, pp. 296-297. See, in this 
sense, the remarks of the Commission in COM (2014) 0559 final, Proposal for a Council Decision 
authorising Member States to ratify, in the interest of the European Union, the Protocol of 2014 to the 
Forced Labour Convention, 1930, of the International Labour Organisation with regard to matters 
related to judicial cooperation in criminal matters, Explanatory memorandum, p. 3.  
21 The content of the duty of cooperation would thus be rather different from that applicable in case of 
mixed agreements for the exercise of shared competences, where it is only an obligation of best efforts. 
This inevitably derives from the exclusive nature of the competence of the EU at stake.  
22 See, e.g., COM/2012/0677, Commission Proposal for a Council Decision authorising Member States 
to ratify, in the interests of the European Union, the Convention concerning Safety in the Use of 
Chemicals at Work, 1990, of the International Labour Organization (Convention No 170); 
COM/2013/152, Commission Proposal for a Council Decision authorising Member States to ratify, in 
the interests of the European Union, the Convention concerning decent work for domestic workers, 
2011, of the International Labour Organization (Convention No 189).  
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preferred to adopt such an instrument. Having its Member States as agents on the 
international level, even when they are partly exercising their own external competences, 
would grant the Union the possibility to participate in legal regimes that would otherwise be 
precluded.  
A remarkable number of international treaties has until today been concluded by Member 
States as agents of the EU (or the then EC). Apart from the already mentioned AETR and ILO 
No. 170 Convention, even recent practice is rather extensive. In 2002, the Council authorised 
Member States to ratify the Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage (the 
Bunkers Convention) of 2001.23 The case is relevant, as parts of the Bunkers Convention, 
particularly those related to matters of jurisdiction and recognition or enforcement of 
judgements, were covered by EU exclusive competence, while all the other substantive norms 
provided in the treaty clearly fell within the competence of the Member States. Notably, Article 
5 of the Council Decision imposes on Member States the duty to ‘use their best endeavours 
to ensure that the Bunkers Convention is amended to allow the Community to become a 
contracting party to it’.24  
Other examples are offered by the Decision authorising the Member States to ratify the 2003 
Protocol to the 1992 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund 
for Compensation of Oil Pollution Damage and the Decision authorising the Member States to 
ratify the 1996 Hague Convention on Parental Responsibility.25 Recently the Council has 
authorized Member States to ratify, in the interest of the Union, two ILO Conventions, namely 
the No. 170 Convention and the No. 189 Convention concerning Decent work for Domestic 
Workers.26 Member States have also been authorised to ratify in the interest of the Union the 
                                               
23 Council Decision No. 2002/762/EC of 19 September 2002.  
24 Other authorizations by the Council are to be found in the nuclear field, in relation to the Convention 
of 29 July 1960 on Third-Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, as amended by the Additional 
Protocol of 28 January 1964 and by the Protocol of 16 November 1982. See Council Decision No. 
2003/882/EC and Council Decision No. 2004/294/EC. See also Council Decision No. 2007/727/EC, 
which subsequently authorized Slovenia to individually ratify, in the interest of the Union, the Protocols 
to the Convention, due to the fact that, at the time of the previous authorizations, Slovenia was not yet 
a member of the EU. This is, however, a different case from that of authorization given on individual 
basis, which will be discussed in the next section. 
25 See Council Decision No. 2004/246/EC of 2 March 2004 and Council Decision No. 2003/93/EC of 19 
December 2002 authorising the Member States, in the interest of the Community, to sign the 1996 
Hague Convention on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition, enforcement and cooperation in respect 
of parental responsibility and measures for the protection of children.  
26 See Council Decision No. 2014/52/UE of 28 January 2014, authorising Member States to ratify, in 
the interest of the European Union, the Convention concerning Safety in the Use of Chemicals at Work, 
1990, of the ILO (Convention No 170); Council Decision No. 2014/51/EU of 28 January 2014, 
authorising Member States to ratify, in the interest of the European Union, the Convention concerning 
decent work for domestic workers, 2011, of the International Labour Organisation (Convention No 189).  
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2014 Protocol to the ILO Forced Labour Convention27 and the Arms Trade Treaty, which has 
been directly negotiated by the Commission.28  
Lastly, a number of Council decisions, authorising the Member States to conclude in the 
interest of the Union certain bilateral agreements for the accession of new States to the 1980 
Hague Convention on Child Abduction, have been the object of the recent Opinion 1/13 by the 
CJEU.29 Interestingly, the Court has confirmed that decisions related to Member States’ 
agreements could be scrutinised under the Article 218(11) TFEU procedure, thus extending 
the scope of the opinion procedure beyond the terms of the provision.30 This also seems to 
confirm that EU institutions are now likely to consider agreements concluded by the Member 
States on behalf of the EU as a particular form of EU external action.31 This is also linked to 
the fact that agreements concluded in the Union’s interest constitute a form of collective 
representation of the EU by means of its Member States acting collectively on the international 
plane, which marks the difference with agreements concluded individually by a single Member 
State with a third country, analysed in the next section.  
 
                                               
27 Due to the presence of opt-out clauses in the field of criminal cooperation, the authorisation to the 
ratification of the Protocol has been split into two different decisions, one addressing criminal 
cooperation provisions and the other addressing social policy issues. See Council Decision n. 
2015/2071/EU of 10 November 2015, authorising Member States to ratify, in the interests of the 
European Union, the Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930, of the International 
Labour Organisation as regards Articles 1 to 4 of the Protocol with regard to matters relating to judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters, in OJ L 301/47 and Council Decision n. 2015/2037/EU of 10 November 
2015, authorising Member States to ratify, in the interests of the European Union, the Protocol of 2014 
to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930, of the International Labour Organisation with regard to matters 
relating to social policy, in OJ L 298/23.  
28 See Council Decision n. 2014/165/EU of 3 March 2014, authoring Member States to ratify, in the 
interests of the European Union, the Arms Trade Treaty, in OJ L 89/44. Art. 1 of the Decision makes 
clear that it applies only “to those matters falling under the exclusive competence of the Union”.  
29 The dispute arose when the Commission proposed to the Council the adoption of certain decisions 
authorising Member States to conclude bilateral agreements with new States wishing to accede to the 
1980 Hague Convention on Child Abduction. Art. 38 of the Convention, in fact, provides that any new 
acceding States must conclude a bilateral agreement of accession with every State party to the 
Convention itself. The Council did not adopt the proposed decisions and the Commission brought a 
request for an opinion by the Court pursuant art. 218(11) TFEU. EU Member States objected during the 
proceeding that these agreements could not be considered as falling within the scope of application of 
an opinion procedure, since they do not constitute proper international agreements but merely acts of 
implementation of the Convention. See CJEU, Opinion 1/13, EU:C:2014:2303, paras. 29-32.  
30 See Opinion 1/13, paras. 43-44, once again stating that “[..]the question whether it may not be 
possible for the EU formally to become a party to an international agreement is irrelevant. In a situation 
where the conditions for being a party to such an agreement preclude the EU itself from concluding the 
agreement, although the latter falls within the EU’s external competence, that competence may be 
exercised through the intermediary of the Member States acting in the EU’s interest.” This conclusion 
had been already envisaged in M. CREMONA, Trustees of the Union Interest, supra note 4, p. 445, noting 
also that a negative decision of the Court on the compatibility of the agreement with EU law would not 
invalidate the agreement under international law. Of course, States will remain responsible for an 
unlawful exercise of their treaty-making power under EU law. 
31 However, the decision of the Court has been criticised also in the light of the fact that many of the 
concerned agreement were not more ‘envisaged’ according to art. 218(11) TFEU, since they’ve already 
been concluded by some Member States with third States, without the Council’s intervention. In these 
cases, it seems that a better solution would have been to start an infringement procedure against 
Member States, in order not to jeopardise the preventive function of the opinion mechanism. See on 
this point I. GOVAERE, “Setting the International Scene”: EU External Competence and Procedures Post-
Lisbon Revisited in the Light of Opinion 1/13, in Common Market Law Review 52, pp. 1299-1305.  
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4. The Authorization of Member States to Conclude International 
Agreements 
 
A rather different practice is that of prior authorisation for individual Member States to conclude 
an agreement with one or more third States. This section will present the main features of this 
kind of procedure, in order to distinguish these cases from those previously analysed.  
First, this practice is usually followed when the agreement that the Member State is ratifying 
falls partly within an EU exclusive competence. Although the procedure for authorisation for 
the conclusion of treaties has been provided by some regulations in limited  fields, it might be 
possible that there exists a general duty for  Member States to ask for  prior authorization 
when they are about to conclude a treaty with third States in a matter falling within the 
exclusive competence of the EU. This duty can be derived from the general provision of Article 
2(1) of the TFEU, which provides that  
‘When the Treaties confer on the Union exclusive competence in a specific area, only 
the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts, the Member States being able 
to do so themselves only if so empowered by the Union or for the implementation of 
Union acts’. 
Thus, whenever Member States are willing to act on the international level in a field of EU 
exclusive competence, they will be able to do so only if previously empowered by the Union, 
that is by requesting a prior authorisation to conclude of the international agreement. This 
seems also to be confirmed by the preamble of the regulations, in which, beside the legal 
basis, Article 2(1) TFEU is usually mentioned.  
One of the first examples is the Regulation on air service agreements between the Member 
States and third countries. The regulation followed the Open Skies cases, decided by the 
European Court of Justice in 1998, in which the Court found some Member States to be in 
breach of their EU obligations, for having unilaterally re-negotiated their bilateral air service 
agreements with the United States.32 In 2004 the above-mentioned Regulation was adopted, 
providing for a duty upon the Member States to notify the Commission of all the existing 
bilateral agreements on air service and to request authorisation for the conclusion of new 
bilateral agreements or for the amendment of existing ones. The rationale for such a regulation 
is to ensure that newly assumed international obligations of Member States are compatible 
with the EU legal order, and thus avoiding any possible normative conflicts between EU law 
and international commitments of Member States.33  
                                               
32 Regulation No. 847/2004/EC of 29 April 2004 on the negotiation and implementation of air service 
agreements between Member States and third countries. See references to judgments reported in note 
7.  
33 The same objective is pursued by a recent regulation regarding Member States’ agreements in the 
energy field. However, the regulation does not provide for a proper authorisation procedure, but instead 
it sets forth a system of information sharing between Member States and the Commission aimed at 
verifying the compatibility of envisaged agreements with EU law legislation in the energy sector. This 
could also be explained in the light of the shared nature of the Union competence in these matters. See 
Decision No 994/2012/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 
establishing an information exchange mechanism with regard to intergovernmental agreements 
between Member States and third countries in the field of energy, in OJ L 299/13. See also COM (2016) 
053 final, Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing an 
information exchange mechanism with regard to intergovernmental agreements and non-binding 
instruments between Member States and third countries in the field of energy and repealing Decision 
No 994/2012/EU.  
57 
 
After the air service agreements Regulation, two other Regulations have been adopted in the 
field of cooperation in civil matters.34 These Regulations set forth a more sophisticated 
mechanism, according to which the authorisation is to be requested by Member States before 
the opening of the negotiations. Member States will be authorised to enter into bilateral 
agreements under strict conditions.35 Before the signing of the agreement they have to notify 
to the Commission the outcome of the negotiation, so that the Commission can assess its 
compatibility with EU law. Moreover, the negotiated text must provide for special clauses 
regarding the possibility of full or partial denunciation in the event of the conclusion of a 
subsequent agreement of the EU – or of the EU and its Member States – with the same third 
country, and the direct replacement of the relevant provisions of the agreement with the 
provisions of the subsequent agreement concluded by the EU with the same third country.36 
In the event of a refusal, the Commission will adopt an opinion that will be discussed with the 
Member State concerned. 
In 2012, the new Regulation on Member States BITs was adopted. It followed  the extended 
scope  of the EU exclusive competence in the field of common commercial policy, which today, 
according to Article 207 of the TFEU, also covers foreign direct investments.37 The EU, 
however, has preferred not to oblige its Member States to terminate all their BITs and to 
renegotiate them, but instead has decided to set up a procedure to assess the compatibility of 
already existing and of newly concluded BITs with EU law and with EU external policy. The 
Regulation is indeed very similar to those on civil cooperation matters, although conditions 
under which the authorisation is to be issued are different.38 
In all these cases, it is for the Commission to verify the compatibility of the foreseen agreement 
with EU law and to decide whether to issue the authorisation.  This is usually to be sought 
                                               
34 See e.g. Regulation No. 664/2009/EC of 7 July 2009 establishing a procedure for the negotiation and 
conclusion of agreements between Member States and third countries concerning jurisdiction, 
recognition and enforcement of judgments and decisions in matrimonial matters, matters of parental 
responsibility and the law applicable to maintenance obligations; Regulation No. 662/2009/EC of 13 
July 2009 establishing a procedure for the negotiation and conclusion of agreements between Member 
States and third countries on particular matters concerning the law applicable to contractual and non-
contractual obligations.  
35 In particular, that the EU does not have an agreement on the same subject matter nor an agreement 
of this kind is likely to be concluded by the EU in the next 24 moths; that Member States have 
demonstrated that they have a specific interest in concluding the agreement due to economic, 
geographical, cultural, historical, social or political ties with the third country concerned; that the 
envisaged agreement will not render EU law ineffective and will not undermine the proper functioning 
of that law; that the agreement will not undermine the object and purpose of EU’s external relations 
policy.  
36 Art. 5 of both Regulation No. 662/2009/EC of 13 July 2009 and Regulation No. 664/2009/EC of 7 July 
2009.  
37 See L. PANTALEO, Member States Prior Agreements and Newly EU Attributed Competence: What 
Lesson from Foreign Investment, in European Foreign Affairs Review 19, 2014, pp. 312-315, arguing 
that the Regulation could be considered as an application by analogy of the priority rule of anterior 
treaties provided by art. 351(1) TFEU. See also J. P. TERHECHTE, Art. 351 TFEU, the Principle of Loyalty 
and the Future Role of the Member States’ Bilateral Investment Treaties, in European Yearbook of 
International Economic Law, 2011, pp. 79 ff.  
38 See Regulation No. 1219/2012/EU of 12 December 2012 establishing transitional arrangements for 
bilateral investments agreements between Member States and third countries. Art. 9 provides 
conditions for the authorisation to open the negotiation: that the agreement is not in conflict with Union 
law, apart from the incompatibilities arising from the allocation of competences between the EU and its 
Member States; that it is not superfluous, because the Commission has submitted a proposal to open 
negotiations for the same agreement under art. 218(3) TFEU; that is consistent with Union’s principles 
and objective for external action; that it does not constitute an obstacle for the conclusion of BITs with 
third countries by the EU. The Commission may also require Member States to include or remove from 
such agreements any clauses where necessary to ensure consistency with the Union’s investment 
policy or compatibility with EU law.  
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before the signature of the treaty, once the text has been adopted. In fact, according to Article 
18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), the signature is the moment 
which triggers a general good faith obligation on the parties not to behave contrary to the 
object and purpose of the treaty, although the agreement only enters into force with the 
ratification. This procedure is aimed at facilitating the work of the Commission, which can 
conduct its verification on the basis of a fixed and definitive text, but before the assumption of 
any kind of international obligation by the Member State.  
5. Effects of Member States Agreements in the EU legal order 
What effects do agreements ratified by Member States have within the EU legal order? Since 
the EU is formally not a party to the treaty, at least from an international law point of view, what 
consequences does the ratification by its Member States have for the Union? The answer 
depends on the degree of EU involvement in the conclusion of the agreement. The different 
effects will be analysed according to the order followed in the sections above.  
5.1 Agreements Concluded on Behalf of the EU: the Doctrine of Representation 
A related issue concerns the question whether an international organisation is bound by its 
Member States’ international obligations.  It can be argued that the set of international 
obligations which bind an international organisation cannot be defined without taking into 
account the international duties of its Member States.39 At the same time, the so-called pacta 
tertiis rule, enshrined in Article 34 of the VCLT,40 provides that treaties can have no legal 
effects on third parties. However, agreements concluded by Member States on behalf or in 
the interest of the Union, have quite contradictory legal implications. On the one hand, they 
provide international obligations that States have assumed merely as agents of the EU, 
adhering to international legal regimes the EU has an interest to be part of, while, on the other 
hand, Member States remain the only subjects responsible, on the international level, for any 
form of non-compliance or breach of those agreements, in particular as far as implementation 
is concerned.  
Some authors have observed that when Member States of an international organisation are 
concluding treaties on its behalf, the international obligations should be considered to bind the 
organisation as well.41 They have thus recalled the doctrine of international representation 
(inspired by contract law) according to which a subject of international law can be represented 
by another subject in the adoption of legal acts or in the commission of legally relevant facts 
with one or more third parties.42 The legal consequence of the relationship between the 
representative subject and the represented one is that all the obligations assumed by the 
                                               
39 P. KLEIN, La responsabilité des Organisations Internationales, supra note 18, p. 326.  
40 Art. 34 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: “A treaty does not create either 
obligations or rights for a third party without its consent.” The same provision is to be found in art. 34 of 
the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organisations 
and between International Organisations.  
41 P. KLEIN, La responsabilité des Organisations Internationales, supra note 18, pp. 326-331; F. NAERT, 
Binding International Organisations to Member State Treaties or Responsibility of Member States for 
Their Own Actions in the Framework of International Organisations, supra note 22, pp. 132-133.  
42 The original definition is to be found in R. DAOUDI, La représentation en droit international, Paris, 
L.G.D.J., 1980, p. 228: “un phénomène de substitution du sujet de droit représentant au sujet de droit 
répresenté dans l’accomplissement d’actes juridiques internationaux ou d’activités matérielle dans les 
relations de ce dernier avec un ou des tiers.” See also A. P. SERENI, Agency in International Law, in 
American Journal of International Law 34, 1940, p. 638. During the preparatory works for the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, the ILC discussed the matter of States concluding treaties on behalf 
of other States or international organisations. Much of the debate was related as to whether this practice 
would fall within the scope of the rules on capacity and thus would not deserve a specific regulation. 
During the Conference of Vienna the matter was set aside and no rule is to be found in the Convention. 
See ILC, 781st Meeting, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol. I, 1965, p. 39 ff.  
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representative will be binding upon the represented. However, the possibility under 
international law of applying the doctrine of representation needs to be cautiously verified.  
The VCLT does not contain any reference to the possible application of the doctrine of 
international representation, nor does the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
between States and International Organisations and between International Organisations 
(VCLT-IOs). Should the doctrine be considered as based on customary international law, it 
would be quite difficult to find the necessary evidence in State practice. Apart from the EU, 
examples of States representing international organisations in the conclusion of treaties with 
third parties are extremely rare and debated.43 Of course, the possibility of considering the EU 
directly bound, vis-à-vis third States, to international obligations assumed by Member States 
on its behalf would enhance the clarity of the applicable law regime, and would help to avoid 
conflicts between EU law and international law. At the same time, it seems difficult to accept 
that such a doctrine is applicable in international treaty relations, for the reasons mentioned 
above.44  
Moreover, the CJEU has never intervened on the matter, except only incidentally in the 
Commune de Mesquer case.45 The Court made clear that both the International Convention 
on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage and the provisions of the International Oil Pollution 
Compensation Fund Convention were not applicable to the case at hand, since the then 
Community had never ratified them and not even all the Member States were contracting 
parties to these treaties at the time of the judgment. The Court also referred to Council 
Decision No. 2004/246, which authorised Member States to conclude in the interest of the EU 
the 2003 Protocol to the Fund Convention, but considered that it had no relevance in that 
proceedings.46 The Court does not seem, however, to have in principle excluded that 
agreements concluded in the interest of the EU could also be binding on the EU itself, but 
simply did not accept the argument that  the convention had become (retroactively) binding 
on the Union, merely because Member States had ratified the Protocol to one of the invoked 
conventions in the interest of the EU. According to the settled case law of the CJEU, this can 
only happen throughout the application of the functional succession doctrine.47  
To a certain extent, this problem is related to a more general question, that is whether 
international organisations can be considered bound by their Member States’ international 
obligations. According to some authors, international organisations are ‘transitively bound’ to 
obligations of their Member States.48 Moreover, the answer could also change depending on 
                                               
43 See, e.g., P. KLEIN, La responsabilité des Organisations Internationals, supra note 18, pp. 326-330, 
giving an account of UN practice, with particular reference to some treaties ratified by the United States 
on behalf of the UN during the Korean War, and of the practice of the Danube Commission.  
44 See e.g. F. MÉGRET, F. HOFFMAN, The UN as Human Rights Violator? Some Reflections on the United 
Nations Changing Human Rights Responsibilities, in Human Rights Quarterly, 2003, p. 318.  
45 The case, related to the Erika accident and to its grave consequences for the French coasts, also 
raised the question on the status within EU law of the Convention on the liability for oil pollution damage. 
See CJEU, case C-188/07, Commune de Mesquer, EU:C:2008:359.  
46 Ibid., paras. 85-86.  
47 The high threshold set by the Court’s case-law, however, has rendered the application of the 
functional succession extremely difficult. The succession of the Union has been rejected in a number 
of cases, among which see CJEU, case C-301/08, Bogiatzi, EU:C:2009:649, paras. 26-34 (in relation 
to the Warsaw Convention for the unification of certain rules relating to the international carriage by air 
of 1929); CJEU, case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America and Others v. Secretary of State 
for Energy and Climate Change (ATAA), EU:C:2011:864, para. 63 (in relation to the Chicago 
Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944). 
48 See e.g. H. G. SCHERMERS, N. M. BLOKKER, International Institutional Law, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2011, p. 996, that, drawing upon the principles on State succession, have considered that 
“by analogy, an organisation formed by States will be bound by the obligations to which the individual 
states where committed when they transferred powers to the organisation.” 
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the number of Member States that have ratified a certain convention.49 Indeed, it is preferable 
to consider the organisation bound only to agreements ratified by all Member States, to 
exclude the risk of indirectly applying a treaty norm to third parties. In a recent judgment, the 
CJEU has upheld a similar reasoning, confirming the possibility of interpreting EU secondary 
legislation in conformity with an international agreement only when the latter has been ratified 
by all EU Member States.50 In any case, it remains unclear whether this “transitive” assumption 
of Member States obligations by the organisations will apply only in relation to previous 
agreements or even to subsequent ones.51  
Even if decisions authorizing Member States to conclude a treaty on behalf of the Union 
cannot produce any external effect, that is to bind the Union on the international level, the 
internal effects of these decisions must be analysed.  
It is submitted, in fact, that agreements that all Member States have concluded in the interest 
of the EU should be considered as internally binding on the Union, that is, in its relationship 
with the Member States. Indeed, when the competence exercised by the Union is exclusive 
and it is in the interest of the Union itself to enter into an agreement with third States, but it 
proves to be difficult to achieve this, it can be argued that the EU has shown the political will 
and has somehow expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty.52 In that case the 
participation of the Union in the negotiations and the acknowledgement by third States of the 
fact that Member States are simply representing the EU in the conclusion of the agreement, 
seems to confirm that the agreement is directly binding on the Union.53 
Furthermore, in the majority of the cases the responsibility for the implementation of these 
agreements will fall on the EU. In fact, while Member States are responsible for the 
implementation of the agreement vis-à-vis the other contracting parties, they will not have the 
power to adopt any national measure which is covered by an EU exclusive competence. It is 
thus inevitable that the duty of implementation – at least as far as matters of EU exclusive 
competence are concerned – rests solely on EU institutions.54  
All the above considerations, of course, also provide an answer to another question. When 
the agreement concluded by the Member States is implemented by the EU, would this amount 
to an integration of the agreement into the EU legal order? Would it be possible, then, to review 
the implementation measures in light of the agreement? 
The matter is rather different in the case of agreements recalled in Union law by a renvoi. In 
Intertanko, the Court has recognised that the validity of an EU Directive could not be reviewed 
                                               
49 For instance, according to De Schutter, the number of ratifying Member States will be irrelevant for 
the agreement to have binding effects on the organisation. O. DE SCHUTTER, Human Rights and the 
Rise of International Organisations, in J. WOUTERS, E. BREMS, S. SMIS, P. SCHMITT (eds.), Accountability 
for Human Rights Violations by International Organisations, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2010, p. 64.  
50 CJEU, case C-537/11, Manzi v. Capitaneria di Porto di Genova, EU:C:2014:19, paras. 45-49.  
51 See K. DAUGIRDAS, How and Why International Law Binds International Organisations, in Harvard 
International Law Journal, 2016, p. 350 ff.  
52 This could essentially amount to an “anticipated succession” of the EU into the obligations of Member 
States. See F. CASOLARI, La Corte di giustizia e gli obblighi convenzionali assunti dall’insieme degli Stati 
membri verso Stati terzi: obblighi comuni o… obblighi comunitari?, in Il Diritto dell’Unione europea, 
2009, pp. 271-273.  
53 Moreover, in the Libor Cipra case, the Court has affirmed that the AETR forms part of the Community 
law and that it had the jurisdiction to interpret it. See CJEU, case C-439/01, Libor Cipra and Vlastimil 
Kvasnicka v. Bezirkshaupt- mannschaft Mistelbach, EU:C:2003:31, paras 23–4. 
54 Conversely, when parts of the assumed obligations fall within a retained competence of the Member 
States, they will also be responsible for implementing them. This implies a far more complex 
coordination with EU institutions, which resembles the pattern of implementation of mixed agreements, 
governed by the duty of loyalty. On this latter aspect see E. NEFRAMI, The Duty of Loyalty: Rethinking 
its Scope through its Application in the Field of EU External Relations, in Common Market Law Review, 
2010, pp. 332-337.  
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in the light of the Marpol 73/78,55 even though some of the provisions contained in the Directive 
made explicit reference to Marpol.56 However, the Court took the view that the relevant 
provisions of the Directive were to be interpreted consistently with the Marpol 73/78.57 A renvoi 
to an international agreement that is not binding upon the EU could trigger the application of 
the principle of consistent interpretation, in order to avoid possible conflicts between EU 
secondary law and international obligations of Member States.58  
The case of agreements concluded by Member States on behalf of the EU is, however, 
different. If we assume that the agreement is binding upon the Union – at least from an internal 
point of view – this would imply that secondary law could be reviewed in the light of that 
agreement, subject to its capability of producing direct effects within the EU legal order.59 This 
is the only way to enhance the consistency of EU external action by means of Member States 
representation and to avoid situations in which Member States could be deemed 
internationally responsible for the actions of the EU.60  
5.2 Agreements Concluded Under Prior EU Authorisation 
The main difference between agreements concluded on behalf of the EU and agreements 
concluded under EU authorisation is that in the latter case Member States are usually acting 
individually and in their own interest.61 Their treaty-making power, however, suffers some 
restraints deriving from the fact that they are a member of the EU. This is caused by two main 
concerns: that Member States do not escape from their EU law obligations by entering into 
                                               
55 The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (so-called Marpol) is one of 
the main instrument in international law dealing with pollution of the maritime environment by ships from 
operational or accidental causes. The Marpol was adopted within the International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO) in 1973. The Protocol of 1978 absorbed the previous convention and both of them 
entered into force in 1983.  
56 CJEU, case C-308/06, The Queen, on the application of International Association of Independent 
Tank Owners (Intertanko) and Others v. Secretary of State for Transport, EU:C:2008:312, paras. 50-
52.  
57 Ibid., para. 52. See also, with reference to the CITES Convention, Criminal Proceedings against 
Xavier Tridon, supra note 17, paras. 23-25; CJEU, case C-154/02, Criminal Proceedings against Jan 
Nilsson, EU:C:2003:590, para. 39.  
58 The doctrine – originally conceived in order to strengthen the effectiveness of directives lacking direct 
effect – requires national law to be interpreted in the light of the directive’s provisions. See generally M. 
KLAMERT, Judicial Implementation of Directives and Anticipatory Direct Effect: Connecting the Dots, in 
Common Market Law Review, 2006, p. 1251 ff. See also F. CASOLARI, Giving Indirect Effect to 
International Law within the EU Legal Order: the Doctrine of Consistent Interpretation, in E. CANNIZZARO, 
P. PALCHETTI, R. A. WESSEL (eds.), International Law as the Law of the European Union, Leiden, 2012, 
pp. 395-415. Authors have suggested that the duty of consistent interpretation may be considered as a 
corollary of the principle of systemic integration set forth by art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. See e.g. M. 
ARCARI, The Creeping Constitutionalisation and Fragmentation of International Law: From 
“Constitutional” to “Consistent” Interpretation, in Polish Yearbook of International Law, 2013, p. 19.  
59 However, if we consider that the agreement is binding upon the EU by the sole virtue of its 
implementation, it would be difficult to affirm that it could take primacy over EU secondary legislation. 
See M. CREMONA, Member States Agreements as Union Law, supra note 12, p. 309.  
60 See, in this respect, the Declaration by the ILO regarding the responsibility of Member States deriving 
from actions attributable to the EU, presented in relation to the conclusion of ILO No. 170 Convention, 
cited in Opinion 2/91, supra note 10.  
61 The need to distinguish between the two categories of agreements has been highlighted by various 
Authors. See, e.g., A. ROSAS, The Status in EU Law of International Agreements Concluded by EU 
Member States, supra note 4, p. 1333; M. CREMONA, Member States Agreements as Union Law, supra 
note 12, pp. 315-322. See also F. NAERT, Binding International Organisations to Member State Treaties 
or Responsibility of Member States for Their Own Actions in the Framework of International 
Organisations, in J. WOUTERS, E. BREMS, S. SMIS, P. SCHMITT (eds.), Accountability for Human Rights 
Violations of International Organisations, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2010, p. 132.  
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international regimes with third countries; and that the integrity and the autonomy of the EU 
legal order is protected from  contradictory actions undertaken by different  Member States. 
As already seen, the duty to request an authorisation found its raison d’etre in preventing 
Member States to assume international obligations that could conflict with EU law. At the same 
time, the authorisation is somehow a useful tool to protect the Member States’ position vis-à-
vis third States.  
Despite the EU intervention in the phases preceding the conclusion of the agreement, this 
cannot be considered as binding upon the Union, at least for two reasons. Firstly, the 
authorisation for the conclusion issued by the Commission is not in any way a proof of the 
consent of the Union itself to be bound by the treaty. Not only does the Commission have  
limited powers in the external representation of the EU,62 its role in these agreements is to 
avoid any possible infringements of EU law by the external action of EU Member States, which 
serves a purely internal function. Secondly, agreements concluded with a prior authorisation 
of the EU are usually bilateral agreements. It seems difficult to argue that a single Member 
State, in its bilateral relations with third countries, has the power to bind the EU and the entirety 
of its Member States within the meaning of Article 216(2) of the TFEU. The lack of consent on 
the part of the EU and of the other Member States to conclude that agreement seems sufficient 
to exclude such an effect.  
Still, these agreements are not without relevance for the EU legal order. Once the agreement 
has been concluded upon authorisation of the EU, it is submitted that Article 4(3) of the TFEU 
should govern the relationship between the EU and the Member State concerned by that 
agreement. Consequently, it flows from the principle of sincere cooperation, but also from the 
international law principles of pacta sunt servanda and of good faith, that EU institutions are 
obliged not to impede Member States to comply with their international obligations.63 It has 
been argued that the principle of primacy of Member States’ anterior agreements (provided in 
Article 351 TFEU) cannot be applied to posterior treaties.64 AG Kokott  has argued, in the 
conclusion to the Commune de Mesquer proceedings, that an application of Article. 351 TFEU 
is even ‘conceivable where an international obligation on the part of a Member State conflicts 
with a subsequently agreed measure of secondary law’65. The Court, however, has remained 
silent on the argument.  
 
6. Member States Position within Other International Organisations 
The last form of interaction between EU law and Member States’ international obligations 
relates to the position of the latter in other international organisations. Even in this case, recent 
practice is showing a growing degree of interference by EU institutions as to how Member 
States should behave within other international organisations, particularly as regards the use 
of voting rights. To this aim, the Treaty of Amsterdam and, subsequently, the Treaty of Nice, 
had provided the EU with the power to establish a common position that Member States have 
                                               
62 For an overview of the recent practice on EU institutions and external representation of the Union 
see A. P. VAN DER MEI, Case Note on EU External Relations and Internal Inter-Institutional Conflicts, in 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 2016, pp. 1051-1076; see also P. G. ANDRADE, 
The Distribution of Powers Between EU Institutions for Conducting External Affairs through Non-Binding 
Instruments, in European Papers, 2016, pp. 115-125.  
63 Even if this duty has been until today recognized by the CJEU only with reference to international 
agreements falling within the scope of art. 351 of the TFEU. See, e.g., CJEU, case 812/79, Attorney 
General v. Juan C. Burgoa, EU:C:1980:231, para. 9.  
64 See Capotorti AG in Case C-181/80, Procureur Général v. Arbelaiz-Emazabel, EU:C:1981:192, para. 
4.  
65 See Kokott AG in Case C-188/07, Commune de Mesquer, supra note 45, para. 95. According to this 
argument, however, the posterior treaty would not prevail over prior secondary law.  
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to follow when they are acting in the framework of international organisations.66 Until recently, 
however, the norm has been usually applied to organisations to which both the Union and the 
Member States were parties.  
Today, Article 218(9) TFEU attributes to the Council the competence to adopt such a common 
position. The norm is a confirmation of the Court’s case-law on the duty of sincere cooperation 
under Article 4(3) TEU and its implications on the scope of Member States’ individual action. 
Article 218(9) TFEU reads as follows:  
‘The Council, on a proposal from the Commission or the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall adopt a decision suspending 
application of an agreement and establishing the positions to be adopted on the 
Union's behalf in a body set up by an agreement, when that body is called upon to 
adopt acts having legal effects, with the exception of acts supplementing or amending 
the institutional framework of the agreement’. 
It follows from this Treaty article that the rationale behind the common position is to strengthen 
the coherence of the external action of the EU by requiring Member States to behave on the 
international level in a manner consistent with EU law and according to EU interests. This was 
clearly the argument behind the Court’s decision in the Commission v. Greece case, which 
was related to a unilateral proposal put forward by Greece within the framework of the IMO.67 
In this case, however, the breach attributed to Greece consisted in the adoption of a unilateral 
proposal in a matter falling within the Union’s exclusive competence, notwithstanding the fact 
that the Union was not a member of the IMO. According to the Court, the fact ‘that the 
Community is not a member of an international organisation does not prevent its external 
competence from being in fact exercised, in particular through the Member States acting jointly 
in the Community’s interest’.68 The argument of a de facto exercise by the Member States of 
Union’s external powers is not new for the Court and evidently it recalls the one applied in the 
context of agreements concluded by Member States on behalf of the EU. The aim, once again, 
is to avoid actions on the international plane that might negatively affect the integrity of EU 
law, particularly when there is a risk of Member States assuming international obligations 
capable of affecting internal common rules. 
In a similar vein, the Court considered a few years later, in the Commission v. Sweden case, 
that Sweden had breached its EU law obligations by unilaterally proposing the listing of a 
substance within an annex to the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants.69 
                                               
66 The EEC Treaty did not contain any such procedure, even if art. 116 provided that “[f]rom the end of 
the transitional period onwards, Member States shall, in respect of all matters of particular interest to 
the common market, proceed within the framework of international organisations of an economic 
character only by common action. To this end, the Commission shall submit to the Council, which shall 
act by a qualified majority, proposals concerning the scope and implementation of such common 
action.” The Court has frequently made reference to the rule. See CJEU, joined cases C-3/76, 4/76, 
6/76, Kramer and others, ECLI:EU:C:1976:114, paras. 42-44; CJEU, Opinion 1/78, 
ECLI:EU:C:1979:224, paras. 49-50, in which the Court affirmed that art. 116 was conceived with a view 
to evolving common action by Member States in international organisations of which the Community 
was not part and that, in such situations, “the only appropriate means is concerted, joint action by 
Member States as member of the said organisation.” 
67 The proposal was related to the establishment of a system of monitoring of compliance with the 
SOLAS and the International Ships and Port Facility Security Code, whose objects fell within the scope 
of already adopted EU secondary legislation.  
68 CJEU, case C-45/07, Commission v. Greece, EU:C:2009:81, paras 31-31.  
69 CJEU, case C-246/07, Commission v. Sweden (PFOS), EU:C:2010:203. On the case see G. DE 
BAERE, “O, Where is Faith? O, Where is Loyalty?” Some Thoughts on the Duty of Loyal Co-operation 
and the Union’s External Environmental Competences in the Light of the PFOS case, in European Law 
Review, pp. 405-419. See also M. CREMONA, Case C-246/07, Commission v. Sweden (PFOS), 
Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 20 April 2010, in Common Market Law Review 
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In that case, a particular emphasis was put on the obligations for Sweden deriving from the 
general duty of sincere cooperation in the field of external relations, but Sweden’s breach  was 
mainly a consequence of the fact that the Union was trying to set a common position from 
which Sweden decided to depart. Therefore, even if the competence at stake was a shared 
one, the Court applied the principle of sincere cooperation as entailing a duty on the Member 
States to facilitate the achievement of the objectives set forth in the Treaties and, in any event, 
not to jeopardise them.70 
Although Commission v. Greece and Commission v. Sweden were relevant in assessing the 
scope of Member States’ obligations when acting on the international plane – in particular as 
regards the need to adopt a common attitude vis-à-vis third States or international 
organisations – they were not directly related to the question of EU powers in relation to an 
international organisation to which only Member States were parties.  
Even after the CITES case, in which the Courts addressed the interpretation of Article 218(9) 
TFEU, the question remained unsettled. This case was about a dispute regarding an EU 
common position within the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). The EU was not a party to the 
Convention, but it had adopted secondary legislation with a view to implement CITES within 
the EU legal order. The issue at stake was mainly related to the nature of Article 218(9) TFEU 
and to whether it could be regarded as a sufficient and autonomous legal basis for the 
establishment of a common position by the Council. In this particular case, though, it was not 
a common position of the EU that the Council had established but a common position to be 
adopted by the Member States within the Conference of the CITES. The Court, following the 
opinion of the Advocate General, deemed that Article 218(9) TFEU could not constitute the 
only legal basis for such an act, being a competence of a procedural character. It confirmed 
that a substantive legal basis would have been necessary for the act to be legitimate. The 
Court did not take any position as to whether Article 218(9) TFEU could be applicable also to 
international organisations or agreements to which only Member States are parties. But the 
fact that it deemed necessary for such a decision to mention a substantive legal basis could 
be read as an implicit acknowledgment of this possibility.71  
In the recent OIV case the Court has firmly confirmed the applicability of Article 218(9) TFEU 
to situations in which only the Member States are parties to an agreement or members of an 
organisation. The judgment is of great relevance for the whole field of EU external relations 
and of course it is of a particular significance in the analysis of the interaction between EU law 
and international agreements of Member States.  
In 2012 Germany brought an action for annulment of a Council decision establishing, in 
accordance with Article 218(9) TFEU, a common position to be adopted by the Member States 
on behalf of the EU with regard to the adoption of certain resolutions in the context of the 
International Organisation for Wine and Vine (OIV), in which the Union is not a member nor 
an observer. The dispute involved two issues that have a great impact on the duties imposed 
on Member States in the management of their international affairs. Germany contested the 
Council’s decision on two different grounds, namely that Artcile 218(9) TFEU would not be 
applicable to agreements to which the EU is not a party and that a common position could not 
                                               
48, pp. 1639-1666. The Convention, however, is a mixed agreement and thus both the EU and its 
Member States are parties to it.  
70 Commission v. Sweden, paras. 69-71, recalling Opinion 1/03, par. 119 and Mox Plant, par. 164. In 
this sense, the duty of loyal cooperation implies a duty of abstention even if the competence at issue is 
neither originally exclusive nor exclusive by virtue of the ERTA doctrine. See on this point G. DE BAERE, 
“O, Where is Faith? O, Where is Loyalty?”, cit., pp. 417-418.  
71 See P. KOUTRAKOS, EU International Relations Law, Hart, Oxford, 2015, p. 156.  
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be established in relation to acts not having a binding force under international law, as was 
the case with OIV resolutions.72  
As for the first claim, Germany had argued that the fact that the Union was not a member of 
the organisation could not per se be decisive on the issue, citing Article 34 TEU as an example 
of a provision expressly obliging Member States to represent the Union’s position in 
international organisations and international conferences.73 The Council, supported by the 
Commission, objected to the claim with different arguments, based both on the wording of 
Article 218(9) TFEU, which just makes a general reference to ‘agreements’ and on the 
necessity to protect the exercise of EU competences through the coordination of Member 
States’ international action.  
The conclusions of the Advocate General provide a detailed analysis of the provision 
concerned, starting from its drafting history and trying to apply both a contextual and a 
teleological interpretation in order to fully understand the scope of Article 218(9) TFEU. After 
having excluded the relevance of the CITES judgment to the case at hand,74 the Advocate 
General addressed the interpretation of the provision from different angles. He highlighted the 
fact that the provision concerns a special procedure that should be followed both for the 
suspension of international agreements and for the establishment of a common position. Since 
the suspension can only occur in relation to EU agreements, the term ‘agreements’ should be 
read as being limited to agreements to which the EU is a party.75 More interestingly, the 
Advocate General takes into account the exception, provided in the second part of the 
provision, on the inapplicability of the simplified procedure in relation to acts ‘supplementing 
or amending the institutional framework of the agreement’. This exception would qualify the 
simplified procedure set forth in Article 218(9) TFEU as a lex specialis with regard to the 
general procedure for the conclusion of international agreements. In fact, the simplified 
procedure provides a limit to the Parliament’s participation and it is therefore not applicable in 
cases where the acts concern such a relevant issue as the modification of the terms of an 
international agreement. The consequence of having established a relationship of speciality 
between the general procedure for the conclusion of EU agreements and the simplified one 
                                               
72 CJEU, case C-399/12, Germany v. Council (OIV), EU:C:2014:2258, paras. 29-36.  
73 This is the case of Member States sitting within the UN Security Council. See I. GOVAERE, Novel 
Issues Pertaining to EU Member States Membership of Other International Organisations: The OIV 
Case, in I. GOVAERE, E. LANNON, P. VAN ELSUWEGE, S. ADAM (eds.), The European Union in the World. 
Essays in Honour of Marc Maresceau, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2014, pp. 234-235. Note, 
however, that being this case related only to PESC matters, the principle does not seems applicable to 
other areas of EU competence. In particular, where the object or the activity of the organisations falls 
outside the PESC, Member States would not enjoy the possibility of a constructive abstention and will 
thus remain subjected to the general majority rule when voting in the Council on the EU’s common 
position. See art. 31 TEU, according to which “When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council 
may qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration under the present subparagraph. In that case, 
it shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union. In a 
spirit of mutual solidarity, the Member State concerned shall refrain from any action likely to conflict with 
or impede Union action based on that decision and the other Member States shall respect its position. 
If the members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this way represent at least one third of the 
Member States comprising at least one third of the population of the Union, the decision shall not be 
adopted.” In this situation a State opposing the decision would just have the duty not to impede the 
Union action. Then, whenever an EU position could not be adopted, the State will remain free to act 
unilaterally and independently. Another example is provided by art. 138(1) TFEU in relation to 
international financial organisations: “In order to secure the euro's place in the international monetary 
system, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt a decision establishing common 
positions on matters of particular interest for economic and monetary union within the competent 
international financial institutions and conferences. The Council shall act after consulting the European 
Central Bank.” 
74 Conclusions of AG Cruz Villalón in Germany v. Council (OIV), EU:C:2014:289, paras. 53-59. 
75 Ibid., paras. 66-69.  
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under Article 218(9) TFEU is, according to the Advocate General, that the latter is not 
applicable to the international agreements of Member States.76   
Regarding the second issue of the case, the one related to the meaning of ‘acts having legal 
effects’, the dispute concerned the question whether these effects should be assessed 
according to international law or to EU law. In fact, under international law, resolutions as 
those usually adopted within the OIV are not binding and thus do not produce legal effects.77 
As a consequence, Germany argued that these acts were therefore not capable of triggering 
the mechanism of Article 218(9) TFEU. According to the Council’s position instead, the 
assessment of the legal effects should focus on the impact of the acts on the Union acquis. In 
particular, the potential effects would be derived from the dynamic reference to OIV resolutions 
in several EU acts since 2008.78 The Advocate General considered the fact that EU legislation 
had made reference to OIV resolutions  not sufficient to confer on them a quality they did not 
possess. In fact, Article 218(9) TFEU, when referring to acts having legal effects which the 
body set up by the agreement ‘is called upon to adopt’, creates a close relationship between 
these acts and the action of the international body and it is in this perspective that the notion 
of its effects is to be assessed. Thus, according to the Advocate General  
‘The body would thus be called upon to adopt acts which have legal effects ab 
origine. The contested provision does not therefore concern cases where acts without 
legal effects acquire them for all intents and purposes only ex post facto, through the 
internal law of a contracting party (in this case, the European Union), not even where 
this occurs automatically by means of a dynamic reference, but rather cases where 
acts exhibit that quality from the outset (and, therefore, in the legal order of the body 
itself, that is to say, international law).’79  
The Court addressed both claims in a rather brief manner and upheld the arguments of the 
Council by acknowledging the applicability of Article 218(9) TFEU to Member States’ 
international agreements. Without any reference to the arguments put forward by the Advocate 
General, the Court found that  
‘where an area of law falls within a competence of the European Union, the fact that 
the European Union did not take part in the international agreement in question does 
not prevent it from exercising that competence by establishing, through its institutions, 
a position to be adopted on its behalf in the body set up by that agreement, in particular 
through Member States which are party to that agreement acting jointly in its interest.’80  
It seems that the Court has adopted a pure competence perspective, without addressing the 
interpretation of the terms of Article 218(9) or taking into account the context in which the 
provision is settled. With a rather circular argument, the Court reached the conclusion that 
                                               
76 Ibid., paras. 74-77.  
77 See, however, ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, in I.C.J. 
Reports 1996, p. 226, para. 70, where the ICJ recognised that certain acts, like General Assembly’s 
resolution, can have a normative value, even if not binding upon the Member States. On the relationship 
between recommendations and good faith obligations see P. DAILLIER, A. PELLET, Droit international 
public, Paris, L.G.D.J., 2002, pp. 379-380.  
78 See in particular Council Regulation n. 479/2008 of 29 April 2008 on the common organisation of the 
market in wine, amending Regulations (EC) No. 1493/1999, (EC) No. 1782/2003, (EC) No. 1290/2005, 
(EC) No. 3/2008 and repealing Regulations (EEC) No. 2392/86 and (EC) No. 1493/1999, OJ L 148/1; 
Council Regulation n. 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common organisation of agricultural 
markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation), OJ L 
299/1, as amended by Council Regulation n. 491/2009 of 25 May 2009, OJ L 154/1.  
79 AG Cruz Villalón in Germany v. Council (OIV), supra note 75, para. 90.  
80 Germany v. Council (OIV), supra note 72, para. 52. The Court also makes reference to the 
Commission v. Greece judgment and to Opinion 2/91, even if, as already observed, the issues at stake 
in those cases were not properly the same.  
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Article 218(9) concerns the establishment of common positions in relation to agreements to 
which the Union is not a party because, otherwise, EU external competence could not be fully 
exercised.81  
The Court also applied an extensive approach in relation to the notion of ‘acts having a legal 
effect’. Following again the Council’s argument, the Court recognised that, by virtue of the 
reference to OIV resolutions contained in EU secondary legislation, the acts of the OIV are 
‘decisively’ capable of influencing EU rules in the area of the common organisation of the wine 
markets. This argument seems justifiable at least from an EU law perspective, since the 
reference contained in secondary legislation is a dynamic one, thus incorporating not only 
existing OIV resolutions but also resolutions to be adopted in the future.82 No mention is to be 
found in the Court’s reasoning as to the fact that resolutions of the OIV are mere 
recommendations and thus, according to international law, do not have any binding force. 
By looking at recent practice, it is quite clear that EU institutions have realized a situation in 
which the EU will have the relevant power to intervene in the position that Member States 
should adopt within other international organisations or international fora.83 This certainly has 
some advantages, in particular as far as coherence of EU external action and effectiveness of 
EU competences are concerned.84 However, it also bears some complexities: the duty to fully 
implement the common pre-established position, without having the Union present in the 
organisation, could affect not only the position of Member States, but also the functioning of 
the organisation itself.85 This also raises some questions as to what extent the EU can interfere 
in the international relations of its Member States and, consequently, how the latter can justify 
this mechanism vis-à-vis third States participating in other international organisations. All 
these aspects do not seem to have received the attention they deserved by the EU institutions. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper has tried to give a brief account of rather a peculiar practice in the external relations 
of the EU. The treaty-making power Member States can still exercise in the examined cases 
is a delegated one, limited by the exclusive competence of the EU and anyway pre-empted 
by EU secondary legislation. 
It has been argued that the EU has to be seen as an ‘open federal Union’, since both the Union 
and its Member States can operate on the international level.86 However, this can sometimes 
                                               
81 See in this sense Germany v. Council (OIV), supra note 72, para. 54.   
82 See for instance art. 120(g) of the Single CMO Regulation: “The methods of analysis for determining 
the composition of the products of the wine sector and the rules whereby it may be established whether 
these products have undergone processes contrary to the authorised oenological practices shall be 
those recommended and published by the OIV.” For the effects of a reference contained in EU 
secondary legislation and the relevant CJEU case-law see supra para. 5.2. 
83 In the recent ITLOS case, the Court has affirmed that art. 218(9) is not applicable in relation to the 
adoption of common position to be taken before international tribunals. See CJEU, case C-73/14, 
Council v. European Commission, EU:C:2015:663. On the judgment see S. R. SÀNCHEZ-TABERNERO, 
Swimming in a Sea of Courts: The EU’s Representation before International Tribunals, in European 
Papers, 2016, pp. 751-758.  
84 See T. KONSTADINIDES, In the Union of Wine: Loos Ends in the Relationship between the European 
Union and the Member States in the Field of External Representation, in European Public Law, 2015, 
pp. 686-688, claiming that the judgement confirms that “agency” exercised by Member States has 
become a key feature of EU external representation. According to the Author, though, framing these 
mechanisms in terms of agency could translate Member States’ obligations of conduct deriving from 
loyalty into obligations of result.  
85 See I. GOVAERE, Novel Issues Pertaining to EU Member States Membership of Other International 
Organisations: The OIV Case, supra note 73, pp. 240-241.  
86 See R. SCHÜTZE, Foreign Affairs and the EU Constitution. Selected Essays, supra note 5, p. 207.  
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lead to legal uncertainty, especially for third States or other international organisations, as far 
as competence, implementation, and issues of international responsibility are concerned. 
As to the latter aspect, it cannot be ignored that, notwithstanding the status or the protection 
that Member States agreements could enjoy in the EU legal order, Member States remain fully 
responsible under international law for any form of non-compliance with international 
obligations deriving from them.87 It is a well-established principle of the law of international 
responsibility that States cannot justify an internationally wrongful act by the attribution of 
competences to other entities such as regional organisations. At the same time, EU law cannot 
produce any effect for third States according to the pacta tertiis principle in Article 34 of the 
VCLT.88 This could create a paradoxical situation in which Member States can no longer 
guarantee the compliance with agreements whose object falls within a competence of the EU, 
while, at the same time, the EU can claim that those agreements do not create any duty for 
the organisation to act in conformity with them.89 
Some of the procedures that the EU has developed in the recent years are certainly relevant 
in coordinating Member States’ external action and in protecting the interests of the Union. 
However, it is desirable that, in a near future, the EU – and especially the Court of justice – 
will be able to clarify the effects that these kind of instruments produce both on the internal 
and on the international plane. It is submitted, in fact, that the principle of sincere cooperation 
could provide a valuable legal basis for finding a balance between the need to ensure the 
integrity of the EU legal order and the necessity to take into consideration the legitimate 
expectations of third States, which to a certain extent have acknowledged that the action of 
the Member States has been guided by EU institutions. This could be done, for instance, by 
expressly recognising that agreements concluded in the interest of the Union are to be 
considered binding as a matter of EU law and that EU secondary legislation must be 
compatible with them.  
Moreover, it is also submitted that the procedure of a previous authorisation to the conclusion 
of international agreements with third States should be extended to a wider range of 
situations,90 so as to ensure form the very beginning the compatibility of international 
obligations to be assumed with the EU legal order. This would at least bring some legal 
certainty and stability in Member States’ relationships with other countries and avoid further 
fragmentation on the internal level. 
                                               
87 See Manzi, supra note 44, para. 41, in which the CJEU expressly acknowledged the possibility that 
a conflict between EU law and international obligations of Member States, not suitable to be solved by 
means of consistent interpretation, will oblige Member States to violate the agreement and, eventually, 
to incur in international responsibility vis-à-vis third parties.  
88 Nor the scenario will change in case EU law was considered as a constitutional legal order, given the 
rule of art. 27 of the VCLT prohibiting the invocation of domestic law in order to justify a violation of an 
international obligation.  
89 Recently, the EU has tried to solve the question related to financial responsibility arising from 
international investment disputes and to find suitable criteria for the apportionment of responsibility 
between EU institutions and Member States. However, the Regulation is applicable only in cases of 
settlement procedures established by an agreement to which the EU is party. See Regulation n. 
912/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 establishing a framework for 
managing financial responsibility linked to investor-to-state dispute settlement tribunals established by 
international agreements to which the European Union is party, in OJ L 257/121.  
90 For instance in the case of bilateral extradition agreements with third countries, where issues of 
compatibility with the prohibition of discrimination under EU law may arise, as already happened in the 
recent Petruhhin case, where the Court held that the nationality exception provided by an extradition 
agreement can run counter EU citizenship rights. See CJEU, case C-182/15, Petruhhin, 
EU:C:2016:630.  
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1. Introduction  
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) brought numerous changes into 
EU law in 2009. For example, the competence on investment now falls under the exclusive 
Common Commercial Policy competence of the Union. In the context  of the current 
investment negotiations affected by the lack of unity amongst the Union and its Member 
States, this paper explores the evolution of EU foreign investment competence before and 
after the enactment of the TFEU, concluding that the competence bears significant limitations 
stemming from the past that have not been compensated for thus far.  
Whereas EU exclusive competence may enhance the negotiation leverage of the EU when 
compared to individual Member States, portfolio investments2 are still excluded from the scope 
of the competence even after the adoption of the TFEU. Post-Lisbon limitations also pertain 
to the application of the Treaty to Member States’ property ownership governance, despite the 
fact that investment revolves around property rights, or is even based on them. Such a narrow 
scope prevents the Union to commit itself to guarantees in case of expropriation of 
investments that are relatively common to investment arbitration. Furthermore, competence 
conferred on the Union in Article 207 TFEU curbs implementation of harmonization measures 
should they be enacted in light of the investment treaty. 
Recent negotiations of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), however, 
showed defiance of certain Member States to the exclusive competence of the Commission, 
which undermined the major strength of the unified negotiation power of the Union. Future 
TTIP negotiations, resistance of some Member States to the already concluded EU-Canada 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), and legal counsellors advising their 
clients to restructure their intra-EU investments pursuant to uncontested extra-EU BITs in the 
light of an unresolved conflict of intra-EU BITs with EU law, all provoke further thoughts of 
future potential adjustments of the EU investment competence.  
 
2. Multi-level Character of EU and National Competences 
The European Union as well as other international organizations and states are subjects of 
international public law. However, the EU is vitally different from other international 
organizations or state formations, including confederations or federations, since the European 
Union acquired part of its capacity to act from the sovereignty of its Member States, which 
makes the decisions taken on the supranational EU level binding upon all Member States.3 
The EU may only act within the limits of the competence that the Member States decided to 
attribute to the Union. The term competence then delineates areas of power which Member 
States conferred on the Union motivated, amongst others reasons, by the prospect of a more 
effective decision-making process at the level of the EU bodies.4 The distinctive feature of 
competence norms lies in the capacity to change legal relations.5 The authority for legislative, 
judicial, and executive measures, formerly executed by the Union’s Member States, become 
                                               
2 Short-term market presence of portfolio investments results from the lack of direct control of less than 
10% of the enterprise and not its form. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Three Laws of International 
Investment: National, Contractual, and International Frameworks for Foreign Capital (OUP 2013) 15. 
3 The EU may only act within the limits of the competence that the Member States decided to attribute 
to the Union. The term competence then delineates areas of power which Member States conferred on 
the Union motivated, amongst others reasons by the prospect of a more effective decision-making 
process at the level of the EU bodies. Kimmo Kiljunen, The European Constitution in the Making (CEPS, 
2004) 21-22; Alina Kaczorowska, European Union Law (Routledge, 2009) 84. 
4 Alina Kaczorowska, supra note 3, at 84. 
5 Gerard Conway, Conflicts of Competence Norms in EU Law and the Legal Reasoning of the ECJ 11 
(9) German Law Journal 966, 975 (2010). 
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a distinct Union power of its own after their conferral6 and is developed within the institutional 
and procedural design of the European Union. 
The areas that Member States have conferred to the EU have expanded remarkably over the 
years and this process has had the effect of limiting the spheres of Member State competence. 
According to Article 3 TFEU, exclusive competence entitles the Union to legislate in delineated 
areas and it at the same time precludes Member States from adopting measures on their own 
unless authorized; while shared and supporting competences allow for action from both the 
Union and the Member States.  
Historically, the scope of the EU’s competences was not entirely clear, which led to some 
creative interpretations by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).7 The unclear 
setting of competences made some Member States fear that the EU would encroach on their 
sovereignty.8 Structural limitations of Member State freedom to act were later labeled as ‘EU 
competence creep’ or ‘creeping competence drift’. 9 Experience with competence creep, 
however, do not align with recent developments following the adoption of the TFEU, and 
complaints against competence drift are becoming less legitimate.10 It can be stoically said 
that the Member States competence fluctuates depending on the relationship with the 
competences of the EU.11 As will be argued in this paper, the investment competence of the 
EU bears signs of this dynamism too. Questions arising concerning the scope of the 
investment competence and its potential competence creep were further fueled by general 
uncertainty about the future collective adoption of an EU comprehensive investment policy.12 
The discourse concerning the division of competences is extremely important for all actors 
involved – Member States, EU citizens, and the Union as such.13  
 
3. Foreign Investment: Competence Shift 
Coming into effect on 1 December 2009, the TFEU brought numerous changes to the EU legal 
system. One of the alterations contained in the TFEU was also a change to the investment 
competence regime: foreign direct investment (FDI) was now part of the Common Commercial 
Policy (CCP) and therefore became part of the exclusive competence of the EU.14 Before the 
TFEU was adopted, protection of FDI belonged to the competence of both Member States 
and the European Union. Member States strived for substantive investment safeguards on the 
                                               
6 Kimmo Kiljunen, supra note 3, at 22. 
7 Alina Kaczorowska, supra note 3, at 87. 
8 Ibid. 
In this respect, Convey asserts that the EU has not been able to define the competences in more detail 
than their delineation in Article 2 TFEU. He further elaborates on horizontal and vertical competence 
relationships. See Gerard Conway, supra note 5, at 967. 
9 Sacha Prechal, ‘Competence Creep and General Principles of Law’ (2010) 3 (1) Review of European 
Administrative Law 19-20. 
10 Alina Kaczorowska, supra note 3, at 87. 
11 Paul Craig, Competence and Member State Autonomy: Causality, Consequence and Legitimacy’ 
Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 57/2009, at 17. 
12 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Towards 
a Comprehensive European International Investment Policy, COM (2010) 343 final (July 10, 2010). 
13 Member States might fear unclear delimitation of the Union’s powers; EU citizens might demand a 
higher degree of legitimacy and democracy in the Union’s competences; while the Union expects such 
a setting of powers which would enable the community to effectively reach its objectives and face future 
challenges. Alina Kaczorowska, supra note 3, at 87. 
14 Asja Serdarevic, The European Union as a Collective Actor in the World Trade Organization (2013, 
Cameron May) 43.. 
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basis of diplomatic protection and bilateral and multilateral treaties,15 and that was one of the 
reasons why a significant number of BITs was signed between future Member States.  
3.1 The Pre-Lisbon Era 
The role of the EU in foreign investment was rather limited before the adoption of the Treaty 
of Lisbon. The CCP of the Union laid down in Articles 131 to 134 of the EC Treaty did not 
extend to investments16 and the protection of foreign investments fell within the ambit of the 
competences of the Member States. Among the instruments for safeguarding investments in 
EU Member States, BITs became the most common form of investment promotion and 
protection.17 This was due to the fact that the EU’s competences were restricted to market 
entry investment aspects and therefore unsuitable for the conclusion of BITs.18 However, the 
overlapping existence of BITs and EU internal market law resulted in a conflict between these 
two systems. 
The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, which was concluded back in 
1957, did not foresee that the relations between the six Member States would be governed 
exclusively on the level of Community law.19 Member States slowly became parties to 
agreements between each other, but they also concluded agreements between them and third 
countries.20 A great burst of external relations, particularly in the field of commerce, occurred 
in the 1970s.21 However, international relations became an area where the Member States 
viewed the treaty-making power of the Union with suspicion.22 This might have been caused 
by the seeming imbalance between the internal and external competence vested to the then 
Community in the TEC. The proponents of the doctrine of parallelism, which called for the 
Union to have equal powers internally and externally, regarded the then Community as having 
not only the competences expressly granted to it in the Treaty, but also those powers to take 
action on any topic that falls within its internal competence.23  
This argumentation is analogous to the justification behind the emergence of the implied 
powers of the Union, first narrowly formulated in 1956,24 and further extensively developed in 
1987.25 Like the doctrine of parallelism, the purely judicial construction26 of implied powers 
                                               
15 Andrej Karpat, European Union’s Exclusive Competence on Foreign Direct Investment’ Notitiae ex 
Academia Bratislavensi Iurisprudentiae 1/2011 94, 94. 
16 Christian Soderlund, Intra-EU BIT Investment Protection and the EC Treaty 24 (5) Journal of 
Investment Arbitration 455, 462. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Jan Asmus Bischoff, Just a Little BIT of ‘Mixity’? The EU’s Role in the Field of International Investment 
Protection Law 48 Common Market Law Review 1527, 1534 (2011). 
19 Bruno de Witte, Old-Fashioned Flexibility: International Agreements Between Member States of the 
European Union, in Constitutional Change in the EU: From Uniformity to Flexibility? 31, 32 (Gráinne De 
Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2000). 
20 Bruno de Witte distinguishes inter se agreements, which are agreements signed between two or more 
Member States, from inter se agreements cum tertiis, which are agreements concluded between a MS 
and a third state. 
Idem. 
21 Tokyo round of GATT negotiations; first trade agreements with EFTA members; preferential 
agreements with southern Mediterranean countries, Maghreb, ACP countries as well as Latin America. 
While most of the competence in the CCP was at that time interpreted by the ECJ as exclusive, Member 
States were not entirely precluded from negotiations as CCP was being implemented gradually. Paul 
Craig & Gráinne de Búrca, The Evolution of EU Law (OUP, 2011) 226; Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca, 
EU Law: Text, Cases, Materials (OUP, 2011) 321. 
22 Trevor Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law: An Introduction to the Constitutional 
and Administrative Law of the European Union (OUP, 2007) 161. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Case 8/55 Federation Charbonniere de Belgique v. High Authority [1956] ECR 245. 
25 Cases 281, 283-5, 287/85 Germany v. Commission [1987] ECR 3203. 
26 Asja Serdarevic, supra note 14, at 43. 
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stems from a discrepancy between the task given and the competence conferred for its 
execution.27 The Court confirmed the theory of implied powers arguing that if the Treaty 
confers a specific task on the EU institutions, it also must delegate ‘the powers which are 
indispensable in order to carry out that task’.28 
The EU’s power to enter into relations with third countries was further strengthened through 
the establishment of the ERTA/AETR29 doctrine in the EU legal order. In the ERTA judgment, 
the ECJ introduced the doctrine by stating: ‘To determine in a particular case the Community’s 
authority to enter into international agreements, regard must be had to the whole scheme of 
the Treaty no less than to its substantive provisions. Such an authority arises not only from an 
express conferment by the Treaty… but may equally flow from other provisions of the Treaty 
and from measures adopted, within the framework of those provisions, by the Community 
institutions.’30 
The teleological approach31 in the judgment represents an approval of the doctrine of 
parallelism.32 The ERTA doctrine was codified in Article 3 (2) and Article 216 (1) of the TFEU,33 
but interpretation as to how they exactly relate to each other might pose difficulties.34 In 
practice, the relation between exclusive competence that is not expressly defined and an 
agreement capable of affecting Community law should be individually analyzed, even in cases 
where the two areas do not obviously overlap.35 The ERTA judgment concludes that Member 
States should not engage in international obligations that would affect internal Community 
law.36 Participation of the Community in the negotiation would ensure that the result is 
consistent with its legislation.37 Holdgaard comments that the Union removes the external 
competence(s) of Member States that could affect internal Community law and establishes a 
parallel external Community competence.38 The ECJ further opined on the implied treaty-
making powers under the doctrine of parallelism in the WTO39 and OECD40 cases. In these 
                                               
27 While the background of the debate concerning the doctrine or parallelism was a striking gap between 
internal and external competences, the theory of implied powes points out to the gap between authority 
given and authority needed. ‘...Community had authority to enter international agreements on subjects 
for which such an authority had not been expressly granted.’ Henry Schermers and Denis Waelbroeck, 
‘Judicial Protection in the European Union‘ (KLI 2001)  752. 
28 Cases 281, 283-5, 287/85 Germany v. Commission [1987] ECR 3203, 28. 
29 European Agreement concerning the Work of Crews of Vehicles Engaged in International Road 
Transport (AETR), done at Geneva on 1 July 1970 (Consolidated text, version 2006, document 
ECE/TRANS/SC.1/2006/2). 
30 Case 22/70 Commission v. Council [1971] ECR 263, 15-16. 
31 Bart Van Vooren & Ramses A. Wessel, EU External Relations Law (CUP 2014) 87. 
32 ‘…The Court therefore had to find a way of upholding the Commission’s contention in principle, 
without applying to the facts of the case. ...this was done by holding that a transfer of treaty-making 
power occured 1969 when the internal measure came into effect.’ Trevor Hartley, supra note 22, 164. 
33 Article 216(1) TFEU: ‘The Union may conclude an agreement with one or more third countries or 
international organisations where the Treaties so provide or where the conclusion of an agreement is 
necessary in order to achieve, within the framework of the Union's policies, one of the objectives 
referred to in the Treaties, or is provided for in a legally binding Union act or is likely to affect common 
rules or alter their scope.’ 
34 Jan Asmus Bischoff, supra note 18, at 1545. 
35 Tristan Baumé, Competence of the Community to Conclude the New Lugano Convention on 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition  and Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial  Matters: 
Opinion 1/03 of 7 February 2006 7 (8) German Law Journal 681, 683 (2006). 
36 Rass Holdgaard, External Relations Law of the European Community: Legal Reasoning and Legal 
Discourses  (KLI 2008) 100. 
37 Piet Eeckhout, Bold Constitutionalism and Beyond, in The Past and Future of EU Law: The Classics 
of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty 220 (Miguel Poiares Maduro and Loic 
Azoulai eds., Hart 2010). 
38 Rass Holdgaard, supra note 36, at 100. 
39 Opinion 1/194 [1994] ECR I-5267. 
40 Opinion 2/92 [1995] ECR I-52. 
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cases, the Court expressed some doubts concerning the causal link between the internal 
powers and exclusive competence.41 In other words, the fact that the Community has internal 
power in a specific area does not automatically translate into exclusivity. However, two clear-
cut cases regarding the Community’s exclusive powers are: i. instances where the Union’s 
adopted internal legislation could be affected by the contracted agreement, and ii. express 
exclusive competence as laid down in the Treaties.42  
What started exclusively as an internal institutional dispute between the Commission and the 
Council in ERTA developed into a pure federalist conflict on the division of powers provoking 
severe schisms in the Union’s legislation which was not rectified until years later.43 The Union 
however translated the EU’s competence into the successful conclusion of free trade and 
association agreements.44  
Member States on the other hand, tried to restrain the ERTA doctrine by increasing interest in 
concluding mixed association agreements, which became a norm, although Member States’ 
activity was often technically unnecessary and the Union had the competence to sign it 
alone.45 In the reality of international negotiations, it became more convenient to rely on shared 
competence, even though according to the ERTA doctrine, the Commission could have 
invoked exclusive competence before the ECJ.46 The Open Skies agreement was concluded 
as a mixed agreement, being a direct result of ERTA’s jurisprudence.47 When negotiating 
topics that were not under EU exclusive competence, negotiations would feature 
representatives of Member States as well as those of the Commission sitting in the room 
together, however in such cases only the Commission’s representatives spoke.48 It was often 
a political question as to whether the Member States would allow the Community to proceed 
on its own or if Member States would demand negotiation of a mixed agreement.49  
Agreements based on shared competence have to be ratified by national parliaments. As 
national parliaments are often unfamiliar with the EU’s external policies, the ratification 
process was in most cases a formality, which was sometimes intentionally delayed so that a 
Member State could gain political leverage on EU internal issues.50 The concerned 
agreements are often described as mixed agreements, as they cover competences of the EU 
and of the Member States. Agreements in the area of commercial policy used to be the most 
notable type of mixed agreements, but similarly to the less common mixed agreements 
governing services and intellectual property, they would all now fall under the exclusive 
competence of the Union’s common commercial policy (CCP). The former complexity of 
                                               
41 Opinion 1/194 [1994] ECR I-5267,88-89; Opinion 2/92 [1995] ECR I-521, 31. 
42 Trevor Hartley, supra note 22, at 171. 
43 The backlash was represented by the antagonist position of Member States against the adoption of 
Community environmental policy as they feared that the transfer of internal competence would result in 
acquisition of external competence. Hjalte Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European Court of 
Justice 10-11 (Brill 1986). 
44 Jan Asmus Bischoff, supra note 19, at 1535. 
45 Pieter Jan Kuijper, Fifty Years of EC/EU External Relations: Continuity and the Dialogue Between 
Judges and Member States as Constitutional Legislators, 31 (6) Fordham International Law Journal 
1579, 1580 (2007). 
46 ‘…it became much easier for the Member States in the Council to insist on a mixed character of 
international agreements in these fields, and it required much persistence from the Commission and a 
constant willingness to go to the ECJ to invoke that declaration and to insist on exclusive competence. 
In the daily reality of external relations, where time is short and questions of competence have to be 
decided quickly, these were qualities that were difficult to muster.’ Ibid. 
47 Markus Burgstaller, European Law Challenges to Investment Arbitration, in The Backlash Against 
Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality 455, 481 (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010). 
48 Stephen Woolcock, The Treaty of Lisbon and the European Union as an Actor in International Trade, 
8 (ECIPE Working Paper No. 01/2010). 
49 Angelos Dimopoulos, EU Foreign Investment Law (OUP 2011) 88. 
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requiring ratification from the EU as well as from Member States raised confusion both within 
the EU as well as with the Union’s external trading partners.51   
3.2 The Lisbon Era 
Although the European Union has been showing signs of significant growth of competences 
over the years,52 exclusive competence on investment matters was not initially intended to be 
included in the European Treaties.53 In the beginning, as already established, the Union’s 
competence related only to the admission of new investments of third countries.54 However, 
the increasing economic interactions within the internal market, the extended scope of 
freedom of capital movement relations with third countries in the Maastricht Treaty, together 
with the intensified monetary cooperation anchored in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, 
contributed to the Union’s interest in including FDI into the Union’s exclusive competence. 
Interestingly, and somewhat contradictorily, the Treaty of Nice introduced a concept of non-
exclusive CCP powers.55 The debate about extending the Union’s competence was materially 
developed further during the Constitutional Convention meetings beginning in 2002, despite 
the discussion being insufficient in general.56 The Treaty of Lisbon broadened the scope of 
the CCP and returned to the idea of exclusive competence. 
The conferral of the FDI competence to the Union was inconsistent. After the exclusion of the 
exclusive competence on investments from the Constitutional Treaty at one point,57 FDI was 
included into Article III-217 of the final text later on58 and was recognized as one of the areas 
of the common commercial policy.59 Moreover, the characteristic feature of the construction of 
the competence in the Constitutional Treaty was one of extraordinary vagueness.60 After the 
Treaty failed to get approval via a public vote in France and the Netherlands, the drafters of 
the TFEU did not follow their previous intention to include FDI within the exclusive 
competence. An opposite stance was adopted in the latest stage of the preparatory work of 
the TFEU when the CCP was amended to embrace FDI, leaving no room for a qualified legal 
discussion on that matter.61 Due to the lack of transparency surrounding the inclusion of the 
                                               
51 Ibid, at 9.  
52 Alina Kaczorowska, supra note 3, at 87; Craig, supra note 10, at 23-24. 
53 Armand de Mestral, The EU as a Maker of Investment Agreements: The Potential Impact on Canada 
and the Broader World System of Bilateral Investment Treaties, McGill University Policy Brief 2 (2008). 
54 Jan Asmus Bischoff, supra note 17, at 1535. 
55 Marise Cremona, External Relations and External Competence of the European Union, in The 
Evolution of EU Law, 246 (Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca eds., 2011); Armand de Mestral, supra note 
52, at 2. 
56 ‘…the European Constitution appears as a simple functional consequence of the process of market 
integration without a discussion of the values it necessarily embodies: it has been taken as a logical 
constitutional conclusion without a constitutional debate.’ Miguel Poiares Maduro, Europe and the 
Constitution: What If This Is As Good As It Gets?, in J.H.H. Weiler & Marlene Wind, European 
Constitutionalism Beyond the State (CUP 2003) 77. 
57 The European Convention Cover Note CONV 707/03: Summary Sheet of Proposals for Amendments 
Concerning External Action, Including Defence Policy (Brussels, 2003) 103. 
58 The European Convention CONV 850/03 (Brussels, 2003)   http://european-
convention.europa.eu/docs/Treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf (last visited Aug. 15, 2016). 
59 Koen Lenaerts, Piet Van Nuffel, and Robert Bray, ‘Constitutional Law of the European Union (TSM 
2005) ¶ 20-006 . 
60 ‘It is recalled, for instance, that, according to Article I-1(1), the Union is to exercise the competences 
conferred by the Member States ‘on Community basis’. This provision is as remarkable for its 
extraordinary vagueness as it is for its apparent disregard for the subtleties of the development of the 
Community legal order and the distinct term in which CFSP is articulated within the new Constitutional 
structure.’ Panos Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law (Hart 2006) 495. 
61 Alexander J. Bělohlávek, Ochrana přímých zahraničních investic v Evropské unii ¶ 479 (C.H. 
Beck2010).  
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FDI competence into the EU’s exclusive competence, Meunier points out that the process of 
conferral of the investment competence happened ‘stealthily’.62 
According to Article 207 (1) TFEU, FDI is considered to be part of the Common Commercial 
Policy of the Union. The Union conducts action in FDI under the exclusive competence as 
defined by Article 3 of the TFEU. The CCP is one of five areas of exclusive competence in the 
TFEU, together with the customs union, the establishing of the competition rules necessary 
for the functioning of the internal market, monetary policy for the Member States whose 
currency is the euro, and the conservation of marine biological resources under the common 
fisheries policy. 
All key aspects of external trade and investment have thus come under exclusive EU 
competence, including the aforementioned mixed agreements.63 Among others, this also 
applies to agreements with trade-related elements in services and intellectual property 
pursuant to Article 207 (1) TFEU. 64 Up to the date when the TFEU came into effect, FDI fell 
under the competence shared by the Union and the Member States. Before 2009, Member 
States would sign BITs, while the Commission would negotiate instruments concerning trade 
and investment in services (such as modes in GATS), other aspects of investment in GATT, 
or TRIMs.65 The inclusion of these agreements into the exclusive competence ends the 
lengthy period of discussion concerning the competence division between the Union and its 
Member States. 
 
4. Competence Shift: Limitations of the Redefined Competence 
FDI, as already stated, now falls under the EU’s exclusive competence. Despite the fact that 
the Union’s exclusive competence should enhance the negotiation leverage of the EU 
compared to single Member States, 66 the competence bears notable limitations.  
The first potential limitation to the competence conferred by Article 207 TFEU is its relative 
incomprehensiveness regarding different forms of investments. The definition in the TFEU 
pertains only to certain forms of investments, namely those that are direct. Simultaneously, 
Member States retain their competence to conclude treaties on indirect forms of investment. 
Bischoff therefore concludes that because of that, the competence for investment is mixed.67 
This view, which would suggest that portfolio investments fall under the comprehensive 
protection of FDI in investment treaties, is not generally accepted by international investment 
law. Inclusion of portfolio investments in the definition of FDI with no foundation in a relevant 
treaty is erroneous, although not uncommon68 due to the close interrelation between the two.69 
Although the categorization of portfolio investment as a form of direct investment is not 
                                               
62 “…the radical transfer of competence crept its way into the treaty by stealth and serendipity and 
resulted from Commission actions and Member State inaction.“ 
Sophie Meunier, Integration by Stealth: How the European Union Gained Competence over Foreign 
Direct Investment (European University Institute, Working Paper No. RSCAS 2014/66) at 7. 
63 Stephen Woolcock, supra note 49, at 8. 
64 Article 207(1) TFEU: ‘The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, 
particularly with regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating 
to trade in goods and services, and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct 
investment, the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy and measures to 
protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies.’ 
65 Ibid, 10. 
66 Markus Burgstaller, supra note 48, at 482. 
67 Thus, contracting mixed governing indirect investments shall require activity of the EU and Member 
States at the same time. 
Jan Asmus Bischoff, supra note 19, at 1534. 
68 Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, International Law on Foreign Investment  (3d ed. 2010) 9; 196. 
69 Fedax N.V. v. Republic of Venezuela, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction (1997). 
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necessarily a sporadic practice in international investment law, such a classification aptly 
points out that the competences conferred on the EU in non-direct investments are not 
exclusive but shared since Article 4 (1) TFEU stipulates that ‘The Union shall share 
competence with the Member States where the Treaties confer on it a competence which does 
not relate to the areas referred to in Articles 370 and 671 TFEU.’ Although portfolio investment 
is described as a specific form of investment within the broader context of EU comprehensive 
investment policy,72 both FDI and portfolio investment are viewed as significant features of 
economic interaction: ‘The Lisbon Treaty's attribution of EU exclusive competence on FDI 
integrates FDI into the common commercial policy. It also allows the EU to affirm its own 
commitment to the open investment environment which has been so fundamental to its 
prosperity and to continue promoting investment, both direct investment and portfolio 
investment, also as a tool of economic development.’73 
Since portfolio investments are not included in the scope of the Union’s exclusive FDI 
competence in Article 207 (1), should a treaty on their protection be signed, these agreements 
would have to be ratified by the EU as well as by the Member States74 since they would have 
to be concluded as mixed agreements.75 It is, however, possible, that the Union acquires full 
competence over FDI matters if the Court considers that the ERTA/AETR doctrine codified in 
Article 3 (2) TFEU76 applies to investment treaties, as confirmed in Pringle.77 The Commission 
                                               
70 Article 3 TFEU: (1.) The Union shall have exclusive competence in the following areas: (a) customs 
union; (b) the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market; 
(c) monetary policy for the Member States whose currency is the euro; (d) the conservation of marine 
biological resources under the common fisheries policy; (e) common commercial policy. 
(2.) The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international agreement 
when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is necessary to enable the Union 
to exercise its internal competence, or in so far as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their 
scope. 
71 Article 6 TFEU: The Union shall have competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or 
supplement the actions of the Member States. The areas of such action shall, at European level, be: 
(a) protection and improvement of human health; (b) industry; (c) culture; (d) tourism; (e) education, 
vocational training, youth and sport;  (f) civil protection; (g) administrative cooperation. 
72 ‘Foreign direct investment (FDI) is generally considered to include any foreign investment which 
serves to establish lasting and direct links with the undertaking to which capital is made available in 
order to carry out an economic activity. When investments take the form of a shareholding this objective 
presupposes that the shares enable the shareholder to participate effectively in the management of that 
company or in its control. This contrasts with foreign investments where there is no intention to influence 
the management and control of an undertaking. Such investments, which are often of a more short-
term and sometimes speculative nature, are commonly referred to as portfolio investments.’ European 
Commission Communication supra note 11, at 2-3. 
73 Ibid, at 11. 
74 Markus Burgstaller, supra note 48, at 472. 
75 If one part of an agreement may be divided into two parts, one of which falls into the purview of 
exclusive powers, and another to the competence of EU MS, the agreement has to be concluded by 
both the Union and M. Should exclusive powers of the Union mix with non-exclusive, the Union 
cooperates with EU MS, but may activate the competence and pre-empt MS from their treaty-making 
powers.  
Marcus Klamert and Niklas Maydell, Lost in Exclusivity: Implied Non-exclusive External Competences 
in Community Law, 13 (4) European Foreign Affairs Review 493, 493-494 (2008). 
76 Article 3 (2) TFEU: ‘The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an 
international agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is 
necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence, or in so far as its conclusion may 
affect common rules or alter their scope.’ 
77 Case C-370/12 Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland [2012], ¶¶ 100-101: ‘In that regard, it must 
be recalled that, under Article 3(2) TFEU, the Union is to have ‘exclusive competence for the conclusion 
of an international agreement when its conclusion … may affect common rules or alter their scope’. It 
follows also from that provision that Member States are prohibited from concluding an agreement 
between themselves which might affect common rules or alter their scope. However, the arguments put 
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has requested the Court, pursuant to the procedure envisaged by the Article 218 (11) TFEU,78 
to determine whether the Free Trade Agreement with Singapore is compatible with the primary 
law of the EU.79 The Commission asked the Court to interpret the scope of the Union’s 
exclusive and shared competence80 also in matters relating to foreign investments.81 To 
connect the dots of the EU’s investment competence it should be recalled that the Court has 
established that Article 207 (1) by being part of the CCP relates only to the external action with 
third states and not the trade in the internal market.82   
The Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered in December 2016 suggests the Court 
to declare that the EU does not have exclusive competence over portfolio investment in the 
context of the conclusion of the Free Trade Agreement with Singapore. Moreover, in so far as 
the Agreement applies to other than foreign direct investment, investment falls within the 
shared competences of the Union and its Member States.83 AG Sharpston dismissed the 
Commission’s argument of extending the ERTA/AETR principle to the Agreement under 
Article 3 (2) TFEU, which was submitted to the Court based on the view that “common rules” 
in Article 3 (2) TFEU should be read as to include “treaty provisions”.84 Since there is no EU 
secondary legislation under Articles 63 (1) and 64 (2) TFEU relating to types of investment 
other than FDI,85 and since no other argument was presented for the competence to be 
exclusive,86 the substantive rules on investments other than foreign direct investment in 
Section 9 (a) of the Agreement should be considered to fall under shared competence.87 
The second potential limitation to the execution of the Union’s exclusive competence on FDI 
is Article 345 TFEU. This article, which is not a Lisbon novelty to EU law and which is to be 
found in the General and Final Provisions of the TFEU, limits the scope of the Treaty’s 
application in that it shall in no way prejudice Member States property ownership 
governance.88 This limitation exists despite the fact that FDI revolves around property rights, 
or even is based on them.89 Such a narrow scope of competence prevents the Union to get 
directly involved in cases of expropriation that are relatively common to investment 
                                               
forward in this context have not demonstrated that an agreement such as the ESM Treaty would have 
such effects.’ 
78 Article 218 (11) TFEU: ‘A Member State, the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission 
may obtain the opinion of the Court of Justice as to whether an agreement envisaged is compatible with 
the Treaties. Where the opinion of the Court is adverse, the agreement envisaged may not enter into 
force unless it is amended or the Treaties are revised.’ 
79 Commission Decision of 30 October 2014 requesting an opinion of the Court of Justice pursuant to 
article 218(11) TFEU on the competence of the Union to sign and conclude a Free Trade Agreement 
with Singapore, C (2014) 8218 final. 
80 Ibid. Article 1 of the Decision: ‘Does the Union have the requisite competence to sign and conclude 
alone the Free Trade Agreement with Singapore? More specifically, which provisions of the agreement 
fall within the Union's exclusive competence?; which provisions of the agreement fall within the Union's 
shared competence?; and  is there any provision of the agreement that falls within the exclusive 
competence of the Member States?’ 
81 Ibid: ‘In particular, doubts have been raised with regard to the extent and the nature of the Union's 
competence in respect of some elements of the chapters of the agreement on the protection of foreign 
investment, transport services, intellectual property, transparency and sustainable development. It is 
therefore advisable to seek from the Court of Justice an opinion clarifying the extent and the nature of 
the Union's competence.’ 
82 C-137/12 Commission v Council [2013] ¶ 56. 
83 Opinion of AG Sharpston in Opinion Procedure 2/15 at 370. 
84 Ibid. at 359. 
85 Ibid. at 360. 
86 Ibid. at 361. 
87 Ibid. at 370. 
88 Article 345 TFEU. 
89 Andrej Karpat, supra note 16, at 94. 
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arbitration.90 Despite the property rights limitations on the EU level, the possibility and margins 
to expropriate, also in the public interest, are fully governed by national laws. Although only 
national legal systems cover the protection against expropriation, in Fearon v. Irish Land 
Commission,91 the CJEU subjected national expropriation rules to the principle of non-
discrimination.92 A similar development could be identified in the area of intellectual property 
rights. The Treaty of Lisbon brought about an exceptional treatment to intellectual property 
rights on the European level as it allowed for their harmonization pursuant to Article 118 TFEU. 
93 Before the adoption of the TFEU, harmonization efforts at the European level were 
challenged.94 While the TFEU stipulates that European rules should not prejudice national 
rules on property rights, IP rights were given a clear exception to this rule.95 IP rights, should 
they be legislated in the national laws of EU Member States, shall be exercised in a manner 
which does not infringe EU law. The argument can be made, by analogy to the distinction 
between the adoption and the exercise of IP rights, that European measures could 
theoretically set conditions for expropriations (e.g. procedural guarantees), while respecting 
the right of Member States to execute the nationalization.96  
The third limitation to the CCP competence that was conferred on the Union is Article 207 (6) 
TFEU.97 This article limits the exercise of the competence, in particular in light of the supporting 
competences of Article 6 (a) TFEU. The EU might lack the competence to implement an 
international agreement if this would amount to enacting harmonization measures in areas in 
which the latter is excluded.98 Examples of such implementation measures may include 
                                               
90 E.g.:  ICSID Case No ARB/07/22; Electrabel S.A. v Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19; Eastern 
Sugar BV v. Czech Republic, SCC Case No. 088/2004, Partial Award (2007); Eureko B.V. v. the Slovak 
Republic, PCA  2008-13. 
91 Case 182/83 Robert Fearon & Company Limited v. Irish Land Commission [1984] ECR 03677. 
92 Ibid, 7.: ‘...although Article 222 of the Treaty does not call in question the Member States‘ right to 
establish a system of compulsory acquisition by public bodies, such a system remains subject to the 
fundamental rule of non-discrimination, which underlies the chapter of the Treaty relating to the right of 
establishment.’ 
93 Article 118 TFEU: ‘In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market, the 
European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, 
shall establish measures for the creation of European intellectual property rights to provide uniform 
protection of intellectual property rights throughout the Union and for the setting up of centralized Union-
wide authorisation, coordination and supervision arrangements. The Council, acting in accordance with 
a special legislative procedure, shall by means of regulations establish language arrangements for the 
European intellectual property rights. The Council shall act unanimously after consulting the European 
Parliament.’ 
94 Case C-3 77/98 Kingdom of the Netherlands v. European Parliament and Council of the European 
Union [2001] ECR 7079. 
95 Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies & Giorgio Monti, European Union Law (CUP 2010) 364. 
96 Angelos Dimopoulos, Creating an EU Investment Policy: Challenges for the Post-Lisbon Era of 
External Relations, in EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era 401, 408 (Paul 
James Cardwell ed., Asser 2002); Marc Bungenberg, The Division of Competences Between the EU 
and Its Member States in the Area of Investment Politics, 2011 European Yearbook of International 
Economic Law 29, 36-37 (2011); Arthur Hartkam, Towards a European Civil Code (KLI 2011) 324; 
see also Opinion of AG Sharpston in Opinion Procedure 2/15 at 340-41. 
97 Article 207 (6) TFEU:‘The exercise of the competences conferred by this Article in the field of the 
common commercial policy shall not affect the delimitation of competences between the Union and the 
Member States, and shall not lead to harmonisation of legislative or regulatory provisions of the Member 
States in so far as the Treaties exclude such harmonisation.’ 
98 As Krajewski explains: ‘Article 207(6) TFEU contains a limitation of the exercise of the competences 
of the common commercial policy according to which the exercise of these competences ‘shall not affect 
the delimitation of competences between the Union and the Member States, and shall not lead to 
harmonisation of legislative or regulatory provisions of the Member States in so far as the Treaties 
exclude such harmonisation.’ Article 207(6) TFEU contains two elements which are closely connected: 
the first part of the provision stating that the delimitation of competences between the Union and the 
Member States shall not be affected by the exercise of the competences in the field of the common 
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possible investment treaty commitments regarding establishment of national treatment or 
guarantees of effective judicial remedies in the investment treaty.99 In this respect, instead of 
centralization, the EU shows signs of federalization, as the implementation of the agreement 
(unlike signing on the EU level) lies within the competence of states.100 
Furthermore, the TFEU does not contain any definition of foreign direct investment, which is 
therefore further defined by CJEU case law.101 
 
5. Positioning the Competence within EU law  
The Treaty of Lisbon affected the allocation of competences between the Commission and 
the Member States: the development of the Treaty articles mirrors the expanding interrelation 
between international investment law and EU law.102 Extra-EU BITs are to be replaced with 
newly negotiated treaties, while intra-EU BITs face divergent opinions from the Commission 
and arbitral tribunals. New investment treaties (TTIP with the USA, CETA etc.) are to be 
negotiated by the EU as a block of states, in line with the EU’s exclusive competence. Although 
the EU declared its ambition to achieve a comprehensive investment policy,103 conflicts of 
intra-EU and extra-EU BITs with EU law are to be resolved independently from each other. 
Cremona aptly reminds ‘…there is a need to remember the importance of the different 
objectives of integration in the internal and external dimensions of the ‘Union project’, a 
difference which is perhaps not always adequately recognized in the demands made in 
relation to approximation of laws’.104 The distinction between the treatment105 of extra-EU and 
intra-EU investment protections may, however, lead to forum shopping through corporate 
nationality planning.  
                                               
commercial policy reiterates the general principle of limited and specific conferral of competences 
(Articles 4(1) and 5(1) and (2) TEU). In the context of external policies this excludes a so-called ‘inverse 
AETR effect’ by which an implicit internal competence could be derived from an explicit external 
competence. The second element of Article 207(6) TFEU holds that the exercise of the trade 
competence may not lead to harmonisation where the treaty expressly prohibits this. This applies in 
particular to those areas in which the Union is only competent for ‘supporting, coordinating and 
complementary action’, such as education and health (Article 6(a) TFEU). As the Treaty of Lisbon 
conferred the Union with the exclusive competence to conclude trade agreements covering services, 
the Union may conclude agreements covering education and health as well. However, the Union may 
not implement such an agreement if these agreements would require harmonisation measures, 
because the Union lacks the competence to harmonise in these areas.’ 
Markus Krajewski, The Reform of the Common Commercial Policy, in EU Law After Lisbon (Biondi et 
al. eds., 2010) 21. 
99 Luis M. Hinojosa-Martinez, The Scope of the EU Treaty-Making Power on Foreign Investment: 
Between Wishful Thinking and Pragmatism, 17 Journal of World Investment and Trade 86, 104 (2016).  
100 Markus Krajewski, supra note 98, at 22. 
101 CJEU defined FDI in Case C–326/07 Commission v. Italian Republic [2009] ECR I–02291, 35 as 
follows: ‘investments of any kind made by natural or legal persons which serve to establish or maintain 
lasting and direct links between the persons providing the capital and the undertakings to which the 
capital is made available in order to carry out an economic activity...’ while ‘the shares held by the 
shareholder enable him to participate effectively in the management of that company or in its control’. 
102 Markus Burgstaller, European Law and Investment Treaties, 26 Journal of International Arbitration 
181, 183 (2009). 
103 European Commission, Communication supra note 13. 
104 Marise Cremona, supra note 56, at 239. 
105 Stephan W. Schill, Ordering Paradigms in International Investment Law: Bilateralism – 
Multilateralism – Multilateralization, in The Foundations of International Investment Law, 109, 121 
(Douglas et al. eds., OUP 2014). 
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Although the predictability of investment protection was declared a foundation for any future 
adjustment resulting from the clash of EU law with international investment treaties,106 
investors have already been advised to consider an extra-EU BITs reconstruction of 
nationalities of their companies conducting foreign investment due to the fear of uncertain 
legal regulation of intra-EU BITs. The corporate nationality has become an elusive criterion in 
investment treaty arbitration107 and law firms have been publicly advising investors to 
restructure their investments by pulling them out of the EU, hence enabling them to use extra-
EU BITs, which remain uncontested.108 This is due to the fact that the express knowledge of 
investment safeguards, i.e. either BITs or EU law provisions, allow investors to internalize 
relevant regulatory risks into their decision-making process as to whether, how, and at what 
costs they invest.109 Moreover, if investors voluntarily opt not to use legal investment protection 
instruments provided in BITs in order to avoid a possible backlash against BITs in the future, 
the investment environment clearly does not ensure the necessary legal certainty. Putting it in 
Ziegler's words: ‘If the EU does not manage to quickly convince investors that either the 
existing BITs of its members or the new EU FTAs do provide a good protection, investors 
might prefer to use vehicles in countries that do satisfy their needs in a less ambiguous way’.110 
Since extra-EU BITs are to remain in place pursuant to Regulation 1219/2012, investors from 
EU Member States may profit from structuring their investment via a third state with an extra-
EU BIT in order to achieve protection similar to intra-EU BITs. Despite the shift to the exclusive 
competence of the Union to contract extra-EU BITs after the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
the Commission has hesitated for years to tackle intra-EU BITs and start procedures against 
Member States that have intra-EU BITs that conflict with EU law. Finally, in June 2015 five EU 
Member States were requested to terminate their intra-EU BITs,111 whilst the CJEU’s ruling 
on the compatibility of intra-EU BITs with EU law might be issued during the course of 2017. 
Internally, the intensification of the power struggle between the European bodies, namely the 
European Parliament, the European Commission, and the Council during the negotiation of 
Regulation 1219/2012 manifested itself in significant communication difficulties regarding FDI 
between the Union actors.112 This might also be due to the fact that after the adoption of the 
Treaty of Lisbon the Parliament’s competences increased and Parliament’s role was 
substantially enhanced113 to the detriment of the Council’s powers.114  
                                               
106 European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, Memorandum of the European Commission 
Q&A: Commission launches comprehensive European International Investment Policy (2010). 
107 Stephan W. Schill, supra note 105, at 121. 
108 Sidley Austin LLP, International Arbitration Update (2/2009); Winston and Strawn LLP, Latest 
Development Concerning European Investment Treaties (2012). 
109 Anthea Roberts, Triangular Treaties: The Extent and Limits of Investment Treaty Rights, 56 (2) 
Harvard Journal of International Law 353, 388 (2015). 
110 Andreas R. Ziegler, The New Competence of the European Union in the Area of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI): A Third Country Perspective, in European Yearbook of International Economic Law 
235, 243 (2013). 
111 European Commission, Commission asks Member States to Terminate their Intra-EU Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, Press Release IP/15/5198 (June 18, 2015). 
112 Lavranos mentions that that the battle of European Parliament against the Council and the Member 
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proficiency in FDI matters, and that the relations between the Council, the Commission and European 
Parliament were ‘heavily poisoned’. Nikos Lavranos, In Defence of Member States‘ BITs Gold Standard: 
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States‘ Perspective, 10 (2) Transnational Dispute Management 12 (2013), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2226979, (last visited Aug. 15, 2016). 
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114 Markus Krajewski, New Functions and New Powers for the European Parliament: Assessing the 
Changes of the Common Commercial Policy from the Perspective of Democratic Legitimacy, in 
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Taking together the Commission’s efforts to harmonize FDI in the EU, Member States’ 
disagreement, ineffective communication of future intentions, inconsistent treatment of the 
distinction between intra-EU BITs and extra-EU BITs, the absolute lack of solutions to replace 
intra-EU BITs, and most importantly the problematic negotiations of the TTIP and the CETA, 
the objective of a smooth transition in FDI-policy might not have been met yet.115 EU 
investment protection has been challenged on various levels from the very beginning.116 
Kuijper asserts that with the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon the EU failed to clearly delineate 
its treaty-making powers and opted for a solution that may lead to a considerable controversy 
within such an important area117 of the Treaty instead.118 Koutrakos criticized the vagueness 
of the competence’s wording as formulated in the Constitutional Treaty,119 and Meunier rather 
harshly pointed out that the process of investment competence conferral could be labelled as 
a historical accident or action happening by stealth.120 Cameron argues that the overlapping 
frameworks of EU law and investment treaties create confusion among investors, which, 
without the required attention, might lead to the creation of disincentives to pursue foreign 
investments in the EU.121 Belohlavek believes that the Commission’s behavior in the field of 
FDI has been filled with arrogance, an attitude that can be quite deadly in a competitive 
globalized international community.122 Burgstaller contends that the infringement proceedings 
against Sweden, Finland, and Austria document the determination of the Commission to 
encroach on the Member State's BITs practice even before the Treaty of Lisbon came into the 
effect.123 There are also suggestions of the continuous unqualified approach of the Parliament 
to the matter.124 Leal-Arcas confirms the existing doubts surrounding FDI matters in the EU, 
pointing out the pitfalls of uncertain interpretation and the lack of preparations.125 Krajewski 
points out that the CCP has not become more transparent through the TFEU.126 Lenk asserts 
that the Union’s efforts to form a comprehensive (intra-EU and extra-EU) investment policy 
have been affected by persistent horizontal and institutional incoherence,127 Paparinskis also 
                                               
115 The Commission’s report on governance guidelines from 2003 for instance mentions: ‘Promoting 
new forms of governance is by no means the sole responsibility of the European institutions, and even 
less so that of the Commission alone. It is the responsibility of all levels of public authority, private 
undertakings and organised civil society because good governance — openness, participation, 
accountability, effectiveness and coherence — are what the public expects at the beginning of the 21st 
century.’ 
European Commission, Report from the Commission on European Governance 5 (2003), 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/docs/comm_rapport_en.pdf, (last visited Aug. 15, 2016). 
116 Ineffective translation of competence distribution into concluded agreements; Insufficient conferral 
of powers to the Union, politicization of the Common Commercial Policy; involvement of the European 
Parliament. 
Marc Bungenberg, supra note 96, at 42. 
117 Van Vooren and Wessel refer to the CCP as the forming heart of EU external relations law. Bart Van 
Vooren and Ramses A. Wessel, supra note 31, at 87. 
118 Kuijper considers Article 216 an ‘awkward formulation’ that is to codify the ERTA doctrine and 
Opinion 1/76:  the TFEU mentions potential or exclusive treaty-making powers, although the Court 
codified them as exclusive in nature, in line with Article 3 TFEU did. See Pieter J. Kuijper, Super-Power 
Frustrated? The Cost of Non-Lisbon In the Field of External Relations, in 51 German Yearbook of 
International Law 18-19 (2009). 
119 Panos Koutrakos, supra note 60, at 495. 
120 Sophie Meunier, supra note 62. 
121 Peter D Cameron, International Energy Investment Law: The Pursuit of Stability (OUP 2010) 362. 
122 Alexander J. Belohlavek, supra note 62, ¶ 37. 
123 Markus Burgstaller, supra note 48, at 464. 
124 See further Nikos Lavranos, supra note 96, at 12.  
125 Rafael Leal-Arcas, The European Union’s Trade and Investment Policy after the Treaty of Lisbon, 
487 Legal Studies Research Paper No. 64/2010. 
126 Markus Krajewski, supra note 116, at 15. 
127 Inconsistence and incoherence in stances among EU MS, the Commission’s argumentation between 
intra-EU and extra-EU aspects of investment protection, as well as diverging positions within the 
Commission’s DG Trade and DG FISMA (institutional incoherence).  
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explains that the first steps of the new extra-EU investment policy have been affected by 
inconsistencies.128  
Despite the Commission’s active role, the competence shift within the Common Commercial 
Policy still leads to public debate.129 The most problematic part is that none of the actors 
involved seem to consider the implications of the growing assertiveness of EU law against the 
international obligations of EU Member States.130 Such consequences include the doubts of 
investors as to whether they will be able to depend on investment treaties (current or 
negotiated) in the future, or whether they will be able to enforce their awards in the EU.131   
6. Concluding Remarks 
The general multilateral approach of the EU towards its trade and investment agenda changed 
in 2006 into a vigorous use of bilateral negotiations as the Union experienced opposition from 
emerging countries as well as from the USA. The use of bilateral agreements was seen as a 
reliable instrument to effectively realize the Union’s market power that was in decline. The 
future erosion of the EU’s market position will likely continue, which will contribute to favoring 
the use of bilateral instead of multilateral trade agreements with the EU.132 However, as far as 
competence is concerned, should an investment treaty be signed in the future, this will be 
done in the framework of the Union’s competence, whose precise scope is expected to be 
further interpreted by the Court in the Opinion on the Free Trade Agreement with Singapore.133 
With the lack of clarity concerning the scope of the investment competence, and a parallel 
elevated assertiveness of the Member States at the expense of the European Commission 
                                               
Hannes Lenk, Challenging the Notion of Coherence in EU Foreign Investment Policy, 8 (2) European 
Journal of Legal Studies 6, 18-19 (2015). 
128 Martins Paparinskis, International Investment Law and the European Union: A Reply to Catherine 
Titi 26 (3) European Journal of International Law 663, 669 (2015): ‘…the definition of most-favoured-
nation treatment in the EU–Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) explains 
that substantive obligations in other treaties are not ‘treatment’, unless particular measures are adopted 
pursuant to them. Why? The proposition that obligations in other treaties do constitute ‘treatment’ seems 
to be reflective of consensus in investment arbitration. What is the reason for such a sharp departure 
from a generally accepted reading of the clause, which is seemingly expressed in the form of an 
interpretation of the ordinary meaning rather than an exception? Third, the definition of fair and equitable 
treatment has been supplemented by an explanation of what conduct can constitute its breach. The 
idea of elaborating fair and equitable treatment in this manner is an interesting one (even if the pedigree 
and implications of some elements may be more obvious than others). However, the effort to ensure 
greater predictability may be undercut by significant differences already present within the EU practice: 
‘targeted discrimination’ in the CETA but not in the draft EU–Singapore Free Trade Agreement (FTA); 
a rule on contractual breaches in the FTA but not in the CETA; and ‘legitimate expectations’ expressed 
as part of the obligation in the FTA but only something to be taken into account in application in the 
CETA.’ 
129 Markus Krajewski, supra note 116, at 15. 
130 Alexander J. Belohlavek, supra note 62, 143. 
131 See for instance the hallmark case of the conflict of EU state aid law with Romania’s commitments 
to enforcement of arbitral awards issued pursuant to the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes Convention: ‘An arbitral award of December 2013 found that by revoking an 
investment incentive scheme in 2005, four years prior to its scheduled expiry in 2009, Romania had 
infringed a bilateral investment treaty between Romania and Sweden. The arbitral tribunal ordered 
Romania to compensate the claimants, two investors with Swedish citizenship, for not having benefitted 
in full from the scheme. The revoked investment incentive scheme selectively favoured certain investors 
and was therefore deemed to be incompatible with EU state aid rules. By paying the compensation 
awarded to the claimants, Romania actually grants them advantages equivalent to those provided for 
by the abolished aid scheme. The Commission has therefore concluded that this compensation 
amounts to incompatible state aid and has to be paid back by the beneficiaries.’ 
European Commission, Commission orders Romania to recover incompatible state aid granted in 
compensation for abolished investment aid scheme, Press Release IP/15/4725 (March 30, 2015). 
132 Stephen Woolcock, supra note 49, at 14. 
133 Commission Decision, supra note 79. 
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with respect to the CETA and TTIP in the changing political (post-Brexit) environment,134 it is 
questionable whether the competence shift may yield any results for the EU. This is so even 
if the CJEU interprets the competence as being exclusive, whether it is through the 
interpretation of the TFEU or the more general doctrine of implied powers. 
 
                                               
134 Nikos Lavranos, Why the EU’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Competence Should be Re-
nationalized, https://efilablog.org/2016/08/25/why-the-eus-foreign-direct-investment-fdi-competence-
should-be-re-nationalized (last visited Aug. 15, 2016). 
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THE ODD ONE OUT: THE LEGAL SCOPE OF EU DEVELOPMENT 
COOPERATION POLICY 
Tina Van den Sanden 1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Development cooperation is formulated by the EU as a multidimensional policy area, which is 
interlinked with several other areas of EU external action such as trade, security and 
environment. It is argued that only an integrated approach covering these areas can meet the 
needs of the developing countries. An important feature of this approach is therefore the need to 
create coherence between these different aspects. This requirement for coherence cannot only 
be found in the guiding policy documents but, more importantly, also in the EU Treaties and the 
legislation on EU development cooperation policy. All EU competences are, however, based on 
the principle of conferral which requires the EU to act only within the limits of the competences 
conferred upon it. From a horizontal perspective – referring to the relationship between different 
competence areas of the EU, such as development cooperation policy, trade or environment – 
this entails that each policy area is distinct from another policy area, each having its own 
procedural rules and actors involved. A specific measure may therefore cover various policy 
areas, while this is not necessarily reflected in the legal competences. This follows from the 
general principle that the EU only has attributed competences, as will be explained further below, 
and is a general concern in EU external action. This paper nevertheless argues that the issue is 
even more pressing in the area of development cooperation policy, as this area is by nature 
strongly interlinked with other areas of EU (external) action. Hence, an inherent tension can be 
identified between the EU’s aim to attain an integrated development cooperation policy on the 
one hand and the principle of conferral on the other hand.  
This paper aims to examine the relationship between conferral and coherence in the area of 
development cooperation policy and its effect on the possible attainment of the development 
cooperation policy objectives from the perspective of the horizontal division of competences: the 
delimitation between the several competence areas of the EU. Firstly, it will further elaborate on 
the relationship between coherence and conferral in the area of development cooperation policy, 
by: (i) exploring the origins of the multidimensional character of EU development cooperation 
policy, as well as the notion of ‘Policy Coherence for Development’ and its implications, (ii) the 
legal roots and consequences of the need for coherence in the area of development cooperation 
policy in particular and (iii) its relationship with the principle of conferral. Secondly, it aims to 
assess the legal scope of development cooperation policy by examining how the conferral-
coherence relationship affects this scope. This section will also address the delimitation question 
between development cooperation policy on the one hand and other EU external competences 
with which it is strongly intertwined on the other hand, namely environment and the Common 
Commercial Policy. In this light, this paper examines the application of theories on the choice of 
the correct legal basis in EU law, ‘the centre of gravity test’ in particular, to the development 
cooperation policy competence. It is argued that a balance needs to be struck between a too 
narrow scope and a too broad scope of the development cooperation competence. Because of 
                                               
11 The author is a PhD researcher and teaching assistant at the Institute for European Law, University of 
Leuven, and conducts a PhD research on the legal framework of EU development cooperation policy. 
Some ideas developed in this paper are part of the reasoning developed in the following article on the 
choice of legal basis in EU external action in general: G. De Baere, T. Van den Sanden, ‘Interinstitutional 
Gravity and Pirates of the Parliament on Stranger Tides: the Continued Constitutional Significance of the 
Choice of Legal Basis in Post-Lisbon External Action’ 12 European Constitutional Law Review (2016),p. 
85 – 113. 
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the development cooperation policy’s strong interrelationship with other areas of EU external 
action, such as trade, security or environmental protection, a contradictory risk exists in relation 
to its legal scope. A too narrow legal scope reduces development cooperation policy to a mere 
policy objective of EU external action, without it constituting a proper legal competence. 
Nevertheless, a too broad legal scope facilitates that the development cooperation policy 
competence oversteps its limits, invading other areas of EU action.  This balance always needs 
to be struck. Finding this balance proves nonetheless to be especially relevant in relation to 
development cooperation policy, as this area is particularly strong linked to other areas. Another 
central question to be answered is to what extent the legal scope of EU development cooperation 
policy corresponds to what constitutes EU development cooperation policy following the policy 
objectives the EU sets itself in this area 2 and the relationship with the principle of conferral. 
Recent case-law from the Court of Justice of the European Union, discussing the scope of EU 
development cooperation for the first time since the Treaty of Lisbon, will prove to be vital in 
answering these questions.  This case-law concerns the newest generation of development 
cooperation agreements, which aim to address a variety of issues vis-à-vis a particular partner 
country in a comprehensive manner. They are an example of the inherent tension present in the 
development cooperation competence. A comprehensive policy towards a particular country, laid 
down in a single instrument, is desirable in light of coherence and effectiveness concerns. 
However, the question is whether the legal competence delimitation rules, governing the legal 
scope of the development cooperation policy competence, allow this approach.  
 
2. Policy Coherence for Development and the Principle of Conferral 
 
2.1 The Origins of the Multidimensional Nature of EU Development Cooperation Policy and 
Policy Coherence for Development 
The 1957 Treaty of Rome established the basis for the relationship between the EU and the 
developing countries. This relationship found its origin in European colonialism at the time, and 
was therefore mainly focused on African countries in a so-called ‘natural partnership between 
Europe and Africa’. 3 During that time the development cooperation competence in part IV of the 
Treaty of Rome took the form of the ‘Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories’.4 The 
objective of the Association was ‘to promote the economic and social development of the 
associated countries’. The achievement of this aim contained a trade component and a 
development aid one, by opening the internal market to colonial imports, by granting tariff 
measures and by providing development aid through the European Development Fund (EDF). 5 
After some colonies gained independence, the relationship between the EU and the ACP states 
(African, Caribbean and Pacific) was based on several subsequently concluded agreements: the 
Yaoundé Conventions and the Lomé Conventions which introduced new areas of cooperation. 
In addition to the trade and aid model, Lomé III and IV in particular further widened the scope of 
EU development cooperation policy by including, for example, environmental protection, cultural 
cooperation but also respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law in the cooperation 
with the developing countries.  
                                               
2 See De Feyter who argues that discussions involving Member States and the EU institutions on whether 
development cooperation policy constitutes the correct legal basis for action are not driven primarily by 
conceptual concerns about what constitutes development cooperation but on the implications for the 
distribution of powers: K. De Feyter, World development law (Intersentia 2001), p. 110-111. 
3 E. Grilli, The European Community and the Developing Countries (CUP, 1994), p. 332. 
4 Article 131 of the Treaty of Rome: this association status was accorded to the OCT’s, meaning the non-
European countries and territories that had special relations with Belgium, France, Italy and the 
Netherlands.  
5 Green Paper on relations between the European Union and the ACP countries on the eve of the 21st 
century: Challenges and options for a new partnership, COM(96) 570 final, 20 November 1996, 9. 
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At the same time, from the mid-1970’s on, the EU embarked on cooperation with other non-ACP 
regions, while the idea of the creation of a development cooperation policy at the then Community 
level emerged. The aim was to create an EU development cooperation policy of its own alongside 
the Member States’ development policies, with the need to move beyond the tariff policy 
instruments which dominated the relations with the developing world until that time. 6 Even at this 
early stage, coherence and coordination were recognized as necessary conditions for the 
effectiveness of development cooperation policy. 7 The 1972 Memorandum introducing a 
Programme for Initial Actions 8 in particular aimed at focusing on specific coordination 
mechanisms. The initiatives to create and strengthen coherence and coordination have largely 
been understood as mechanisms governing the division of competences between the EU’s 
development cooperation policy and the Member States’ national development cooperation 
policies. The need for coherence within the then Community, between development cooperation 
and other areas, is nevertheless stressed as well. 9 
The 2000 Communication ‘The European Community’s Development Policy’ marks an important 
change of perspective as it aims to build an overall development cooperation strategy with clear 
objectives, which was lacking until that time.10 EU development cooperation policy is considered 
to be a multidimensional notion. Both the Communication as well as the 2000 Cotonou 
Agreement, the current framework for cooperation with the ACP states, recognize the 
encouragement of sustainable development that leads to poverty reduction and poverty 
eradication to be the general objective of EU development cooperation policy. Poverty reduction 
and eradication is in itself seen as a multifaceted concept. Because of its multidimensional 
character, a development policy that fosters poverty reduction requires an integrated approach, 
touching upon other areas of EU action such as trade, environment, security and political 
dialogue.11 The aim to create an overall approach to development cooperation at the EU level is 
largely a response to international initiatives within the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) and the World Bank, which establish a comprehensive view on 
development cooperation policy.12 The notion of ‘Policy Coherence for Development’ (PCD) 
indeed finds its origins in the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which has 
been concerned with Policy Coherence for Development since the mid-1990’s. 13 Several 
definitions of the notion have been formulated14 at the OECD level but an unofficial working 
definition, agreed during a 2003 workshop, describes PCD as ‘Working to ensure that the 
objectives and results of a government’s development policies are not undermined by other 
policies of that same government which impact on developing countries, and that these other 
policies support development objectives where feasible’’. 15  
The EU implemented this notion in its development cooperation policy with the Communication 
‘Policy Coherence for Development – Accelerating progress towards attaining the Millennium 
Development Goals’, which considers PCD to be an essential prerequisite to attain the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 16 The EU aims to promote and enhance PCD in the 
                                               
6 Commission Memorandum on a Community policy for development co-operation, 27 July 1971 SEC(71) 
2700, p. 4 (hereafter: ‘Commission Memorandum’). 
7 Commission Memorandum, p. 7, 22. 
8 Memorandum from the Commission on a Community policy on development cooperation. Programme for 
initial actions, 2 February 1972, SEC(72) 320, p. 20. 
9 Commission Memorandum, p. 15. 
10 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: The European 
Community’s Development Policy, COM(2000) 212 final, p. 4-5 (hereafter: ‘Communication ‘The European 
Community’s Development Policy’) 
11 Communication ‘The European Community’s Development Policy’, p. 16-21. 
12 Communication ‘The European Community’s Development Policy’, p. 5. 
13 OECD, Building policy coherence, tools and tensions, 1996. 
14 2001 DAC Guidelines on Poverty Reduction; The DAC Journal, Development Co-operation 2001 Report. 
15 OECD, Policy Coherence for Development: Promoting institutional good practice, p. 28. 
16 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European 
Economic and Social Committee, Policy Coherence for Development – Accelerating progress towards 
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context of attaining MDG 8 on the Global Partnership for Development 17 PCD is defined as ‘the 
challenge of how non-aid policies can assist developing countries in attaining the MDGs’ and 
‘non-development policies should respect development policy objectives and development 
cooperation should, where, possible, also contribute to reaching objectives of other EU policies’. 
18 The Communication identified the following priority areas: trade, environment, security, 
agriculture, fisheries, the social dimension of globalization, migration, research and innovation, 
information society, transport and energy. It is argued that in these areas synergy with 
development cooperation objectives is considered to be particularly relevant. For each of these 
priority areas specific ‘coherence for development commitments’ were established. The 
Commission monitors progress on PCD by the means of a biennial report which covers all EU 
activities concerning PCD, including activities of the Member States in this regard. The Council 
confirmed the Communication, added climate change as a twelfth priority area and endorses to 
examine the Council’s internal instruments, procedures and mechanisms to strengthen the 
effective integration of development concerns in the decision making procedures on non-
development policies and called on the Commission and the Member States to do the same. 19  
The European Consensus on Development, the guiding document on the EU’s vision on 
development cooperation policy,20 further underlines the multidimensional character of 
development cooperation and poverty eradication in the context of sustainable development, 
which is firmly recognized as the primary and overarching objective of EU development 
cooperation. A broader understanding of poverty eradication is reflected, possibly encompassing 
different areas of EU action.21 The areas of trade, environment, infrastructure, energy, rural 
development and agriculture, governance, democracy, human rights and institutional reform, 
conflict prevention and human development are marked as areas for action.  The commitment to 
PCD receives a central role in the European Consensus, defining PCD as “ensuring that the EU 
shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in all policies that it implements 
which are likely to affect developing countries, and that these policies support development 
objectives”.22  
In line with the definition formulated by the OECD, this notion therefore brings about a negative 
and a positive aspect. Other policies may not only have a negative impact on developing 
cooperation policy, but they must also support the attainment of the policy objectives of 
development cooperation. 23 In the framework of a more effective development cooperation 
policy, PCD is further embedded as a priority for future development cooperation frameworks in 
                                               
attaining the Millennium Development Goals, COM(2005) 134 final, p. 3 (hereafter: Communication ‘Policy 
Coherence for Development’). The EU upholds to be one of the most committed partners in helping achieve 
the MDGs: Conclusions of the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States 
meeting within the Council, Millennium Development Goals: EU contribution to the review of the MDG’s at 
the UN 2005 High Level Event, 24 May 2005. Following Article 208 (2) TFEU the European Union and the 
Member States shall comply with the commitments and take account of the objectives they have approved 
in the context of the United Nations and other competent international organizations.  
17 Council of the European Union, ‘Millennium Development Goals: EU contribution to the review of the 
MDGs at the UN 2005 High Level Event. Conclusions of the Council and the Representatives of the 
Governments of the Member States Meeting within the Council’ 24 May 2005, p.9. 
18 Communication Policy Coherence for Development, p. 3-4. 
19 Council of the European Union, ‘Millennium Development Goals: EU contribution to the review of the 
MDGs, p. 10. 
20 Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting 
within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy: 
‘The European Consensus’ (2006 OJ C46/1) (hereafter: European Consensus). On the occasion of the 
signing of the European Consensus on Development by High Representative Ashton, the European 
Consensus was confirmed as the guiding document for EU development cooperation: Ashton Schultz Joint 
Statement on the European Consensus on Development, 3 April 2014.  
21 European Consensus, points 11-12. 
22 European Consensus, point 35. 
23 G. Ashoff, ‘Enhancing Policy Coherence for Development: Justification, recognition and approaches to 
achievement’ German Development Institute, 2005, p. 11. 
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the Communications ‘An Agenda for Change’ 24 and ‘A Decent Life for All’. 25 In 2013 the 
Commission and the High Representative issued a Joint Communication which acknowledged 
the ‘comprehensive approach’ to be the guiding principle for EU external action across all areas, 
in particular in relation to conflict prevention and crisis resolution. The Joint Communication 
argues that increased consistency between the different areas of EU external action and between 
these and its other policies by drawing on the EU’s full range of instruments and resources will 
make the EU’s external action more consistent, effective and more strategic.26 
The guiding policy documents on development cooperation therefore formulate development 
cooperation policy as a multidimensional concept, which is interlinked with several other areas of 
Union action. This intertwinement between development cooperation and other areas of EU 
action inevitably brings about the necessity for coherence, reflected by the notion of ‘Policy 
Coherence for Development’. This notion occupies not only an important place in the legally non-
binding policy documents on EU development cooperation policy, coherence in general and its 
specific expression in the area of development cooperation is also confirmed in the EU Treaties.  
2.2 Policy Coherence for Development as a Treaty Obligation 
The principle of coherence is not only a political and economic imperative,27 it also has 
constitutional significance. Although some authors do not attach legal importance to the principle 
28 the majority of legal scholarship recognises coherence as a constitutional principle because of 
the multiple references to the principle in the EU Treaties as a legal obligation. 29  
Provisions on the need to ensure coherence and consistency in the EU’s external action 
framework in general can be found in different articles of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). 
Article 21 (1) TEU lays down the principles which are pursued by this area, while paragraph (2) 
of this article formulates the objectives which are common to EU external action. Following Article 
21 (3) TEU these principles and objectives shall be respected and pursued in the development 
and implementation of all different areas of the Union's external action, which brings about the 
need for coherence: the Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external 
action and between these and its other policies. The Council and the Commission, assisted by 
the High Representative, are the central actors in ensuring consistency by cooperating to that 
effect. The Treaty provisions on the institutions further clarify the role of the different institutions 
in ensuring coherence.30 The General Affairs Council shall ensure consistency in the work of the 
different Council configurations, while the Foreign Affairs Council shall ensure that the Union's 
external action is consistent. 31 The High Representative, who is also one of the Vice-Presidents 
of the Commission, plays a key role in ensuring the consistency of the Union's external action. 
He or she shall be responsible within the Commission for responsibilities incumbent on it in 
                                               
24 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Increasing the impact of EU Development 
Policy: an Agenda for Change, COM(2011) 637 final.  
25 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - A Decent Life for All: Ending poverty and giving 
the world a sustainable future, COM(2013) 92 final.  
26 Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. The EU’s comprehensive approach 
to external conflict and crises. JOIN(2013) 30 final.  
27 M. Carbone, ‘Mission impossible: the European Union and Policy Coherence for Development’, 30 
Journal of European Integration (2008), p. 326. 
28 P. Gauttier, ‘Horizontal coherence and the external competences of the European Union’, 10 European 
Law Journal (2004), p. 24. 
29 B. Van Vooren, EU external relations law and the European Neighbourhood Policy: A paradigm for 
coherence? (2011 Routledge), p. 59; E. Herlin-Karnell, T. Konstadinides, ‘The rise and expression of 
consistency in EU law: Legal and strategic implications for European integration’, 12 Cambridge Yearbook 
of European Legal Studies (2013), p. 141. 
30 Article 13(1) TEU.  
31 Article 16(6) TEU.  
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external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union's external action. 32 Article 26 
(2) TEU lays down the coherence requirement in the area of CFSP.  
A first observation is that the Treaty refers to the notion of ‘consistency’ rather than using the 
term ‘coherence’. In legal scholarship it is generally accepted that the terms consistency and 
coherence differ in degree: while consistency points to the absence of contradictions between 
different areas, coherence brings about a more positive aspect which requires synergy, added 
value and complementarity between different areas of EU action. 33 It can, moreover, be argued 
that the term consistency in the Treaties in fact relates more to the latter concept of coherence. 
The references to consistency in the Treaties should therefore not be understood as merely 
demanding the absence of contradictions, but require a higher degree of synergy between the 
different areas of Union action.34 In this sense, coherence entails different dimensions. Firstly, 
coherence applies (i) horizontally, requiring coherence between the TEU external competences, 
the TFEU external competences and the (external aspects of the) internal competences (ii) 
vertically, between Union and Member State action and (iii) institutionally between the EU 
institutions. 35 Secondly, coherence covers other principles of EU law: the negative dimension of 
coherence, avoiding contradictions, gaps and duplications, is attained by delimitation rules that 
apply horizontally, vertically and institutionally, as well as rules on conflict resolution. The positive 
dimension of coherence, ensuring synergy and complementarity, needs to be achieved by rules 
on cooperation and coordination - mainly through the principle of sincere cooperation - which 
apply vertically and institutionally, affecting horizontal coherence as well. 36 
The specific expression of coherence in the area of development cooperation policy in the form 
of PCD is embedded in the Treaties: the specific Treaty articles on development cooperation 
policy lay down a reinforced demand for coherence by requiring the integration of development 
concerns in other areas. The explicit development cooperation competence was introduced by 
the Maastricht Treaty, as one of the objectives of the Treaty was to ‘assert the European Union’s 
identity on the international scene’. 37 The Treaty articles on development cooperation policy 
covered the ‘triple C-principles’, 38 corresponding to the different dimensions of coherence 
identified above. These are: (i) coherence between policies that have an impact on developing 
countries and the attainment of the objectives of development cooperation, by requiring to take 
into account the development cooperation objectives when implementing these other policies; (ii) 
complementarity between EU and Member States’ policy in development cooperation; and  (iii) 
coordination of EU and Member State policy in the field of development cooperation. Moreover, 
Article C of the Maastricht Treaty introduced the general principle on coherence and consistency 
by stating that the single institutional framework had to ensure consistency of Union action, in 
                                               
32 Article 18 (4) TEU.  
33 C. Tietje, ‘The concept of coherence in the TEU and the CFSP’, 2 EF Rev. (1997), p. 212; R. Wessel, 
‘The inside looking out: Consistency and delimitation in EU external relations’ 37 CML Rev. (2000), p. 
1150; P. Koutrakos, Trade, foreign policy and defence in EU constitutional law, (Hart 2001), p. 39; L. den 
Hertog, S. Stross, ‘Coherence in EU external relations: Concepts and legal rooting of an ambiguous term’, 
18 European Foreign Affairs Review (2013), p. 376-377. 
34 P. Koutrakos, Trade, foreign policy and defence in EU constitutional law, (Hart 2001), p. 39; C. Hillion, 
‘Tous pour un, un pour tous! Coherence in the external relations of the European Union’ in M. Cremona 
(ed.), Developments in EU External Relations Law, (OUP 2008), p. 17. 
35 S. Nutall, ‘Coherence and consistency’ in C. Hill and M. Smith (eds.) International relations and the 
European Union (OUP 2005), p. 92; C. Hillion, ‘Tous pour un, un pour tous! Coherence in the external 
relations of the European Union’ in M. Cremona (ed.), Developments in EU External Relations Law, (OUP 
2008), p. 17. 
36 C. Hillion, ‘Tous pour un, un pour tous! Coherence in the external relations of the European Union’ in M. 
Cremona (ed.), Developments in EU External Relations Law, (OUP 2008), p. 18-35; M. Cremona, 
‘Coherence through law: What difference will the Treaty of Lisbon make?’, 3 Hamburg Review of Social 
Sciences (2008), p. 13-16; B. Van Vooren, footnote 29, p. 67-71. 
37 Article 2 EU Treaty.  
38 M. Holland, M. Doidge, Development policy of the European Union (Palgrave Macmillan 2012), p. 157; 
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particular of the Union’s external relations, security, economic, and development policies. This 
refers back to the interrelationship between the different areas, as equally expressed in the policy 
documents.  
These three principles can still be found in the current Treaty articles 208-211 TFEU on 
development cooperation policy with Article 208(1) TFEU holding that “The Union shall take 
account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are 
likely to affect developing countries”. This inclusion of PCD in the Treaty has received criticism 
as being too weak. There is no explicit reference to coherence, while PCD is formulated as to 
merely take account of the objectives of development cooperation. The focus is on the process 
rather than on the results, which makes development cooperation policy vulnerable to more 
powerful interests such as trade and agriculture. 39 At first sight, the formulation of PCD indeed 
relates more to an integration requirement, similar to the one on environmental protection in 
article 11 TFEU (see below). Before examining the application of this principle in the case-law of 
the Court and the relationship with environmental protection and the CCP, a light has to be shed 
on the other founding principle that comes into play when assessing the legal scope of 
development cooperation policy: the principle of conferral.  
2.3 The Principle of Conferral 
The principle of conferral refers to the particular conferment of powers to which the EU is subject. 
The principle governs the limits of Union competences and is currently formulated in Article 5 
TEU, which states that ‘the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred 
upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. Competences 
not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States’. The EU therefore 
only has those powers attributed to it by the Member States in the Treaties. The principle has 
been referred to as an ‘organising principle of the constitutional order’ of the EU, as it expresses 
the classic characteristic of the EU legal order, namely that it is not so-called ‘self-
authenticating’.40 This entails that competences cannot originate from within the order itself but 
always necessarily follow from conferment by the Member States through the Treaties. In Opinion 
2/94 the Court underlined that the principle not only applies to the internal EU order but also in 
the area of external action, which means that also in this area the Union has only those powers 
which have been conferred upon it.41 In the primary law of the EU, Article 7 TFEU further 
expresses the relationship between conferral and coherence by stating ‘The Union shall ensure 
consistency between its policies and activities, taking all of its objectives into account and in 
accordance with the principle of conferral of powers’. This relationship is further underlined in the 
institutional context, in particular in both paragraphs of Article 13 TEU. Paragraph 1 holds that 
the institutional framework aims to promote the Union’s values, advances its objectives, serves 
its interests, those of its citizens and those of the Member States, and ensures the consistency, 
effectiveness and continuity of its policies and actions, while Article 13(2) TEU underlines that 
each institution shall act within the limits of the powers conferred on it in the Treaties, and in 
conformity with the procedures, conditions and objectives set out in them.  
A very concrete consequence that the principle of conferral brings about is the requirement that 
each EU legal measure needs to be based on the correct legal basis, which has to be found in 
the Treaties. The Court determined that the choice of the appropriate legal basis for a Union 
measure has constitutional significance.42 As a consequence, the determination of the correct 
legal basis is subject to rigorous rules and criteria. The classic case-law of the Court on the choice 
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of legal basis clarifies that the choice of legal basis cannot depend on an institution’s conviction 
as to what the correct legal basis is, but that it has to be based on ‘objective factors amenable to 
judicial review, such as purpose and content’. 43 If the measure pursues a twofold purpose or a 
twofold component, and if one is identifiable as the main or predominant purpose or component, 
whereas the other is merely incidental, the measure has to be founded on a single legal basis, 
namely that required by the main or predominant purpose or component. 44 By way of exception, 
if it is established that the measure simultaneously pursues several objectives that are 
inseparably linked without one being secondary and indirect in relation to the other, the measure 
should be founded on the corresponding legal bases.45 It has been argued that the strict conferral 
of powers on the EU might affect the coherence and efficiency of the EU’s actions, especially on 
the international scene: it follows from the principle of conferral that when the EU aims to respond 
to an international (emergency) situation it first has to determine whether and how, on what legal 
basis and through which institution, it is competent to act, therefore giving ‘precedence to 
considerations of competence over considerations of effectiveness in its international action’.46 
This is a particular concern for the EU, as opposed to a national state (such as the US for 
example) that is able to swiftly respond to international crises in a comprehensive manner, even 
combining military and civilian elements. The question can thus be raised whether the principle 
of conferral might form an obstacle to coherent external action.  
It has been argued in legal scholarship that there is not necessarily a contradiction between 
conferral on the one hand and coherence on the other hand. On the contrary, conferral is 
necessarily linked to the attainment of the more negative dimension of consistency: delimitation 
rules are designed to ensure coherence in the sense that they aim to avoid duplications, gaps 
and contradictions.47 Hillion describes the relationship as ‘guaranteeing consistency stricto sensu 
between the external activities of the Union contributes to achieving the coherence of its external 
action’.48 Consistency in EU law is then achieved only when the EU is acting ‘intra vires’. In that 
sense, Article 7 TFEU aims to tackle ‘complexity and legitimacy gaps’.49 In its broader sense, 
coherence indeed covers the principle of conferral, expressed in its particular form covering 
delimitation rules. Conferral is therefore necessary to attain coherence. However, it is clear that 
tensions are possible with the other dimensions of coherence, namely the more positive 
dimension of cooperation and complementarity.50 On the one hand the EU needs to develop a 
comprehensive approach in order to tackle complex international issues, which equally entails 
that the EU’s different actors need to cooperate in order to attain coherence, while on the other 
hand the actors always need to take into account that they can only act within the powers 
conferred upon them, making it difficult for them to meet the requirements of coherence and 
delimitation at the same time.51 The refugee crisis is a topical example of this issue. The response 
to this crisis requires a complex comprehensive strategy, covering issues of both internal and 
external action, as well as political and legal considerations. However, the division of 
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competences between the different areas of action, as well as between the different actors, make 
it difficult for the EU to respond to the crisis in a swift and coherent manner.  
The next section will examine the legal scope of EU development cooperation policy, as well as 
the delimitation between development cooperation policy and other areas of Union action, namely 
the environmental competence and the common commercial policy competence.  
 
3. The Scope of Development Cooperation: Horizontal Division of 
Competences Between Development Cooperation and Environment 
and the Common Commercial Policy  
3.1 The Legal Scope of EU Development Cooperation Policy 
The Maastricht Treaty first introduced an explicit legal basis for development cooperation in the 
Treaties, including a set of specific objectives. Pursuant to Articles 130u-130y TEC (later 
renumbered as Articles 177-181 TEC), EU development cooperation had to foster (i) the 
sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries, and more particularly 
the most disadvantaged among them, (ii) the smooth and gradual integration of the developing 
countries into the world economy and (iii) the campaign against poverty in the developing 
countries. Moreover, Union development cooperation policy had to contribute to the general 
objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. The objectives in Articles 130u-130y and Articles 177-
181 TEC therefore express a concept of development cooperation which is not confined to its 
economic aspect: the trade aspect as well as the environmental, human rights and peace and 
security aspect are represented in the Treaty objectives,52 corresponding to the multidimensional 
concept of development cooperation policy put forward in the basic policy documents (see 
above). 
The wide ambit of these objectives was confirmed in pre-Lisbon case-law. Rendered a few years 
after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, the Portugal/Council case was the first case 
which gave the Court the opportunity to interpret the new Treaty title on development cooperation 
policy and to clarify its scope. In this case Portugal had brought an action for annulment of Council 
Decision 94/578/EC concerning the conclusion of the Cooperation Agreement between what was 
then the European Community and the Republic of India on Partnership and Development.53 The 
contested decision was based on the development cooperation and CCP legal bases, while 
Portugal argued that the inclusion in the agreement of specific clauses on human rights, energy, 
tourism, culture, intellectual property and drug abuse control could not be covered by the 
development cooperation legal basis and therefore required the addition of supplementary legal 
bases. The Court lays down a two-pronged test to determine the scope of development 
cooperation agreements. The Court decided that first, in order to qualify as a development 
cooperation agreement, the agreement must pursue development cooperation objectives, at the 
time referred to in Article 130u EC Treaty. These objectives are broad enough that measures 
required for their pursuit can concern a variety of specific matters. This is particularly the case 
when an agreement establishes the framework of cooperation. The Court underlines that 
requiring a development cooperation agreement to be based on additional legal bases each time 
it touches on a specific matter, would render the development cooperation competence and 
procedures ‘devoid of substance’. A development cooperation agreement can therefore contain 
clauses concerning various specific matters without altering the characterization of the 
agreement. Second, the characterization of the agreement has to be determined having regard 
to its essential object and not in terms of individual clauses, provided that these did not impose 
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such extensive obligations concerning the specific matters referred to that those obligations in 
fact constitute objectives distinct from those of development cooperation.54 The Court found on 
the merits that the cooperation provided for by the agreement takes particular account of the 
needs of a developing country and thus contributes to furthering the development cooperation 
objectives.55 The provisions of the agreement were moreover limited to determining the areas for 
cooperation and to specifying certain of its aspects and actions and were therefore limited to 
establishing the framework of cooperation. They did not prescribe in concrete terms the manner 
in which cooperation in each specific area envisaged was to be implemented. As a result, 
provisions on energy, intellectual property, tourism, culture and the control of drug abuse could 
form part of an integrated development cooperation agreement between the EU and India.  
The judgment in Portugal v Council clarifies several aspects of the scope of EU development 
cooperation policy and provides a clear test to determine whether an agreement remains within 
the limits of development cooperation policy. By underlining the specific competence the Union 
has to conclude development cooperation agreements with non-member countries, the Court 
recognizes the significance of the fact that development cooperation had been given its own legal 
basis in the Maastricht Treaty by recognizing that it was now entitled to its own specific scope.56 
In the Small Arms and Light Weapons case the Court further clarified that the objectives of Union 
development cooperation policy should not be limited to measures directly related to the 
campaign against poverty. Nevertheless, if a measure was to fall within development cooperation 
policy, it had to contribute to the pursuit of that policy’s economic and social development 
objectives.57 The aims of development cooperation therefore go beyond poverty reduction or 
poverty eradication, but also cover broader economic and social development objectives. 
In the post-Lisbon era, the primary legal framework on development cooperation policy is covered 
by Articles 208-211 TFEU. Article 208(1) TFEU identifies the reduction, and in the long term, the 
eradication of poverty as the primary objective of EU development cooperation. Apart from this 
primary objective, the provisions on EU development cooperation remain silent about the other 
development objectives, which were mentioned in the old Articles 130u-130y EC Treaty and 
Articles 177-181 EC Treaty. Article 208(1) TFEU nevertheless also underlines that development 
cooperation has to be conducted within the framework of the principles and objectives of the 
Union's external action. This inevitably leads to the question whether the new formulation of the 
Treaty articles on development cooperation with the clear identification of poverty reduction and 
eradication as the primary objective of development cooperation has limited the scope of the EU 
development cooperation competence to measures aimed at poverty reduction or eradication.58  
The Treaty Articles’ reformulation has led certain authors to conclude that the Treaty of Lisbon 
limited the scope of the EU development cooperation competence to measures aimed at poverty 
reduction or eradication, in line with the specific development cooperation objective in Article 208 
(1) TFEU. The most far-reaching view is the one formulated by Schütze, who believes that the 
new formulation of the provisions on development cooperation policy in the post-Lisbon Treaties 
with poverty eradication as the primary objective of development cooperation has considerably 
limited the scope of article 209 TFEU to the pursuance of this primary objective. According to this 
view, as the general external action objectives have become secondary or incidental to poverty 
reduction as development cooperation’s primary aim, the scope of Article 209 TFEU is confined 
to measures aimed at poverty reduction and eradication.59 He nevertheless nuances this 
approach by concluding that the post-Lisbon scope of EU development cooperation policy will 
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depend on how broadly the Court will interpret the primary aim of poverty reduction and 
eradication.  
The argument that the general external action objectives, including the ‘old’ development 
cooperation objectives, have become secondary or incidental to poverty reduction as 
development cooperation’s primary aim cannot be followed. Such explanation would neutralize 
the common EU external action objectives in Article 21 (2) TEU, inserted by the Treaty of Lisbon, 
as well as negate Article 208(1) TFEU which requires that development cooperation be 
conducted in the framework of the common EU external action objectives. A more balanced view 
formulated by Koutrakos provides a better approach, 60 which also appears to be in line with the 
approach adopted by the Court (see below). Koutrakos argues that the identification of poverty 
reduction and eradication as the primary objective of development cooperation means that 
development cooperation measures can only pursue the other objectives referred to in Article 
21(2) TEU when these are secondary or incidental.61 Article 208(1) TFEU serves a two-fold 
function in this respect. On the one hand it establishes a bridge with the general external action 
objectives formulated in Article 21 TEU, while on the other hand it avoids overuse of the 
development cooperation legal basis as it rules out reliance on the development cooperation 
legal basis for measures mainly concerned with objectives other than the fight against poverty.62 
Confining the scope of development cooperation policy to a limited interpretation of the objective 
‘poverty eradication’ would hollow out the competence. On the other hand, it is clear that a too 
broad definition of the development cooperation policy competence is not desirable either, as this 
potentially leads to the situation where this competence invades other areas of EU external 
action, precisely because of its multidimensional nature and broad objectives. It is particularly 
this balance that the Court of Justice is seeking in its post-Lisbon case-law on the scope of 
development cooperation policy. 
In the Philippines PCA case63 the Court had the opportunity to clarify the scope of development 
cooperation policy post-Lisbon. In this case the Commission asked the Court to annul the Council 
decision on the signing of the Framework Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between 
the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of the Philippines, 
of the other part. The Commission had based the proposal for this decision on the legal bases 
Article 207 TFEU, relating to the common commercial policy, and Article 209 TFEU, relating to 
development cooperation. 64 The Council, however, adopted the contested decision authorizing 
the signing of the Framework Agreement, adding legal bases on readmission of third-country 
nationals (Article 79(3) TFEU), transport (Articles 91 and 100 TFEU) and the environment (Article 
191(4) TFEU). The Commission asked the Court to annul the contested decision in so far as the 
Council added these additional legal bases. The Court recalled and confirmed its two-pronged 
test developed in Portugal v Council to determine the appropriate scope of development 
cooperation agreements and to assess whether the provisions relating to readmission, transport 
and the environment also fell within development cooperation policy or whether they required the 
addition of supplementary legal bases. First, the Court considered that the agreement as a whole 
contributes to furthering the pursuit of the objectives referred to in Articles 21(2)(d) TEU and 
208(1) TFEU on development cooperation. 65 With regard to the specific provisions, the Court 
concluded that the provisions relating to readmission, transport and the environment, consistently 
with the European Consensus, contribute to the pursuit of the objectives of development 
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cooperation. 66 Second, the provisions of the PCA relating to readmission of nationals of the 
contracting parties, to transport and to the environment did not contain obligations so extensive 
that they could be considered to constitute objectives distinct from those of development 
cooperation, according to the Court. 67 The Council should therefore not have added Articles 
79(3), 91, 100 and 191(4) TFEU as legal bases for the contested decision. 
The Court therefore confirms the potentially broad scope of development cooperation policy by 
confirming the policy’s broad objectives. It does so by referring to the provisions on coherence 
formulated in Article 208(1) TFEU and Article 21 (2) TEU in order to conclude that EU 
development cooperation is not limited to measures directly aimed at the eradication of poverty.68 
Consequently, the Court reinforces the notion of policy coherence for development in this 
judgment. At the same time, the Court therefore does not seem to follow the argument that the 
general EU external action objectives are only incidental to the objectives mentioned in the 
specific provisions on each policy area. As already indicated above, such reasoning would indeed 
make the common EU external action objectives in Article 21 (2) TEU, as well as the coherence 
requirement in Article 208(1) TFEU redundant. In reaching its conclusion, the Court moreover 
refers to the broad definition of ‘poverty eradication’ as formulated by the non-legally binding 
policy documents on Union development cooperation, as well as secondary EU law, using them 
as an interpretative tool to support the wide scope of EU development cooperation policy.69 The 
Court discusses the European Consensus on Development as well Regulation 1905/2006,70 and 
the Development Cooperation Instrument. The European Consensus, the leading policy 
document on the EU’s perspective on development cooperation policy, interprets poverty 
eradication as a multidimensional concept, which reflects a broader understanding of poverty 
eradication possibly encompassing different areas of EU action.71 In line therewith, the Court in 
Philippines PCA referred to the broad notion of development cooperation and poverty eradication 
as a multifaceted concept as upheld by the European Consensus and the DCI I.72 It therefore 
used a non-legally binding instrument, in combination with a pre-Lisbon legislative instrument, as 
the basis to determine the objective and appropriate legal basis of a measure.73 The fact that the 
Court also relied on policy documents in the Philippines Borders Management74 and the Small 
Arms and Light Weapons cases75 seems to indicate that the Court’s reliance on policy documents 
in order to support the choice and scope of a legal basis is particularly prominent in cases 
concerning development cooperation.76 The Court therefore establishes a link between the legal 
scope of EU development cooperation policy and what constitutes EU development cooperation 
policy following the policy’s documents. However, it needs to be underlined that the Court indeed 
uses the policy instruments to further support its choice of legal basis for the specific measure at 
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hand. Using soft law policy documents and secondary law  to define the limits of primary law 
competences arguably would be in conflict with the hierarchy of norms. 77    
A confirmation of the broad nature of the objectives of development cooperation policy, as well 
as a recognition of a corresponding broad policy notion, in the Portugal/Council and the 
Philippines PCA case leads to a comprehensive scope of development cooperation policy. The 
Court’s broad interpretation of poverty eradication as the principal objective of development 
cooperation policy leaves room for an extensive scope of measures, even if the development 
cooperation competence were to be limited solely to the explicitly formulated primary objective of 
‘poverty eradication’.  However, because of the nature of the development cooperation policy 
objectives, a too broad interpretation of development cooperation objectives is problematic as 
this might lead to the situation where this policy potentially covers nearly any area of Union 
external action, therefore raising problems under the principle of conferral.78  
Determining the limits of development cooperation policy solely on the basis of its objectives is 
therefore problematic. The test formulated in Portugal/Council and the Philippines PCA case 
contains, however, a two-fold criterion. Not only do the provisions have to contribute to the pursuit 
of development cooperation objectives, they may not contain obligations so extensive that they 
may be considered to constitute objectives distinct from those of development cooperation that 
are neither secondary nor indirect. In order to determine whether this second aspect of the test 
is fulfilled, the Court uses a content-based criterion, contrary to the objective-focused first aspect. 
In the Portugal v Council case the Court held that the provisions of the agreement which relate 
to specific matters establish the framework of cooperation between the contracting parties: they 
are limited to determining the areas for cooperation and to specifying certain of its aspects and 
various actions to which special importance is attached. By contrast, they did not prescribe in 
concrete terms the manner in which cooperation in each specific area envisaged was to be 
implemented.79 After Portugal v Council it was believed that this criterion developed by the Court 
essentially involved the question whether the EU had to commit to a concrete obligation in a 
specific field.80 It was argued that when an agreement gives rise to clear rights and obligations in 
specific fields81 or when the future negotiation of specific agreements is mandatory rather than 
permissive, 82 additional legal bases need to be added. The provisions on the environment and 
transport in the Philippines PCA case follow the same line of reasoning. However, with regard to 
the provisions on readmission of third country nationals the Court recognizes that Article 26(3) 
PCA contains specific obligations, as the parties shall admit back their nationals, they will provide 
their nationals with required documents and they agree to conclude as soon as possible an 
agreement for the admission/readmission of their nationals. 83 However, the Court still concluded 
that these provisions do not contain obligations so extensive that they may be considered to 
constitute objectives distinct from those of development cooperation. This is so because, 
according to the Court, although the provisions on readmission do contain specific obligations 
and that they are to some extent concrete as to how the readmission is to be carried out, they 
still need to be implemented further by concluding a readmission agreement. The provisions in 
the PCA itself do not cover in a detailed manner the cooperation in the area of readmission so 
as to enable its immediate and concrete implementation. A readmission agreement is needed to 
further implement the commitments and such agreement will, by contrast, cover such detailed 
provisions on the readmission of nationals. 
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The second aspect of the test therefore focuses rather on the content of the provisions than on 
the objectives. By focusing more on the content of the provisions, the Court addresses the 
problem that by applying solely an objectives-based approach to determine the scope of 
development cooperation policy, in combination with a wide interpretation of its objectives, this 
area potentially occupies nearly all other areas of EU external action.84 The addition of a content-
based criterion indeed seems to be the only viable solution to determine the scope of 
development cooperation policy.85 There has been a slight shift in the way the Court assesses 
the second aspect of the test. The criterion shifted from the question whether the cooperation 
was prescribed in concrete terms in Portugal/Council to the question whether the provisions still 
need implementation in Philippines PCA.  
The more flexible implementation criterion in Philippines PCA has been criticized in the light of 
the principle of conferral, as the Court accepts clear legal obligations in the area of readmission, 
which has its own treaty-making competence and a specific decision-making procedure which 
differs from development cooperation. 86 However, the initial test developed by the Court in 
Portugal v Council may also restrict the scope of development cooperation policy. In particular, 
the requirement that the provisions with respect to the other areas of cooperation must not entail 
extensive obligations and must be restricted to identifying the aims and subjects of the 
cooperation, could lead to the situation where development cooperation agreements can only 
provide the most general of frameworks for cooperation in specific areas. A too narrow scope of 
development cooperation in this sense may in turn hamper the effective development of this 
area,87 and appears to contradict the broad notion of development cooperation policy espoused 
by the EU. The Court itself has expressed this concern both in Portugal v Council as in Philippines 
PCA by underlining that it should be ensured that the development cooperation competence is 
not rendered ‘devoid of substance’,88 showing the concern that is shared by the author that 
development cooperation policy remains a distinct competence of EU external action and not 
merely a policy objective. Therefore, the slight shift in the test in Philippines PCA is necessary to 
retain the space that the development cooperation competence occupies in the general system 
of EU external relations law and it ensures that this competence is not limited to the most general 
of cooperation forms. The latter entails the risk that the development cooperation objectives are 
reduced to an overall principle or value of EU external action, rather than respecting the fact that 
development cooperation policy is a competence of EU external action on its own. Moreover, 
development cooperation may not be reduced to the mere grant of financial assistance to 
developing countries.89 The shift in the test in Philippines PCA arguably even creates the 
opportunity to take more integrated measures, enabling a more comprehensive approach to 
development cooperation policy. This is in line with the policy objectives the EU sets itself, as 
well as with the arguments in development studies that only a comprehensive approach will help 
meet the needs of developing countries. 90 While the test makes more integrated measures 
possible, it is clear that a detailed agreement in a specific field on the other hand, such as the 
                                               
84 See also: A. Ott, ‘The legal bases for international agreements post-Lisbon; Of pirates and The 
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readmission agreement in Philippines PCA, will have to be adopted under another legal basis.91 
Concerns in light of the principle of conferral therefore need to be rebutted.  
Because of the nature of the development cooperation competence and its objectives, it is 
necessary to find an appropriate balance between conferral and coherence. The test used by the 
Court seems to strike a good balance. The first objectives-based criterion of the test confirms the 
broad notion of EU development cooperation policy and its objectives. By formulating the second 
criterion of the test as a content-based criterion, on the other hand, the Court limits the potentially 
too encompassing scope of development cooperation policy, causing concerns under both the 
principle of conferral and the institutional balance. The Court therefore balances the aim and 
content aspect of the choice of legal basis theory in relation to development cooperation policy, 
which leads in this case to a balanced scope of development cooperation policy.   
It becomes clear that determining the scope of EU development cooperation policy is a 
precarious balancing act. Because of the nature of the competence and the formulation of the 
policy concept behind the competence, development cooperation policy has the risk of either 
being formulated too narrowly, with the risk of being confined to a mere principle of EU external 
action, or too broadly, possibly invading nearly any other area of EU external action. The latter 
might be the effect of applying the so-called ‘centre of gravity test’, a test commonly used by the 
Court to determine the choice of legal basis, in a too narrow sense to development cooperation 
policy (see below). With its potentially broad scope on the one hand, but its narrow one on the 
other hand, we might refer to the ‘development cooperation paradox’. Because of this paradox it 
is a challenge for development cooperation policy to find its place in the general framework of 
EU external action. This will be further underlined in the next section, when discussing the 
delimitation between development cooperation policy and other areas of EU external action, 
environment and the CCP in particular. Both competences have a different demarcation towards 
the development cooperation competence: the relationship between development cooperation 
policy and environment is characterized by the dominance of development cooperation over the 
environmental competence, while the relationship between development cooperation policy and 
the CCP can rather be described by referring to the dominant role of the CCP. 
3.1 The Delimitation with Environment and the Common Commercial Policy 
The consequence of the abovementioned case-law formulated in Portugal/Council and 
Philippines PCA is that provisions on other areas of Union action such as on the environment, 
transport, migration, energy, intellectual property, tourism, culture and the control of drug abuse 
and presumably also on other areas can, within certain limits, fall under the scope of development 
cooperation policy. Remarkably, as will be further discussed in detail, this does not seem to be 
the case for the CCP.  
Development cooperation and environmental protection are strongly intertwined issues as 
developing countries are disproportionately impacted by climate change and natural disasters, 
while lacking the resources to deal with the negative effects. They are also often particularly 
dependent on natural resources, aggravating their vulnerability to degradation and depletion of 
the environment. On the other hand, development and growth contribute to prosperity but they 
also cause environmental challenges.92 The concept of ‘sustainable development’ was launched 
by the World Commission on Environment and Development in the report Our Common Future, 
led by the former Prime minister of Norway, Gro Harlem Brundtland, and therefore also known 
as the Brundtland Commission.93 This report had in turn significant influence on the 1992 Rio 
Declaration, which embedded development and environment further in the UN agenda.94 The link 
                                               
91 Opinion of AG Mengozzi, Case C-377/12, point 77. 
92 Communication ‘A decent life for all’, p. 4. 
93 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, www.un-documents.net, 
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94 UN General Assembly, Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio 
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between the environment and development was further confirmed in the MDGs, the seventh of 
which aims to ensure environmental sustainability. At the EU level the link is emphasized in all 
documents guiding the EU’s vision on development. The European Consensus in particular 
builds on the MDGs and identifies the eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable 
development as the primary and overarching objective of EU development cooperation. 
Sustainable development with a view of eradicating poverty lies moreover at the heart of the 
discussions on the successor of the Millennium Development Goals, the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs).95 Poverty eradication is seen as an essential requirement for and 
one of the overarching objectives of sustainable development.96 The EU not only claims to comply 
with the commitments and take account of the objectives approved in the context of the United 
Nations and other competent international organisations in line with Article 208(2) TFEU, but also 
argues to be one of the most committed partners in the formation of the post-2015 SDGs. 97 
In the Treaties development cooperation and environment are linked through several articles. 
Firstly, since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the link between EU external 
environmental policy and EU development cooperation policy is made explicit in Article 21(2) 
TEU. This article provides for the Union to define and pursue common policies and actions, and 
to work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to ‘foster 
the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with 
the primary aim of eradicating poverty’ and to ‘help develop international measures to preserve 
and improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural 
resources, in order to ensure sustainable development’. 98 Secondly, Article 208(1) TFEU 
reaffirms that Union policy in the field of development cooperation is to be conducted ‘within the 
framework of the principles and objectives of the Union's external action’ 99 and to ‘comply with 
the commitments and take account of the objectives they have approved in the context of the 
United Nations and other competent international organisations’. 100 These principles, objectives, 
and commitments all contain important environmental obligations.  
Following the case-law in Portugal v. Council and Philippines PCA, provisions on environmental 
protection can, to a certain extent, be included in a development cooperation policy agreement, 
without the need to add the legal basis on environment. However, as soon as they reach the 
threshold of the second aspect of the test, an additional legal basis is needed. In the Portugal v. 
Council and Philippines PCA cases the Court applied a so-called ‘centre of gravity’ test in order 
to determine whether the use of the additional legal base was justified. The test formulated by 
the Court is the expression of the centre of gravity test. The determination of the essential object 
of the development cooperation measure refers to the identification of the main aim in the general 
theory, while the requirement that the specific provisions may not contain obligations so extensive 
that they in fact constitute distinct objectives refers to their incidental or secondary nature, which 
makes the environmental legal basis subordinate to the main development cooperation 
competence. The Court used more specifically a particular form of the centre of gravity test, ‘the 
absorption doctrine’ as identified by Maresceau: the main objective ‘absorbs’ the other provisions 
relating to distinct objectives.101 
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A crucial provision to understand the relationship between environment and development 
cooperation is Article 11 TFEU, which states that “Environmental protection requirements must 
be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Union's policies and activities, in 
particular with a view to promoting sustainable development”. Article 11 TFEU therefore requires 
environmental protection measures to be integrated or ‘mainstreamed’ into the definition and 
implementation of the Union’s policies, in particular with a view to promoting sustainable 
development. Development cooperation and environmental protection therefore contain both an 
integration requirement. Environmental as well as development concerns have to be taken into 
account when conducting other policies. However, when comparing both integration 
requirements it becomes apparent that the wording of the requirement in the field of development 
cooperation policy is weaker (‘shall’, ‘take account’, ‘objectives’, ‘likely to affect developing 
countries’) than the one with regard to environmental protection (‘must’, ‘requirements’).102 It 
therefore seems that because of the strongly formulated environmental integration requirement, 
the Court accepts more easily the inclusion of environmental aspects in measures, without 
necessitating the addition of the environmental legal basis. Merely taking account of 
environmental concerns does not suffice to bring a measure under the environmental 
competence, as this is exactly what the environmental integration requirement demands. The 
Court’s case-law therefore seems to strike a fair balance between the development cooperation 
and the environmental competence: environmental provisions can form part of an international 
agreement under the development cooperation legal basis, as long as the obligations are not so 
extensive as to constitute distinct objectives. It corresponds, moreover, with the EU’s policy vision 
on the integration of environmental and development concerns. 
The case is different with regard to trade provisions in development cooperation agreements. 
While the development cooperation legal basis can absorb provisions on other substantive areas 
of cooperation, provisions on trade appear to require their own CCP legal basis.103 In 
Portugal/Council, Portugal had argued that then Article 113 TEC was ‘redundant as a legal basis 
for the conclusion of the Agreement’, as then Article 130y constituted ‘a sufficient basis for the 
provisions in the Agreement concerning commercial policy, since the principal objective of the 
Agreement is development cooperation and the Community possesses specific powers of action 
in the sphere of the common commercial policy’. The Court did not go into the point, arguing that 
the deletion of Article 113 EC would not influence the decision-making procedure and hence not 
the content of the act.104 In Philippines PCA the scope of the development cooperation legal basis 
to cover other provisions was disputed, while the presence of the CCP legal basis was not the 
subject of the dispute. When examining Title III ‘Trade and Investment’ of the Framework 
Agreement with the Philippines, however, the provisions in this title do not seem to go beyond 
the test formulated to assess whether additional legal bases on environment, transport and 
readmission are necessary. The provisions on trade and investment do not seem to go beyond 
declarations on the aims and subjects of the cooperation and therefore do not contain obligations 
so extensive that they form distinct objectives. Another explanation must therefore be sought. 
The relationship between the CCP and development cooperation can be explained by both the 
specific nature of the CCP competence and by historical reasons.   
Like development cooperation, the common commercial policy is characterized by a very broad 
scope. An EU act falls within the CCP if it relates specifically to international trade in that it is 
essentially intended to promote, facilitate or govern trade and has direct and immediate effects 
on trade.105  In relation to the, likewise broad, development cooperation competence this leads 
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to the situation where the CCP is able to invade development cooperation, whereas development 
cooperation in turn is capable to do so in relation to other areas of cooperation, which is 
demonstrated by the Philippines PCA and the Portugal/Council cases. In Opinion 1/78 the Court 
made it clear that a broad interpretation of the CCP should be maintained, as a restrictive 
interpretation would risk disturbing intra-Community trade.106 Therefore, commodity agreements 
which regulate trade agreements drafted in the framework of UNCTAD and which also have a 
clear development cooperation aim, are covered by the CCP competence. Trade measures are 
said to be the clearest example of instruments which are used to attain aims which are incidental 
to the policies corresponding to their legal basis. Trade measures have been used to pursue 
development cooperation objectives (e.g. in the context of the Generalised System of 
Preferences) but also to attain environmental aims and foreign policy objectives.107 As Eeckhout 
describes it: ‘trade measures are trade measures, whatever the objectives pursued, even if their 
objective is wholly unrelated to commercial or economic considerations’.108 It therefore seems 
that as soon as a development cooperation agreement contains provisions related to the CCP 
objectives - which it mostly does - the CCP legal basis needs to be added.109   
From a historical perspective, the CCP predates development cooperation as an express EU 
competence and the relationship between the EU and the developing countries has always been 
based on a trade and aid rationale. The EU agreements with developing countries can be 
categorized in different ‘generations of agreements’. The ‘first-generation’ agreements contained 
only provisions on trade, whereas the ‘second-generation’ agreements extended to limited areas 
of economic cooperation as well, while the ‘third-generation’ agreements cover a variety of areas 
of cooperation, aimed at a comprehensive framework of cooperation.110 Before Maastricht these 
‘third-generation’ agreements were based on the CCP and the flexibility clause, as an express 
development cooperation legal basis in the Treaties was lacking.111 After the Maastricht Treaty 
they were based on the CCP and development cooperation legal bases.112 The CCP legal basis 
was therefore consistently present in the agreements that the EU concluded with developing 
countries, which could provide another explanation why the provisions in international 
agreements on CCP bring about the addition of their own legal basis. Maresceau refers in this 
regard to the ‘classical pattern’ following which development cooperation policy agreements are 
traditionally based on both the development cooperation policy and CCP legal bases.113  
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4. Conclusion 
The EU formulates its development cooperation policy as a multidimensional notion, which is 
interlinked with several other areas of EU (external) action. This inherent intertwinement brings 
about a reinforced demand for coherence in the area of development cooperation policy referred 
to as ‘policy coherence for development’. This is more than a policy concept, as this demand for 
increased coherence is enshrined in the Treaty as well. Since the Treaty of Lisbon this coherence 
requirement is more firmly embedded in the constitutional structure of the EU, with the common 
external action objectives formulated in Article 21 (2) TEU and the specific demand for coherence 
in development cooperation policy in Article 208 TFEU. However, the scope of development 
cooperation policy is also governed by the principle of conferral, requiring the EU to act only 
within the limits of the competences conferred upon it. This entails that the legal development 
cooperation policy competence cannot simply invade all other areas of EU external action. 
Otherwise every measure taken towards a developing country would automatically fall under the 
scope of the development cooperation policy competence. This paper examined how the 
coherence-conferral relationship defines the scope of the development cooperation competence 
and how a balance is struck between both principles in defining the scope of EU development 
cooperation policy.  
First, the Court does take account of the policy concept of what constitutes EU development 
cooperation policy, referring to policy documents in the area in order to support its definition of 
the legal scope of development cooperation policy. As the Court has applied this technique in 
several cases in this area, it seems that it considers this approach particularly relevant in 
development cooperation policy. Second, the Court does strike a balance between coherence 
demands and conferral restrictions when defining the legal scope of development cooperation 
policy, avoiding that the competence would be defined too narrowly or too broadly. The two-
pronged test to determine the scope of development cooperation policy, its agreements in 
particular, developed in the case-law of the Court of Justice strikes a balance between coherence 
and conferral. The first objectives-based criterion of the test confirms the broad notion of EU 
development cooperation policy and its objectives, ensuring the need for coherence, as the 
development cooperation policy competence can cover other issues as well. By formulating the 
second criterion of the test as a content-based criterion, on the other hand, the Court limits the 
potentially too broad scope of development cooperation policy, avoiding that the development 
cooperation policy competence oversteps its limits and potentially invade nearly every other area 
of EU external action. The latter ensures respect for both the principle of conferral and the 
institutional balance.  
The difficulty to ensure a balanced scope of the development cooperation competence is further 
illustrated by assessing its delimitation with two related areas of Union action: environment and 
the common commercial policy. Both these areas, however, relate differently to the development 
cooperation competence. The relationship between development cooperation policy and 
environment is characterized by the dominance of development cooperation over the 
environmental competence, as the development cooperation competence can, within certain 
limits, cover environmental protection provisions, which is the case in the agreement between 
the EU and the Philippines. With its balanced test, however, the Court ensures that ‘pure’ 
environmental measures taken vis-à-vis a particular developing country can still be based on the 
environmental protection competence, while avoiding that every measure taken towards a 
developing country would fall under the development cooperation competence. As pointed out 
while discussing the case-law on the scope of the development cooperation policy competence, 
the same is true for other areas of EU action as well, such as the protection of human rights, 
provisions on transport, energy, tourism, culture, intellectual property and even readmission of 
third country nationals. The limit of the invasion by development cooperation policy of other areas 
of EU external action can apparently be found with the CCP: while the development cooperation 
legal basis can absorb provisions in international agreements on other substantive areas of 
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cooperation, provisions on trade always seem to require their own CCP legal basis. Different 
explanations are possible but these can rather be found in the nature of the CCP itself, which is 
the dominant competence in relation to the development cooperation competence, or in historical 
and pragmatic reasons, rather than through applying the test on the choice of the development 
cooperation legal basis formulated by the Court. The scope of the EU external action 
competences is still the subject of inter-institutional disputes. The future case-law of the Court 
will therefore be of further use to determine the exact boundaries between the different areas of 
action, ensuring the fundamental principle of conferral, while the increased demands for coherent 
external action as inserted by the Treaty of Lisbon need to be respected as well. 
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APPENDIX: COLLOQUIUM PROGRAMME 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interdisciplinary Doctoral Colloquium: 
The European Union as a Global Actor 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Concept 
8 May 2015, Leuven 
Concept and Programme 
 
Establishing the EU as a more visible, more effective and stronger global actor was one the key 
objectives of the Treaty of Lisbon, which has now been in force for more than five years. This 
has led the EU to take initiatives in many different areas of international law and relations. 
The area of EU external action has therefore increasingly been the subject of research in law 
and political science. This interdisciplinary doctoral colloquium aims to encompass different 
topics in this wide area of research. Doctoral researchers in law and political science will 
present their research in a conference style format. Guests from the European institutions and 
from academia have been invited to be discussants on the panels. The event is aimed to 
provide researchers with the opportunity to present their work among colleagues from 
different disciplines who are working on issues related to the EU’s role as a global actor. 
 
106 
 
2. Programme 
 
9.00-9.15: 
 
9.15-10.45: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10.45-11.00: 
Welcome by Prof. Dr. Jan Wouters, KU Leuven 
 
Keynotes and discussion 
 The Federalisation of EU External Competences after Lisbon 
Prof. Dr. Piet Eeckhout, University College London 
 The EU in International Trade: A Tale of Multilateralism, Bilateralism and Unilateralism 
Prof. Dr. Sieglinde Gstöhl, College of Europe 
 
Coffee and tea break 
PARALLEL PANEL SESSIONS (GGS, Meeting Room Dorlodot / Seminar Room Premonstreit) 
11.00-12.15: Panel 1: The EU as a Trade Actor (Premonstreit) 
Chair: Prof. Dr. Bart Kerremans, KU Leuven 
Discussants: James Flett, European Commission, Legal Service and 
Prof. Dr. Sieglinde Gstöhl, College of Europe 
 The Transparency-Secrecy Trade-off in EU Trade Policy: 
Explaining Informalisation and Transparency in EU Decision- 
making on International Negotiations 
Evelyn Coremans, KU Leuven (doctoral seminar) 
 A Comparison of Trade Policy-Making in Federations 
Christian Freudlsperger, Berlin Graduate School for 
Transnational Studies 
Panel 2: The EU as a Sustainable Actor (Dorlodot) 
Chair: Prof. Dr. Geert Van Calster, KU Leuven 
Discussants: Prof. Dr. Morten Broberg, University of Copenhagen 
and Dr. Simon Schunz, College of Europe 
 The EU & Fair Trade: Mapping the field 
Deborah Martens, Ghent University 
 The EU’s External Forest Policy in the International Forest 
Regime Complex 
Pauline Pirlot, Université catholique de Louvain 
 The EU as a Global Environmental Actor: Extraterritoriality and 
Climate Change 
Natalie Dobson, Utrecht University 
    12.15-13.15:     Lunch 
 
PLENARY SESSION  (Faculty of Law, DV3.01.13, Tiensestraat 41) 
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13.15-14.45: Panel 3: The EU as a Development and Security Actor (Premonstreit) 
Chair: Prof. Dr. Peter Van Elsuwege, Ghent University 
Discussants: Prof. Dr. Cedric Ryngaert, Utrecht University, Yole 
Tanghe, KU Leuven and Matthieu Burnay, KU Leuven 
 The Odd One Out: The Legal Scope of EU Development 
Cooperation Policy 
Tina Van den Sanden, KU Leuven (doctoral seminar) 
 The EU and the Security-Development Nexus: Bridging the 
Legal Divide 
Hans Merket, Ghent University 
Panel 4: The EU as an Investment Actor (Dorlodot) 
Chair: Prof. Dr. Hans van Houtte, KU Leuven 
Discussants: Prof. Dr. Geert Van Calster, KU Leuven, Prof. Dr. Dirk 
De Bièvre, University of Antwerp, and Nicolas Hachez, KU Leuven 
 Understanding the history of investment protection to better 
understand the challenges of the EU’s investment competence 
Govert Coppens, KU Leuven (doctoral seminar) 
 The EU as an Actor in Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
Hannes Lenk, University of Gothenburg 
14.45-16.00: Panel 5: The Law of the EU as an International Actor (Premonstreit) 
Chair: Prof. Dr. Geert De Baere, KU Leuven 
Discussants: James Flett, European Commission, Legal Service and 
Prof. Dr. Peter Van Elsuwege, Ghent University 
 Constructing a Dam to Resist a River Bursting its Banks: 
Looking for the Borders of the EU’s External Competence in the 
Field of IP 
Yole Tanghe, KU Leuven 
 European Union Competence on Foreign Investment: 
Limitations of the Past and Future 
Dominik Moskvan, University of Antwerp 
 The EU and Member States International Agreements 
Stefano Saluzzo, University of Palermo 
Panel 6: The EU as a Social Actor (Dorlodot) 
Chair: Prof. Dr. Jan Orbie, Ghent University 
Discussants: Prof. Dr. Simon Schunz, College of Europe, and Prof. Dr. 
Dirk De Bièvre, University of Antwerp 
 The Framing of ‘Social Trade’: Labour Issues under the EU- 
Colombia/Peru Free Trade Agreement 
Lore Van den Putte, Ghent University 
 The External Conditions of the EU as a Global Actor: 
Interactions with China on Social Issues 
Hang Yuan, Ghent University 
 The EU as a Coordinator in Global Health: Towards 
Convergence or Complementarity? 
Lies Steurs, Ghent University 
16.00-16.15: Coffee and Tea Break 
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Don’t forget to 
follow @LeuvenGGS 
for updates! 
Conference hashtag: 
#LeuvenIDC 
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18:30 
 
16.15-17.30: 
Panel 7: The EU as a Human Rights Actor (Premonstreit) 
Chair: Prof. Dr. Jan Wouters, KU Leuven 
Discussants: Prof. Dr. Piet Eeckhout, University College London, and 
Prof. Dr. Morten Broberg, University of Copenhagen and Dr. Frederik 
Naert, Legal Service of the Council 
 Assessing the EU’s Role at the UN Human Rights Council 
Anna-Luise Chané and Arjun Sharma, KU Leuven 
 “Europeanization” of international human rights law: 
sanctions as a case study 
Isabella Querci, Università degli Studi di Genova 
 Spring as a New Beginning? An Investigation into the EU’s 
Sanctions Practice Following the Arab Spring 
Andreas Boogaerts, KU Leuven 
Panel 8: The EU as a Normative Power (Dorlodot) 
Chair: Prof. Dr. Stephan Keukeleire, KU Leuven 
Discussants: Dr. Ricardo Passos, Director of the Legal Service of the 
European Parliament and Dr. Kolja Raube, KU Leuven 
 Beyond Parliamentarisation: Towards a Conceptual 
Framework for the Study of the European Parliament’s 
Diplomacy 
Daan Fonck, KU Leuven (doctoral seminar) 
 The Extraterritorial Effects of EU Data Protection Law in the 
Data Protection Directive and the Proposed General Data 
Protection Regulation 
Mistale Taylor, Utrecht University 
CLOSING PLENARY (Premonstreit) 
 
Discussion of Findings from the Panels by Jed Odermatt and Dr. Kolja Raube, KU 
Leuven Concluding Remarks by Prof. Dr. Stephan Keukeleire, KU Leuven 
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 The Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies is an interdisciplinary research centre of 
the Humanities and Social Sciences recognized as a Centre of Excellence at the KU Leuven. It 
hosts researchers from law, economics, political science, history, philosophy and area studies. 
The Centre initiates and conducts interdisciplinary research on topics related to globalization, 
governance processes and multilateralism, with a particular focus on the following areas: (i) the 
European Union and global governance; (ii) human rights, democracy and rule of law; (iii) trade 
and sustainable development; (iv) peace and security; (v) global commons and outer space; (vi) 
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